I'd love to see the data behind this claim, especially on the audio side.
Also, if everything in the future has some touch of AI inside, for example cameras using AI to slightly improve the perceived picture quality, then "made with AI" won't be a categorization that anybody lifts an eyebrow about.
Almost all the big hosted AI providers are publicly working on watermarking for at least media (text is more of a mixed bag); ultimately, its probably a regulatory play—the big providers expect that the combination of legitimate concerns and their own active fearmongering, combined with them demonstrating watermarking, will result in mandates for commercial AI generation services to include watermarking. This may even be part of the regulatory play to restrict availability and non-research use of open models.
Sure in some cases a model might do some astounding things that always shine through, but I guess the jury still out on these questions.
If the problem is "kids are using AI to cheat on their schoolwork and it's bad PR / politicians want us to do something" then competitors' models aren't your problem.
On the other hand, if the problem is "social media is flooded with undetectable, super-realistic bots pushing zany, divisive political opinions, we need to save the free world from our own creation" then yes, your competitors' models very much are part of the problem too.
Additionally, I don’t think the watermark has to be deterministic.
It is easy to alter by just saving to a different format or basic cropping.
I would love to see how SynthID is fixing this issue.
https://help.openai.com/en/articles/8912793-c2pa-in-chatgpt-...
> SynthID adjusts these probability scores to generate a watermark. It's not noticeable to the human eye, and doesn’t affect the quality of the output.
I think they need to be clearer about the constraints involved here. If I ask What is the capital of France? Just the answer, no extra information.” then there’s no room to vary the probability without harming the quality of the output. So clearly there is a lower bound beyond which this becomes ineffective. And presumably the longer the text, the more resilient it is to alterations. So what are the constraints?
I also think that this is self-interest dressed up as altruism. There’s always going to be generative AI that doesn’t include watermarks, so a watermarking scheme cannot tell you if something is genuine. It is, however, useful for determining that something came from a specific provider, which could be valuable to Google in all sorts of ways.
Printer tracking dots[1] is one prior solution like this; annoying, largely unknown, workarounds exist, still - surprisingly efficient.
> Both journalists and security experts have suggested that The Intercept's handling of the leaks by whistleblower Reality Winner, which included publishing secret NSA documents unredacted and including the printer tracking dots, was used to identify Winner as the leaker, leading to her arrest in 2017 and conviction.
Oh crap, knowing Google it probably means they will put articles generated using their AI higher among the search results.
The problem is becoming urgent: more and more so-called “podcasts” are entirely fake, generated by NotebookLM and pushed to every major platform purely to farm backlinks and run blackhat SEO campaigns.
Beyond SynthID or similar watermarking standards, we also need models trained specifically [0] to detect AI-generated audio. Otherwise, the damage compounds - people might waste 30 minutes listening to a meaningless AI-generated podcast, or worse, absorb and believe misleading or outright harmful information.
[0] 15,000+ ai generated fake podcasts https://www.kaggle.com/datasets/listennotes/ai-generated-fak...
I like the digital signature approach in general, and have argued for it before, but this is the weak link. For photos and video, this might be OK if there's a way to reliably distinguish "photos of real things" from "photos of AI images"; for plain text, you basically need a keystroke-authenticating keyboard on a computer with both internet access and copy and paste functionality securely disabled -- and then you still need an authenticating camera on the user the whole time to make sure they aren't just asking Gemini on their phone and typing its answer in.
Which is why I say it would destroy privacy/pseudonymity.
> For photos and video, this might be OK if there's a way to reliably distinguish "photos of real things" from "photos of AI images";
I suspect if you think about it, many of the issues with text also apply to images and videos.
You'd need a secure enclave You'd need a chain of signatures and images to allow human editing. You'd need a way of revoking the public keys of not just insecure software, but bad actors. You would need verified devices to prevent allowing AI tooling the using software to edit the image....etc.
This are only the flaws I can think of in like 5 minutes. You've created a huge incentive to break an incredibly complex system. I have no problem comfortably saying that the end result is a complete lack of privacy for most people while those with power/knowledge would still be able to circumvent it.
I understand the technical side of the suggestion. The social and practical side is inevitably flawed.
You need some sort of global registry of public keys. Not only does each registrar have to be trusted but you also need to both trust every single real person to protect and not misuse their keys.
Leaving aside the complete practical infeasability that, even if you accomplish it, you now have a unique identifier tied to every piece of text. There will inevitably be both legal processes to identify who produce a signed work as well as data analysis approaches to deanonamize the public keys.
The end result is pretty clearly that anyone wishing to present material that purports to be human made has to forgo anonymity/pseudonymity. Claiming otherwise is like claiming we can have a secure government backdoor for encryption.
I would also argue that those techniques do greatly reduce privacy and anonymity.
Have you looked into kinds of mitigations that cryptography offers? I’m not an expert, but I would expect there are ways to balance some degree of anonymity with some degree of human identity verification.
Perhaps there are some experts out there who can comment?
> Creates a Zero Knowledge (ZK) Proof of the camera sensor data and other metadata
That sounds like a nightmare to me.
We once considered text to be generated exclusively by humans, but this assumption must be tossed out now.
I usually reject arguments based on an assumption of some status quo that somehow just continues.
Why? I’ll give two responses, which are similar but use different language.
1. There is a fallacy where people compare a future state to the present state, but this is incorrect. One has to compare two future states, because you don’t get to go back in time.
2. The “status quo” isn’t necessarily a stable equilibrium. The state of things now is not necessarily special nor guaranteed.
I’m now of the inclination to ask for a supporting model (not just one rationale) for any prediction, even ones that seem like common sense. Common sense can be a major blind spot.
Very fair point.
And no, it’s less about the status quo and more about AI being the default. There are just too many reasons why this proposal, on its face, seems problematic to me. The following are some questions to highlight just a few of them:
- How exactly would “human creators [applying] their own digital signatures to the original pieces they created” work for creators who have already passed away?
- How fair exactly would it be to impose such a requirement when large portions of the world’s creators (especially in underdeveloped areas) would likely not be able to access and use the necessary software?
- How exactly do anonymous and pseudonymous creators survive such a requirement?
AI watermarking is adversarial, and anyone who generates a watermarked output either doesn't care, or wants the watermarked removed.
C2PA is cooperative: publishers want the signatures intact, so that the audience has trust in the publisher.
By "adversarial" and "cooperative", I mean in relation to the primary content distributor. There's an adversarial aspect to C2PA, too: bad actors want leaked keys so they can produce fake video and images with metadata attesting that they're real.
A lot of people have a large incentive to disrupt the AI watermark. Leaked C2PA keys will be a problem, but probably a minor one. C2PA is merely an additional assurance, beyond the reputation and representation of the publishing entity, of the origin of a piece of media.
2. Adding watermarks may reduce the ability of an LLM, which is why I don’t think they will be widely adopted.
3. Consider this simple task: ask an LLM to repeat exactly what you said. Is the resulting text authored by you, or by the AI?
And if I scan the image or take a picture of the image on display.
I think this technology is gonna quickly get eliminated from the marketplace, cause people aren’t willing to use AI for many common tasks that are watermarked this way. It’s ultimately gonna cause Google to lose share.
This technology has a basic use dilemma problem where widely publishing it’s ability and existence will cause your AI to stop being used in some applications
I think it’s weirder that they’re clamoring to give people tools to detect AI while clamoring to present AI-generated content as perfectly normal— no different than if the user had typed it in themselves.
To the extent watermarking technology builds trust and confidence in a product, this is a factor that moves against your prediction.
Talk is cheap. People sometimes make predictions just as easily as they generate words.
There's lot of room for contributions here, and I think "fingerprinting layer" is an under-valued part of the LLM stack, not being explored by enough entrants.
egeozcan•5mo ago
dragonwriter•5mo ago
There is a kind of arms race that has existed for a while for non-watermarked content, except that the detection tools are pretty much Magic 8-ball level of reliability, so there's not a lot of effort on the counter-detection side.