Consumers and publishers take certificates and certs for granted. I see many broken certs, or brands using the wrong certs and domains for their services.
SSL/TLS has done well to prevent eavesdropping, but it hasn't done well to establish trust and identity.
At the same time, it sounds like the issues you describe aren’t CA/issuance issues, but rather, simple misconfigurations. Those aren’t incidents for the ecosystem, although definitely can be disruptive to the site, but I also wouldn’t expect them to call trust or identity into disrepute. That’d be like arguing my drivers license is invalid if I handed you my passport; giving you the wrong doc doesn’t invalidate the claims of either, just doesn’t address your need.
I can't even imagine how much a pain it would be to try and moderate certs based on some consistent international notion of trustworthiness. I think the best you could hope to do is have 3rd parties like the BBB sign your cert as a way of them "vouching" for you.
Happened to see it in the CT logs, and when that CA next came up for discussion on the Mozilla dev security policy list, their failure to address and disclose the misissuance in a timely manner was enough to stop the process to approve their request for EV recognition, and it ended in a denial from Mozilla.
Couldn't it just be responsible for its own key and signing incremental advances to a log that all publishers are responsible for storing up to their latest submission to it?
If it needed to restart and some last publisher couldn't give it its latest entries, well they would deserve that rollback to the last publish from a good publisher..
This requires the logs be held by independent parties, and retained forever.
If 12 CAs send to the same log and all have to save up to their latest entry not to be declared incompetent to be CAs, how would all 12 possibly do a worse job of providing that log on demand than a random 3rd party who has no particular investment at risk?
(Every other CA in a log is a 3rd party with respect to any other, but they are one who can actually be told to keep something indefinitely because they would also need to return it for legitimizing their own issuance.)
The info they get back from the CT log may be a Merkle Hash that partly depends on the other entries in the log - but they don't have to store the entire log, just a short checksum.
Maybe there is an acceptable way to shift long-term storage to CAs while using CT verifiers only for short term storage? E.g. they keep track of their last 30 days of signatures for a CA, which can then get cross-verified by other verifiers in that timeframe.
The storage requirements don't seem that bad though and it might not be worth any reduced redundancy and increased complexity for a different storage scheme. E.g. what keeps me from doing this is the >1Gbps and >1 pager requirements.
(I.e. your log ends abruptly but polling any other CA that published to the same CT shows there is more including reasons to shut you down.)
I don't see how a scheme where the CT signer has this responsibility makes any sense. If they stop operating because they are sick of it, all the CAs involved have a somewhat suspicious looking CT history on things already issued that has to be explained instead of having always had the responsibility to provide the history up to anything they have signed whether or not some CT goes away.
This is rich. Imagine a company that famously can't be contacted by humans wanting - no, expecting - to be able to reach someone at their leisure.
I'm sorry, but no. I'd consider running a CTL, but I'd never give contact information to the likes of Google unless I got the same in return.
People love to say it, but when we had GSuite issues at my previous workplace we spoke to GSuite support and had a resolution quickly. When we had GCP queries we spoke to our account manager who gave us a technical contact who escalated internally and got us the advice we needed. When we asked about a particular feature we were added to the alpha stage of an in-development product and spoke with the team directly about that. I've got friends who have had various issues with Pixel phones over the years and they just contact support and get a replacement or fix or whatever.
Meanwhile I've seen colleagues go down the rabbit hole of AWS support and have a terrible time. For us it was fine but nothing special, I've never experienced the amazing support that I've heard some people talk about.
We were a <100 person company with a spend quite a bit less than many companies of our size. From what I've heard from YouTubers with a million followers, they have account managers and they always seem to encourage talking to account managers.
I should've qualified what I wrote, but what I mean is that no matter who you are, if you don't know someone there and aren't paying them money, there's no way to communicate with humans there.
It's like companies that won't let you sign up unless you give them a cell phone number, but not only do they not have a number themselves, they don't even have email. Or, for companies like Verizon, they don't have email, but they have phone numbers with countless layers of "voice assistants" you can't skip. It's a new way of "communicating" that's just crazymaking.
In this case, you point to the hypocrisy of being uncontactable but demanding your contact details, except that Google does provide support to customers, and in this relationship they are essentially a customer of your CT log, and given the criticality of that service they rightly expect the service provider to be held to a high standard. I don't think they're holding you to a standard that they themselves wouldn't agree to be held to for a service that critical. I've got to make it clear that this is my personal opinion though.
source: I used to do vendor relations for a large public org where contractors (medium tech companies) would routinely try to skirt the line on what they had to deliver. I would rather deal with them than GoogleFi, because in that situation there was a certain point where I could give up and hand it off to our lawyers.
That certainly wasn't my experience. Unless 'we're not going to help you' counts as a resolution. We did get a response quickly, but there was no path to resolving the issues I had other just ignoring the issues.
http://www.aaronsw.com/weblog/squarezooko
Ben Laurie read this post by Aaron Swartz while thinking about how a certificate transparency mechanism could work. (I think Peter Eckersley may have told him about it!) The existence proof confirmed that we sort of knew how to make useful append-only data structures with anonymous writers.
CT dropped the incentive mechanism and the distributed log updates in favor of more centralized log operation, federated logging, and out-of-band audits of identified log operators' behavior. This mostly means that CT lacks the censorship resistance of a blockchain. It also means that someone has to directly pay to operate it, without recouping the expenses of maintaining the log via block rewards. And browser developers have to manually confirm logs' availability properties in order to decide which logs to trust (with -- returning to the censorship resistance property -- no theoretical guarantee that there will always be suitable logs available in the future).
This has worked really well so far, but everyone is clear on the trade-offs, I think.
If you figure out a good way to involve an incentive structure like that, let us know!
And:
> Bandwidth: 2 – 3 Gbps outbound.
I am not sure if this is correct, is 2-3Gbps really required for CT?
agwa•6h ago
eddythompson80•4h ago
WAL replication, rsync, bittorrent, etc all things that don't quite work as needed.
[1] https://github.com/mchangrh/sb-mirror/blob/main/docs/breakdo...
[2] https://github.com/ajayyy/SponsorBlock/issues/1570