For client devices, https://lowrisc.org/news/lowrisc-a-decade-of-bringing-open-s... > OpenTitan’s “Earl Grey”, will be the plan of record hardware RoT for [2025] Chromebooks.. Caliptra, another open source Root of Trust project with wide industry adoption, has incorporated a considerable amount of OpenTitan’s IP into its design.. OpenTitan’s CPU core, the Ibex RISC-V microcontroller, is an important project in its own right.. Microsoft based its CHERIoT-Ibex design on lowRISC’s commercial-grade Ibex CPU core, extending it with the proven CHERI hardware security extensions.
For servers, https://github.com/chipsalliance/Caliptra & https://146a55aca6f00848c565-a7635525d40ac1c70300198708936b4...
> Caliptra consists of IP and firmware for an integrated Root of Trust block.. targets datacenter-class SoCs like CPUs, GPUs, DPUs, TPUs.. implementing a Root of Trust for Measurement (RTM) block inside an SoC. A Caliptra integration provides the SoC with Identity, Measured Boot and Attestation capabilities.
https://opentitan.org/book/doc/use_cases/index.html & https://github.com/Microsoft/ms-tpm-20-ref
> OpenTitan can be used to implement the full Trusted Platform Module (TPM) 2.0 specification to meet client and server platform use cases.
RISC-V based, follows the RISC-V marketing book.
I like to bring up McDonalds as an example because IIRC it requires the highest, 'strong integrity' verdict from SafetyNet/Play Integrity/nom-du-jour. Maybe they should rename it to something with Open in the name when OpenTitan comes to Chromebooks.
tonetegeatinst•5h ago
transpute•4h ago
From OP:
> Moving away from unverifiable ‘black boxes’ and towards fully transparent and verifiable foundations unlocks a new paradigm, putting device owners back in control of their remotely connected devices without requiring physical diligence by hardware manufacturers.. assurance-first approach ensures that security starts below the operating system, offering protection against the most sophisticated hardware and firmware attacks and more common software vulnerabilities.
If a commercial SoC is marketing their usage of an open-source silicon IP block with transparent high assurance, one can only hope they would welcome open security research, ideally via a bug bounty program.