Reinventing the Python Wheel

This reminds me a lot of the PSP Pandora's Battery: a special factory "boot from external flash" system with exploitable vulnerabilities - on PSP, the special Pandora's Battery "JigKick" serial number 0xFFFFFFFF or the factory battery challenge/response "Baryon Sweeper" on newer consoles, followed by a rather complicated exploit in the "ipl.bin" signature checking process on the external hardware. On the Wii U, the "unstable power" battery jig followed by a simple overflow in SDBoot1.

https://www.psdevwiki.com/psp/Pandora

https://github.com/khubik2/pysweeper

mjg59•8m ago

Having spent a while working in embedded and learning that this is not a lesson that's been internalised: this is why you never sign any executable that can boot on shipped hardware unless you'd be ok with everyone running it on shipped hardware. You can not promise it will not leak. You can not promise all copies will be destroyed. If it needs to run on production hardware then you should have some per-device mechanism for one-off signatures, and if it doesn't then it should either be unsigned (if fusing secure boot happens late) or have the signature invalidated as the last thing that happens before the device is put in the box.

A lot of companies do not appear to understand this. A lot of devices with silicon-level secure boot can be circumvented with signed images that have just never (officially) been distributed to the public, and anyone relying on their security is actually relying on vendors never accidentally trashing a drive containing one. In this case Nintendo (or a contractor) utterly failed to destroy media in the way they were presumably supposed to, but it would have been better to have never existed in this form in the first place.