I won't spoil the article, but if we didn't, we'd be the Ship of Theseus.
otikik•9h ago
Would we, though :) ?
addaon•8h ago
If every atom in a cell is replaced dozens of times, is it the same cell?
codegladiator•8h ago
If every vibration in a wave is replaced dozens of times, is it the same wave?
burnt-resistor•7h ago
[Something about trees and sounds.]
ChristianGeek•7h ago
Is something defined by its form or its substance?
codegladiator•7h ago
Is word defined by meaning or feeling?
exe34•6h ago
It's defined by the dictionary.
Hamuko•4h ago
Which one?
exe34•4h ago
The Oxford English Dictionary.
dinfinity•3h ago
Depends on the definition of "same" for the cell. It's not straightforward at all.
Most symbols in language where you try this refer to macrostates, collections of microstates that conform to the relevant macrostate pattern. Assigning identity in the first place is highly dependent on what purpose/function you're assigning identity for: what are you trying to achieve by labeling a macrostate as such?
The Ship of Theseus is a classic example in this regard, but complicated by the 'of Theseus' bit: Are we trying to determine ownership? Who built it? Who is standing on it? Those questions lead to very different answers for the thought experiment; they depend on how you define "The Ship of Theseus". Sidenote: examples that include consciousness such as teleportation thought experiments complicate matters even more.
The Sorites paradox / paradox of the heap is one of the simplest thought experiments in this category that mostly avoids that but still runs into the "well, what are you defining a heap for?" issue. One way out is fuzzy membership: Unless you have to act on whether something is a heap or not it is also fine to say "this is 80% like a heap", but as soon as you do have to act on it the 80% membership doesn't cut it.
We don't really have to act on heaps in a way where a sloppy assignment of membership matters, but there are similar things where it matters a lot. A relevant example would be abortion: half-aborting a baby isn't going to work; you're either going to end up with an alive or a dead baby. So defining a fetus fuzzily as "80% human" doesn't help. You are going to have to define a cutoff to achieve a binary distinction and make a decision. Another sidenote: converting fuzzy input patterns to better defined output patterns or even binary distinctions is kind of what neurons do.
edit, addendum: There are of course many dimensions along which to define cutoffs for abortion. The 'is/is not human' distinction is mainly relevant if you start from the premise 'no innocent humans should be killed intentionally' or something similar, which isn't necessarily a given.
A very compressed form of the way I look at it, but hopefully clear and interesting enough.
bravesoul2•7h ago
And why would that would be a problem?
thaumasiotes•8h ago
Women are born with all of their eggs, but they kill the eggs as part of the onset of menopause, which I guess wouldn't count for this question.
To have an original cell, it would have to divide zero times between your birth and your death. I think nerve cells might have this property?
fracus•9h ago
otikik•9h ago
addaon•8h ago
codegladiator•8h ago
burnt-resistor•7h ago
ChristianGeek•7h ago
codegladiator•7h ago
exe34•6h ago
Hamuko•4h ago
exe34•4h ago
dinfinity•3h ago
Most symbols in language where you try this refer to macrostates, collections of microstates that conform to the relevant macrostate pattern. Assigning identity in the first place is highly dependent on what purpose/function you're assigning identity for: what are you trying to achieve by labeling a macrostate as such?
The Ship of Theseus is a classic example in this regard, but complicated by the 'of Theseus' bit: Are we trying to determine ownership? Who built it? Who is standing on it? Those questions lead to very different answers for the thought experiment; they depend on how you define "The Ship of Theseus". Sidenote: examples that include consciousness such as teleportation thought experiments complicate matters even more.
The Sorites paradox / paradox of the heap is one of the simplest thought experiments in this category that mostly avoids that but still runs into the "well, what are you defining a heap for?" issue. One way out is fuzzy membership: Unless you have to act on whether something is a heap or not it is also fine to say "this is 80% like a heap", but as soon as you do have to act on it the 80% membership doesn't cut it.
We don't really have to act on heaps in a way where a sloppy assignment of membership matters, but there are similar things where it matters a lot. A relevant example would be abortion: half-aborting a baby isn't going to work; you're either going to end up with an alive or a dead baby. So defining a fetus fuzzily as "80% human" doesn't help. You are going to have to define a cutoff to achieve a binary distinction and make a decision. Another sidenote: converting fuzzy input patterns to better defined output patterns or even binary distinctions is kind of what neurons do.
edit, addendum: There are of course many dimensions along which to define cutoffs for abortion. The 'is/is not human' distinction is mainly relevant if you start from the premise 'no innocent humans should be killed intentionally' or something similar, which isn't necessarily a given.
A very compressed form of the way I look at it, but hopefully clear and interesting enough.
bravesoul2•7h ago