Did a first pass on this when it was posted earlier this week (I think). It's great to see an influx of consciousness papers on HN.

This looks interesting. I'm not that familiar with IIT, mostly because I think it is too abstract to really say anything about consciousness. It's like measuring the electrical current of a computer motherboard as a theory for how operating systems work. It seems the wrong level of analysis to me. I'm feeling the same way about this theory which is covering a lot of concepts but they're all very high level and abstract (it's not grounding it in any concrete details of the brain).

Aside from that, I have one comment on the qualia section: > Qualia are a highly condensed, intrinsically valuable, and behaviorally oriented higher-order representation and functional label of the cognitive system’s internal generative model’s assessment of its own stat

i don't think those properties are necessary for qualia. For example you can meditate and have a completely functionless experience of consciousness that serves no purpose by definition (contentless, egoless, etc), yet it would still be qualia because it's still the experience of consciousness. Conversely you can have the functionality of representing internal states without any consciousness. The definition of qualia in the paper would probably apply to current LLMs, since they have some kind of internal assessment of internal states, especially agents.