Hmm... I see a rant against the state of software (bad software, AI diarrhea, ...) and TooBigTech having control over everything. I can agree with that, but it has nothing to do with the "passwords vs passkeys" question.
The rant against passkeys? I don't get it. Just like one can use a password manager controlled by TooBigTech or KeePass, one can use a passkey controlled by TooBigTech or a Yubikey. I find it great to authenticate directly with my Yubikey (over FIDO2) instead of using my Yubikey to decrypt a password and copying it in a form.
And then there is the part that is completely wrong about security. They say that they "can't trust their phone" so they don't want to keep the passkeys there. But that is not correct: if the passkeys are encrypted and the key is stored in a TPM, then that's effectively similar to having a security key (you have to trust the TPM, just as you have to trust the security key of course).
And then there is the nonsense:
> I can set up KeePass Portable on a USB key, run it in Linux via WINE, place it inside an encrypted VeraCrypt container, copy to any which file sharing service, if I want.
If the device where you enter the password is compromised, then the password will be compromised as soon as you enter it on that device. No matter how much you show off with your funny setup with WINE and VeraCrypt. A password manager doesn't protect against that, so passwords can be exfiltrated as they are used. Whereas a FIDO2 authentication requires the passkey every time. E.g. I need to physically touch my Yubikey for it to sign the challenge. It could be MitM, but it is visible ("I touched my Yubikey and it didn't work, what happened?").
Authenticating over FIDO2 with a security key is strictly superior to entering a password in a field, period.
palata•1y ago
The rant against passkeys? I don't get it. Just like one can use a password manager controlled by TooBigTech or KeePass, one can use a passkey controlled by TooBigTech or a Yubikey. I find it great to authenticate directly with my Yubikey (over FIDO2) instead of using my Yubikey to decrypt a password and copying it in a form.
And then there is the part that is completely wrong about security. They say that they "can't trust their phone" so they don't want to keep the passkeys there. But that is not correct: if the passkeys are encrypted and the key is stored in a TPM, then that's effectively similar to having a security key (you have to trust the TPM, just as you have to trust the security key of course).
And then there is the nonsense:
> I can set up KeePass Portable on a USB key, run it in Linux via WINE, place it inside an encrypted VeraCrypt container, copy to any which file sharing service, if I want.
If the device where you enter the password is compromised, then the password will be compromised as soon as you enter it on that device. No matter how much you show off with your funny setup with WINE and VeraCrypt. A password manager doesn't protect against that, so passwords can be exfiltrated as they are used. Whereas a FIDO2 authentication requires the passkey every time. E.g. I need to physically touch my Yubikey for it to sign the challenge. It could be MitM, but it is visible ("I touched my Yubikey and it didn't work, what happened?").
Authenticating over FIDO2 with a security key is strictly superior to entering a password in a field, period.