> HTTP cookies were never intended for session management
Seems odd. IIRC that's exactly what they were meant for. State management for http which is stateless. Am I missing some history here?
RFC 2965, make of it what you want but I agree with you. Actually, RFC 2109 is even older (1997) and says more or less the same.
The "abstract idea" of a cookie is an identifier that it lets a server consider requests within a larger series of requests by the same person, but the fact that it can do that at all also meant that it solved the whole "how do we know whether this user is logged in without every page request after login needing to be a POST that includes the user's name and password again".
The faster we get an antitrust breakup of Google from Chrome and Android, the better.
Defending against account takeovers with passkeys and DBSC (11 points, 1 month ago) https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=44725402
Chrome Origin Trial: Device Bound Session Credentials (85 points, 4 months ago, 80 comments) https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43865379
Device Bound Session Credentials Explainer (14 points, 2024, 5 comments) https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39926961
DBSC will run into all the same problems on platforms that don’t support TPMs. Not sure how this is changing the landscape. It’s just another implementation of the same thing.
DBSC is intended to be deployed opportunistically alongside regular cookies, so users on devices without TPMs just won't benefit from the additional protections that DBSC provides.
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9449
The spec doesn't say where you store the key material, but you could reasonably put it in a TPM.
https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/msal/javascript/brow...
However, DBSC as an API and protocol is similarly agnostic about key storage. There is no attestation and the User Agent is fully responsible for selecting key storage that provides the best protection.
If you cared about security you would let me authenticate with ssh key signatures. GitHub does this, if you can manage to talk to an HSM you can manage to talk to the openssh agent.
If they decide to make an example out of me, to teach the rest of you how to behave, I am screwed. I guess that's the "freedom" you US based folks are talking about. This has already been affecting the discourse on sites like HN for a while.
Right now, I am apprehensive about anything Google related. Even about anything big tech related. How is this going to be used to limit our rights and track all our movements?
IlikeKitties•5h ago
jsnell•5h ago
IlikeKitties•5h ago
[0] https://grapheneos.org/articles/attestation-compatibility-gu...
mirashii•5h ago
snickerdoodle12•5h ago
jeffbee•5h ago
odie5533•5h ago
IlikeKitties•5h ago
tantalor•5h ago
What's preventing alternative clients from doing that?
Vecr•5h ago
IlikeKitties•5h ago
gjsman-1000•5h ago
kbaker•5h ago
OK I take it back, privacy is one of their specified goals:
> Note that the certificate chain for the TPM is never sent to the server. This would allow very precise device fingerprinting, contrary to our privacy goals. Servers will only be able to confirm that the browser still has access to the corresponding private key.
However I still wonder why they don't have TLS try and always create a client certificate per endpoint to proactively register on the server side? Seems like this would accomplish a similar goal?
arnarbi•1h ago
That is effectively what Token Binding does. That was unfortunately difficult to deploy because the auth stack can be far removed from TLS termination, providing consistency on the client side to avoid frequent sign outs was very difficult, and (benign) client side TLS proxies are a fairly common thing.
Some more on this in the explainer: https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-dbsc#what-makes-device-boun...
UltraSane•5h ago
speed_spread•5h ago
Valuable to who, exactly?
Analemma_•5h ago
v3xro•4h ago
In other words - focus on solving the real issue (ability to give more fine-grained permissions to programs) rather than restricting the ability of users to do what they want with credentials they already have on hardware they control.
pessimizer•5h ago
Speak for yourself, Kemosabe.
nixgeek•5h ago
chaz6•4h ago
dang•2h ago
If you wouldn't mind reviewing https://news.ycombinator.com/newsguidelines.html and taking the intended spirit of the site more to heart, we'd be grateful.
You're of course welcome to make your substantive points more thoughtfully.
IlikeKitties•1h ago
I truly believe that we'll see a world where everything requires remote attestation and corporate approved devices within the next few years. It's a nightmare scenario for me and I consider it inevitable. I just don't have much more than sad cynicism left since it seems to become worse every day.
dang•1h ago
I hear you about this issue (corporate control over devices, let's call it) and of course a large segment of the community agrees with you. Howwever, the moderation point here isn't about that; it's about a style of commenting that we're trying to avoid here. Your account has been posting in that style on unrelated issues too, so I think this is independent of the specific content.