There will come a day where American exceptionalism gets kicked in the face, but only once America overextends. China's blue-water navy is nowhere near as credible as their littoral forces, meaning that they're much better equipped to fight Taiwan than America. This is the fight they want, and they're overwhelmingly prepared to kill Americans until popular support collapses.
It's a mistake to get sucked into the "China strong" outward presentation of the PRC - they're much more cunning (and constrained) than they make themselves out to be. They're willing to play poker at the international table until the knives come out, which is smarter than what many countries can say about their foreign policy.
Prompt global strike less about preemption, but building up proportional responses on retaliation latter. US discussion around TW scenario factors in mainland strikes, with assumption that CONUS will be relatively spared. Once conversation includes hitting PRC mainland = PRC hitting CONUS, then escalation math becomes very different. Global strike and blue water are both we can touch your homeland capabilities, with global strike potentially able to make bluewater obsolete, i.e. global striking carrier hulls or logistic nodes that sustains bluewater prevents them from being forward deployed and being able to deliver fires at all.
That's what makes US GD optics extra worthwhile, at this point US has sunk trillions and decades into carrier centred (and soon B21) expeditionary force structure, with no hint of pivot (i.e. IMO too much interbranch drama to build out equivalent of PLARocketForce). Sailors like their big boats, aviators like their fancy planes. No one wants to be the glorified uber driver for big icbm rockets. Marine MLRs closest, but they get to brag about driving off big boats in their big cars that shoot small missiles. At the end of the day, GD, going to be blanket wank material for US having bestest/most impenetrable missile defense can validate the other force structures that requires forward / preposition by at least pretending they're not as vulnerable as they are. It's how US gets to continue play the China weak card as long as china remains cautious / PLA remains untested. i.e. if PRC stays smart and appear weak relative to US.
Realistically, total war between nuclear weapon states is unlikely to happen under the current geopolitical paradigm. Proxy conflicts trying to push nations to collapse from internal stress will remain the real arena of great powers until such time that an effective counter to full scale nuclear attacks are not only developed but trusted. In such a world, shooting down long range, highly maneuverable missiles with advanced countermeasures isn't just possible, it's routine.
That's probably how it plays out if it plays out (also imo unlikely). But also mere existence of capabilities like PRC PGS will force parties to recalibrate response matrix. It would also be true to say ANY US strike on PRC mainland via any delivery platform, boats/planes/subs at scale will invite immediate retaliatory MAD response... after all essentially every US delivery platform is dual capable, i.e. can be nuclear tipped -> warhead ambiguity problem. How would PRC know otherwise? Except rational actors (maybe lol expectations) from both sides knows adversary capable of conventional homeland strikes will have to adjust response accordingly. This means in world where PRC can strike CONUS at scale, US likely has to settle for launch on confirmation, just like PRC has to deal with US striking mainland at scale. That's why assured second strike via triad exists (really SSGN for US, rocketforce TELs in tunnels for PRC). But until shooting actually starts, GD doesn't need to be trusted, it just needs to exist to placate domestic audience or confuse adversaries.
bigyabai•6mo ago
The argument is that it's safer and easier to intercept a ballistic missile in it's ballistic phase than it is to defeat it in a boost or terminal phase. This is true, but it will result with adversaries skipping those steps altogether. Additionally, it likely wouldn't protect against long-range cruise missiles or similarly maneuverable glide vehicles. Best case scenario, nuclear weapons get sent up in satellites and "deorbited" in a scheduled attack that won't be recognizable until it's too late. Worst case scenario, a space-capable adversary (eg. Iran, China, Russia) kicks off a Kessler syndrome and flips the table back in their favor. It's no-win, even as peacetime deterrence.
This is why nonproliferation and elimination was America's only feasible solution to the nuclear issue: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reykjav%C3%ADk_Summit
mittensc•6mo ago
Cruise missiles can be destroyed via existing ground/sea defenses. Patriots have proven they can intercept anything non-ballistic and there are likely better capabilities not revealed yet.
The US is also very far away for effective cruise missles. (and has a lot of allies nations in the way)
Nuclear weapons sent as sattelites to be de-orbited sound novel, although they can be tracked easily and disabled covertly. (Russia has 'stolen' a US sattelite in the past without much repercussions)
Kessler syndrome might be a net win if you are at the point of nuclear war, at which point, without ballistic missiles any country will not stand much against US conventional power.
So... there aren't many drawbacks to the plan, the only thing I'm curious is if we don't already have that capability covertly via starlink... shouldn't be hard to take over those and guide them into ballistic missiles...
bigyabai•6mo ago
It is not realistic to depend on special forces to disable nuclear satellites if (and when) they exist. As I highlighted in my previous link, one of the primary things stopping the USSR from deploying nuclear weapons to space was the idea that America wouldn't deploy space-based interceptors. Both China and Russia will jump at the chance to start hiding nukes in orbit. Our only options are to leave ICBMs as the status quo or negotiate for complete nuclear elimination. This is the downside that I am alluding to, besides the billions of dollars in taxpayer money this will burn starting a new nuclear arms race.
You cannot use Starlink satellites to intercept ballistic missiles for multiple reasons. They do not have enough propellant, they don't move fast enough even to catch it in the boost phase, they orbit too low to intercept in the ballistic phase and they aren't designed to have high-impulse maneuvering motors. It would be a neat party trick, but there isn't an ice cube's chance in hell the DOD would privatize a life-or-death nuclear defense system like that. No, not even an administration this crazy.
mittensc•6mo ago
EU, japan, canada all have defenses of their own and collaborate.
All other countries bordering russia/china do as well..
Then add in all the islands that US has bases on or of allied nations with detection capabilities.
Once detected, the US navy and airforce can plan interceptions.
Which way would a cruise missile go and how much fuel would it need to reach the US?... let's be real here.
> It is not realistic to depend on special forces to disable nuclear satellites if (and when) they exist.
Why special forces?, just laser their thrusters once in range during peacetime... who's going to do what?
> one of the primary things stopping the USSR from deploying nuclear weapons to space was the idea that America wouldn't deploy space-based interceptors
I would argue the idea was that the US would disable them as they got into space. Or that the US would do the same. Or that they innevitably fail sometimes and might leave portions of your homeland unhospitable.
> Both China and Russia will jump at the chance to start hiding nukes in orbit.
I disagree.
> Our only options are to leave ICBMs as the status quo or negotiate for complete nuclear elimination
That's a bit naive considering russia's behavior.
> This is the downside that I am alluding to, besides the billions of dollars in taxpayer money this will burn starting a new nuclear arms race.
Last arms race brought the USSR to collapse. Russia isn't looking too capable right now for another one, hence perfect timing to take advantage of their weakness.
> You cannot use Starlink satellites to intercept ballistic missiles for multiple reasons
Thanks, nice points to think about, you are likely correct right now.
> It would be a neat party trick,
Yes it would, so what would it take for them to work?,
would early intelligence on possible launch times, missile locations, directions and all be enough to compute interceptors ahead of time during boost?
would slight alterations and massive numbers covering the globe make up for that?
Also, not privatize, just plain take over of spacex in case of emergency. DoD would use them as kinnetic interceptors. DoD could also force design changes on spacex in anticipation.
So much to think about :)
Edit: you missed nuke subs, so the MAD is still around unless the US has a way to kill them if they get too close to the us.
bigyabai•6mo ago
> All other countries bordering russia/china do as well..
Do they ever shoot down the routine Tu-95 flights that head for the pacific ocean? Doesn't seem like it, they could open their bays whenever they wanted outside Anchorage or Seattle: https://english.alarabiya.net/News/world/2025/01/30/russian-...
> Once detected, the US navy and airforce can plan interceptions.
The fastest ocean craft the Navy has can't pull 40 knots in regular conditions. It takes an F/A-18 far too long to cover 250 miles even at mil-speed, same for Air Force F-15s. They aren't planning much of anything, particularly if they can't see the missile. NORAD won't see them and naval radars are far too small to cover even the West coast.
> Which way would a cruise missile go and how much fuel would it need to reach the US?... let's be real here.
Wherever it wants. Modernized Kalibr missiles can fly in excess of 2,500 miles... after being launched from a vehicle with it's own range: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kalibr_(missile_family)#Domest...
> just laser their thrusters once in range during peacetime... who's going to do what?
You make it sound so easy. What if the ground operators detect your intercept and decide to fight back? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Almaz
> That's a bit naive considering russia's behavior.
It was very realistic and feasibly attainable during the Reykjavík summit, half a decade before the collapse of the Soviet Union and Balkanization of nuclear-armed states.
> Russia isn't looking too capable right now for another one
The USSR wasn't fighting NATO forces when their strategic weapons were valuable. What were they going to do in the 80s, nuke the Mujahideen? Russia has their nukes, and they have casus belli even if their war in Ukraine is bogus. The ICBMs are already built, it doesn't cost them extra to fire a solid-fuel rocket. I'm as skeptical of Russia's nuclear arsenal as anyone, but to discount it entirely is nuts.
> Yes it would, so what would it take for them to work?
An unprecedented level of trust? Who do you think owns the satellites, Uncle Sam and his American Eagle? It's a private system. The DOD does not control the Starlink satellites, they have no desire to build the backbone of their nuclear defense system out of an LEO system in another billionaire's playground. Even a pants-on-head stupid eminent domain plan like you're insinuating would be failure-prone, not to mention profoundly moronic from a compensation and liability standpoint. In an emergency situation, we can't guarantee that the DOD would or could take control. Or that the satellites could fill the mission they demand.
You can give the US every feasible advantage and Starlink still comes up short. Modern TEL missiles come pre-fuelled and can be launched faster than satellites can coordinate. An ICBM TEL can employ FOBS, meaning that you don't have a launch azimuth just by seeing where the rocket is aimed. You would need satellites proportional to the area-of-uncertainty in low earth orbit to intercept an ICBM during boost phase with a satellite, which is a radius <800 miles wide being traversed in the span of ~60 seconds. Not to mention, Russia or China could rapidly deplete satellite propellant just by driving TELs cross-country on a regular basis. Much cheaper than the Tu-95 scares they've relied on.
> you missed nuke subs, so the MAD is still around unless the US has a way to kill them if they get too close to the us
If you want to be completely pedantic, intercepting SLBMs doesn't even remotely stop your enemy from nuking you either. Kalibr missiles can be launched from a submarine too, or SRBMs that don't have a long enough ballistic phase to intercept from space. It's no-win regardless of your satellite defenses.
This is the last time I'll say it, since it's becoming quickly apparent that we're playing by the Calvinball rules of deterrence; the only realistic nuclear defense is nonproliferation. Yes, it's far-fetched, but it's ~1,000x more attainable than hard-killing a submarine nuke using a satellite: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Status-6_Oceanic_Multipurpose_...
mittensc•6mo ago
Russia would never accept that considering their conventional weakness...
And let's be real, without their nukes there would already be a desert storm russia edition.
So what other options are there?
The rest of your comment is pretty well thought out and yeah, it's probably still bad but better then it was in the cold war.
Only counterpoint is that same arguments were made when patriots were installed in estern europe... and in hindsight it was a great idea, patriots can intercept those kalibr missiles you mention.
So... add patriots along the coast and problem solved, it's a matter of cost. That can be solved when your life is on the line.
Which leads me to something else, in case of emergency/martial law, you can take over anything you want, including starlink. It's not a big issue as you note.
Alternatively, DoD can have a secret contract with enough money or court order forcing spacex to do anything. So carrot and stick.
jjk166•6mo ago
The reason ballistic missiles fly through space is because that is the fastest, easiest way to cross long distances. Every other option has significant drawbacks. Space based intercept won't address every potential vulnerability, but those vulnerabilities already exist, and are preferable to the current status quo.
Kessler syndrome wouldn't do anything to stop midcourse-phase interceptors. They aren't in space long enough to be affected. Even if we pretend for a second it would be possible to put so much mass in orbit to stop interceptors, you've also essentially intercepted every nuke, doing the job of those interceptors for you.
bigyabai•6mo ago
It isn't likely that a Golden Dome would stop rogue nations from attacking America with ICBMs, nor would it stop an all-out attack. It encourages new developments in space-based weaponry, ratchets up the fragile tension that enables satellite weaponry, and ultimately becomes a net-threat to Americans. Even if it was free, the sentiment that you project deploying such a system turns you into the abhorrent imperial power of space. You are naturally now the enemy of free spacefaring nations.
jjk166•6mo ago
The purpose of ballistic missile defense is not to deter a state from attacking with ICBMs, it is to intercept ICBMs. For small strikes such as the scenarios given above, it can defeat or mitigate them. For sufficiently large strikes, nukes will get through, but fewer will get through, and importantly the adversary doesn't know which will get through, so for a given arsenal size they need to either double up on targets or accept a significant fraction of targets not being destroyed, either of which means more stuff is left standing than if there wasn't such a missile defense system in place. Again, defense systems are not meant to be undefeatable, they are just to force your adversary into incurring the cost to potentially defeat them. There is a deterrent effect to any weapon system - if it's harder, riskier, and more expensive to defeat the adversary, all the less reason to try - but that's just an added bonus.
The argument that this system encourages development of space based weapons falls on deaf ears. Space based weapons are already under active development by multiple nations, and will be implemented regardless because an adversary's satellite network is already a serious military asset to be attacked and defended. Given the choice between weaponized space and not being nuked versus probably still weaponization of space and being nuked, I know which option I'm choosing. I am even less compelled by the claim that a space based interceptor, whose sole purpose is to prevent nuclear armageddon and has no offensive capability whatsoever, somehow equates to space imperialism. The would be nuclear war mongers seem like the real enemy of free spacefaring nations.
There is a very real question of opportunity cost. Developing and deploying such a system is resource intensive, could those resources be better spent elsewhere? Is there a better way to defend against these threats? Are there realistic alternatives that prevent nuclear war by other means? I think a compelling case could be made for either. Whatever that alternative is though needs to be better than "sit around and pray no one launches nukes."