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Lean Explained with TypeScript

https://gruhn.me/blog/2026-08-29/
1•fagnerbrack•1m ago•0 comments

Ahsan Hadi: PostgreSQL 19 Is Here: Worth the Wait

https://www.pgedge.com/blog/postgresql-19-is-here-worth-the-wait
1•omegaSigma95•5m ago•0 comments

Muru – AI-assisted Rust server for Python apps by mod_WSGI's creator

https://simonwillison.net/2026/Nov/21/muru/
1•joshcsimmons•5m ago•0 comments

Judge Won't Let 'DMCA-Ignored' Host Use Cox Ruling to Escape $42M Judgment

https://torrentfreak.com/judge-wont-let-dmca-ignored-host-use-cox-ruling-to-escape-42m-judgment/
1•gslin•7m ago•0 comments

Show HN: I asked a simple RegEx question and DeepSeek had a breakdown

https://chat.deepseek.com/a/chat/s/d6d82831-9b07-44fb-ae5b-6d3163e25092
1•abbassix•17m ago•0 comments

Double Agent finds chess position where all 63 moves check, beating 1968 record

https://www.doubleai.com/research/maxwell-chess-record-63-checks
1•NeuralOracle•22m ago•0 comments

After 49 Years, Voyager 1 Is One Light-Day from Earth

https://www.nytimes.com/2026/11/18/science/nasa-voyager-1-earth-light-day.html
1•tosh•22m ago•1 comments

AI Slop as a Service: Why Microsoft Won But the Soviets Lost

https://www.flyingpenguin.com/ai-slop-as-a-service-why-microsoft-won-but-the-soviets-lost/
1•Brajeshwar•23m ago•0 comments

Berlin Simulator Game

https://kairollmann.de/berlin-survivor/
1•kadrian12•24m ago•0 comments

GloriART Internet Radio now with cross-device Cloud Sync

https://gloriart.net/radio/
1•EmiIIius•27m ago•0 comments

DNS Stamps Specification

https://dnscrypt.info/stamps-specifications/
1•NeuralOracle•28m ago•0 comments

Nigel Richards: The Scrabble Champ Making History (2022)

https://wordfinder.yourdictionary.com/blog/meet-nigel-richards-the-scrabble-champ-making-history/
1•thunderbong•28m ago•0 comments

TeamsCache – Read Local Microsoft Teams Messages via CLI or MCP

https://github.com/stn1slv/teamscache
1•stn1slv•32m ago•0 comments

A Field Guide to Elephpants

https://afieldguidetoelephpants.net/
1•theanonymousone•35m ago•0 comments

A paste-y journey – finding a pastebin candidate to use

https://savyasacheejha.com/posts/a-paste-y-journey/
1•genghizkhan•38m ago•0 comments

Arduino App Lab

https://docs.arduino.cc/software/app-lab/
1•teleforce•40m ago•0 comments

Anti-Photoshop: A Mega-Combine Without a Technical Specification

https://medium.com/@smoking2man/anti-photoshop-a-mega-combine-without-a-technical-specification-f...
1•Aldus551•43m ago•0 comments

Harsher on Male? Evaluating LLMs on Gender-Asymmetric Moral Framing in Conflicts

https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.14068
1•rzk•43m ago•0 comments

Rejoining EU 'on the table' as UK makes deals on trade and young people

https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2026/nov/21/rejoining-eu-uk-trade-youth-deals-ed-miliband
3•vrganj•44m ago•0 comments

Sphere

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sphere_(venue)
2•tosh•47m ago•0 comments

ChatGPT shrunk down to run on a Super Nintendo

https://www.theregister.com/offbeat/2026/11/21/chatgpt-shrunk-down-to-run-on-a-super-nintendo/531...
1•nephihaha•49m ago•0 comments

Roast My UI

https://heltweg.org/posts/roast-my-ui/
1•rhazn•50m ago•0 comments

TI Embedded AI

https://www.ti.com/en-us/technologies/edge-ai
1•teleforce•52m ago•1 comments

Lean Should Be Ashamed

1•LTaoist•54m ago•0 comments

Show HN: Tartelette – an RP2040 emulator and breakout simulator

https://pferreir.github.io/tartelette/
1•_pferreir_•57m ago•0 comments

Kvrocks

https://www.percona.com/blog/inside-kvrocks/
4•bashhq_r•58m ago•0 comments

87% of the Anthropic power will come from gas and 11% from coal in 2028

https://betterdatacenterproject.com/2026/11/16/how-ai-is-powered-a-breakdown-of-byop-and-grid-power/
64•happosai•1h ago•39 comments

Is AI plagiarizing human research?

https://twitter.com/Robert_E_Grant_/status/2124338413662847228
2•doener•1h ago•0 comments

Scientists build whole-Earth simulation to help find life on other planets

https://www.washington.edu/news/2026/11/02/whole-earth-simulation-exoplanets-alien-life/
1•giuliomagnifico•1h ago•0 comments

Scientists sequenced a whale's entire genome using drones and whale snot

https://www.npr.org/2026/11/21/nx-s1-6044816/scientists-sequenced-a-whales-entire-genome-using-dr...
2•Brajeshwar•1h ago•0 comments
Open in hackernews

Show HN: Confidential computing for high-assurance RISC-V embedded systems

https://github.com/IBM/ACE-RISCV
103•mrnoone•1y ago
Dear HN community! Looking forward to hearing your feedback on ACE (assured confidential execution), technology that implements VM-based trusted execution environment (TEE) for embedded RISC-V systems with focus on a formally verified and auditable firmware. We target high-assurance systems that can benefit from compartmentalization and hardware-backed isolation. The key ingredient called security monitor (firmware) is implemented in Rust. The formal specification is defined as annotations directly in code and gets translated to Coq using RefinedRust automation. ACE design is now part of the RISCV confidential VM extension (CoVE) specification (deployment model 3).

Comments

IshKebab•1y ago
Can you explain what the relationship is between this and CoVE? Is ACE (this repo) the firmware, and CoVE the RISC-V hardware extensions that it requires?

How does it run on a P550 if that doesn't support CoVE?

aseipp•1y ago
Yes, that's basically the relationship between CoVE and ACE, from a quick glance. In this case, ACE is simply implementing a formally modeled and verified security monitor where the design has been extracted to Coq and the invariants proven.

It can work on P550 because CoVE supports several "Deployment strategies", the one ACE uses is referenced in the README: CoVE spec, Appendix D, "M-mode [Trusted Security Manager] based deployment model" https://github.com/riscv-non-isa/riscv-ap-tee/blob/main/src/... -- the other appendicies detail e.g. Smmtt based designs, and apparently there's a not-yet-written "Nested Virtualization" design in Appendix C.

They also note that the P550 isn't a "true" port due to the preliminary, non-ratified H extension, and it also misses another required extension called "Sstc" but they just emulate it. (Sstc is interesting; it seems to be a performance optimization for delivering timer interrupts directly to supervisors, but I can imagine in the case of CoVE timer interrupts going through M-mode could leak data, making it more of a security issue.)

Leveraging M-mode is basically how previous security monitors like keystone worked too, back on the original HiFive Unleashed. It just sorta treats M-mode as an analogue to the "secure world" in ARM parlance, though there is no requirement that M-mode has e.g. an encrypted memory controller and dedicated memory region, and I'm guessing other things (I'm not super familiar with TrustZone.)

Broadly speaking this reminds me as a kind of a evolution/combination of Microsoft's Komodo (formally verified, but was only for e.g. SGX-style enclaves) and existing M-mode TEE systems like Keystone -- but upgraded to support "Confidental Computing" virtual machines. So that's quite nice.

mrnoone•1y ago
The CoVE specification defines a unified confidential computing architecture for RISC-V that scales across embedded, edge, and cloud use cases. The system designers select the appropriate deployment model based on the specific constraints and goals of their target systems. ACE adopts the deployment model tailored for mid- to high-end embedded platforms (see Appendix D in the CoVE spec).

Ultimately, we should expect multiple CoVE implementations optimized for different domains. For instance, in cloud environments, the focus is on maximizing performance and resource utilization—typically requiring full CoVE support and advanced hardware features such as Smmtt and AIA. Salus from Rivos is an example of such a high-end implementation. In contrast, embedded systems have limited power and silicon budgets, and thus prioritize simpler hardware. These systems trade off performance and accept memory fragmentation in favor of reduced hardware complexity and cost—ACE is designed with this trade-off in mind.

ACE runs on P550 by emulating the missing hardware features. This enables experimental deployment on real hardware. (P550 is the first commercially available RISC-V processor with virtualization support.)

neom•1y ago
Developers have faced in the confidential computing space, particularly with x86 TEEs, fragmentation leading to vendor lockin and a difficult developer experience due to multiple, somewhat incompatible standards/approaches. Does the CoVE effort, and IBM's involvement in it, aim to prevent a similar situation in the RISC-V world, fostering a more open and standardized TEE ecosystem? Are you using CCC to align RISC-V CoVE with efforts to improve the developer experience? I hope we see common abstractions across different TEE architectures!!!
mrnoone•1y ago
I agree with your point, we need common abstractions across different TEE architectures!

The CoVE specification addresses fragmentation in the RISC-V ecosystem by defining a unified confidential computing architecture that scales across embedded, edge, and cloud use cases. Higher layers of the software stack, for example Linux KVM and QEMU, implement the defined ABI, enabling support for a variety of CoVE-compliant implementations. Currently, there are two CoVE implementations: ACE, targeting embedded systems, and Salus, aimed at cloud deployments. Additionally, there are efforts underway to port OP-TEE to the CoVE architecture.

Within the Linux kernel, there is ongoing work to unify internal interfaces across different TEE implementations (x86,ARM,Z,PowerPC) and harden the guest kernel. The CoVE patches are designed to align with these abstractions, though they have not yet been upstreamed. Remote attestation is still the pain point, since the CoVE spec proposes formats that are not compatible with Intel/AMD/TPM style. On the other hand, the ACE's local attestation re-uses the format from OpenPOWER PEF and opens it with versioning to new algorithms and properties.

From an end-user standpoint, VM-based TEEs are more agnostic to the underlying hardware technology compared with process-based TEEs, as they rely on the virtualization boundary for isolation. What does still change is the guest kernel and its supporting libraries, which must be adapted to leverage platform-specific attestation mechanisms.

anonymousDan•1y ago
How does this differ from Keystone?
mrnoone•1y ago
There are two key differences:

(1) ACE leverages hardware virtualization support, including an MMU, to enable confidential virtual machines. In contrast, Keystone is designed for simpler processors that rely on just machine/supervisor/user privilege levels and physical memory protection (PMP), making it more suitable for process-based enclaves—similar to architectures like Komodo or Intel SGX. In that sense, ACE is conceptually closer to Intel TDX, but tailored for a different domain: embedded systems rather than cloud infrastructure.

(2) In ACE, the architecture and code are simplified to facilitate formal verification.

hyperhello•1y ago
> ACE supports local attestation, a mechanism to authenticate confidential VMs intended for embedded systems with limited or no network connectivity.

I'm interested to know the safe definition of 'limited' connectivity - is there some kind of boundary which logical reasoning can't support?

l0ng1nu5•1y ago
This area is where I see riscv excelling ahead of current proprietary options. I don't think it can compete on speed in terms of general purpose computing at this point.

The way I see it, once guaranteed security is offered, security conscious IT admins will insist on using it and the herd will eventually follow.