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Clarity vs. complexity: the invisible work of subtraction

https://www.alexscamp.com/p/clarity-vs-complexity-the-invisible
1•dovhyi•40s ago•0 comments

Solid-State Freezer Needs No Refrigerants

https://spectrum.ieee.org/subzero-elastocaloric-cooling
1•Brajeshwar•59s ago•0 comments

Ask HN: Will LLMs/AI Decrease Human Intelligence and Make Expertise a Commodity?

1•mc-0•2m ago•0 comments

From Zero to Hero: A Brief Introduction to Spring Boot

https://jcob-sikorski.github.io/me/writing/from-zero-to-hello-world-spring-boot
1•jcob_sikorski•2m ago•0 comments

NSA detected phone call between foreign intelligence and person close to Trump

https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/feb/07/nsa-foreign-intelligence-trump-whistleblower
3•c420•3m ago•0 comments

How to Fake a Robotics Result

https://itcanthink.substack.com/p/how-to-fake-a-robotics-result
1•ai_critic•3m ago•0 comments

It's time for the world to boycott the US

https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/2/5/its-time-for-the-world-to-boycott-the-us
1•HotGarbage•3m ago•0 comments

Show HN: Semantic Search for terminal commands in the Browser (No Back end)

https://jslambda.github.io/tldr-vsearch/
1•jslambda•3m ago•0 comments

The AI CEO Experiment

https://yukicapital.com/blog/the-ai-ceo-experiment/
2•romainsimon•5m ago•0 comments

Speed up responses with fast mode

https://code.claude.com/docs/en/fast-mode
3•surprisetalk•9m ago•0 comments

MS-DOS game copy protection and cracks

https://www.dosdays.co.uk/topics/game_cracks.php
3•TheCraiggers•10m ago•0 comments

Updates on GNU/Hurd progress [video]

https://fosdem.org/2026/schedule/event/7FZXHF-updates_on_gnuhurd_progress_rump_drivers_64bit_smp_...
2•birdculture•10m ago•0 comments

Epstein took a photo of his 2015 dinner with Zuckerberg and Musk

https://xcancel.com/search?f=tweets&q=davenewworld_2%2Fstatus%2F2020128223850316274
7•doener•11m ago•2 comments

MyFlames: Visualize MySQL query execution plans as interactive FlameGraphs

https://github.com/vgrippa/myflames
1•tanelpoder•12m ago•0 comments

Show HN: LLM of Babel

https://clairefro.github.io/llm-of-babel/
1•marjipan200•12m ago•0 comments

A modern iperf3 alternative with a live TUI, multi-client server, QUIC support

https://github.com/lance0/xfr
3•tanelpoder•13m ago•0 comments

Famfamfam Silk icons – also with CSS spritesheet

https://github.com/legacy-icons/famfamfam-silk
1•thunderbong•14m ago•0 comments

Apple is the only Big Tech company whose capex declined last quarter

https://sherwood.news/tech/apple-is-the-only-big-tech-company-whose-capex-declined-last-quarter/
2•elsewhen•17m ago•0 comments

Reverse-Engineering Raiders of the Lost Ark for the Atari 2600

https://github.com/joshuanwalker/Raiders2600
2•todsacerdoti•18m ago•0 comments

Show HN: Deterministic NDJSON audit logs – v1.2 update (structural gaps)

https://github.com/yupme-bot/kernel-ndjson-proofs
1•Slaine•22m ago•0 comments

The Greater Copenhagen Region could be your friend's next career move

https://www.greatercphregion.com/friend-recruiter-program
2•mooreds•23m ago•0 comments

Do Not Confirm – Fiction by OpenClaw

https://thedailymolt.substack.com/p/do-not-confirm
1•jamesjyu•23m ago•0 comments

The Analytical Profile of Peas

https://www.fossanalytics.com/en/news-articles/more-industries/the-analytical-profile-of-peas
1•mooreds•23m ago•0 comments

Hallucinations in GPT5 – Can models say "I don't know" (June 2025)

https://jobswithgpt.com/blog/llm-eval-hallucinations-t20-cricket/
1•sp1982•23m ago•0 comments

What AI is good for, according to developers

https://github.blog/ai-and-ml/generative-ai/what-ai-is-actually-good-for-according-to-developers/
1•mooreds•23m ago•0 comments

OpenAI might pivot to the "most addictive digital friend" or face extinction

https://twitter.com/lebed2045/status/2020184853271167186
1•lebed2045•25m ago•2 comments

Show HN: Know how your SaaS is doing in 30 seconds

https://anypanel.io
1•dasfelix•25m ago•0 comments

ClawdBot Ordered Me Lunch

https://nickalexander.org/drafts/auto-sandwich.html
3•nick007•26m ago•0 comments

What the News media thinks about your Indian stock investments

https://stocktrends.numerical.works/
1•mindaslab•27m ago•0 comments

Running Lua on a tiny console from 2001

https://ivie.codes/page/pokemon-mini-lua
1•Charmunk•28m ago•0 comments
Open in hackernews

Active NPM supply chain attack: Tinycolor and 40 Packages Compromised

https://socket.dev/blog/tinycolor-supply-chain-attack-affects-40-packages
85•feross•4mo ago

Comments

JonChesterfield•4mo ago
AI detected potential malware. Plus a bunch of words. Is this a real thing? It does look like all the other npm compromise notes. But the page has AI and potential written on it, so the whole thing may be fabricated, and there are no other comments here.

So on balance I guess I'll ignore it. What a time to be a developer.

seanieb•4mo ago
socket.dev is a well known a reputable company, and their founder is pretty well known and trusted too. And looking that their blog post it looks like detected a real attack.
feross•4mo ago
Founder of socket.dev here. “AI detected potential malware” is what we call the alerts generated by our automated malware detection engine that runs on all newly published open source packages in real-time. However, these alerts are reviewed by our threat research team and once a human has confirmed the finding, we upgrade it to “Known malware”.

At this point (given we just published research about this) we've upgraded this threat to Known malware.

So in short:

- “AI detected potential malware” = automated system found something suspicious

- “Known malware” = human confirmed it’s real

The wording is intentional because not every automated hit ends up being true malware. It’s better to give developers early visibility into possible threats, even if they turn out to be benign, than to miss a real attack.

junon•4mo ago
TIL you're the founder of Socket. Thank you (and your team) for the help last week.
ATechGuy•4mo ago
Speculating based on another post: "...our investors are pushing us hard to frame it as AI..."
kevin_thibedeau•4mo ago
To avoid LeftPad 3.0 they're going to have to add some sort of signed capabilities manifest to restrict API access for these narrow domain packages. Then attackers would limited to targeting those with network privileges.
lrvick•4mo ago
Package signing of any kind was ruled out in 2013 for nonsensical reasons https://github.com/npm/npm/pull/4016
____tom____•4mo ago
Time to revisit, clearly.
tmpfs•4mo ago
Agreed, more than time to revisit. I have stopped using npm entirely because of their cavalier attitude to security.

Code signing could and should have been implemented years ago. It's not a panacea but just part of defense in depth.

I can't trust npm whatsoever to do the right thing at this point.

aussieguy1234•4mo ago
They're scanning for credentials. If they can get things like AWS credentials, I would expect to see cloud crypto mining as their next move. So it would be a good idea to keep an eye on your infra if you are affected.
lrvick•4mo ago
Anyone that has production AWS creds in the same operating system they randomly execute unreviewed code on the internet on should have their access revoked.
efortis•4mo ago
Mitigate it with:

  echo "ignore-scripts=true" >> ~/.npmrc

https://blog.uxtly.com/getting-rid-of-npm-scripts
wrs•4mo ago
Some packages have install scripts that actually need to run (e.g., esbuild).

pnpm refuses to run install scripts from packages you haven’t manually authorized, which helps a bit.

efortis•4mo ago
Yes, at the end of that blog there are two options for that:

  npm install --ignore-scripts=false package-i-trust

Or, trigger the installation script:

  node node_modules/puppeteer/install.js
wrs•4mo ago
The pnpm version of this is persistent. You approve the package once, and regular install works thereafter. Which is nice.
DemocracyFTW2•4mo ago
is that permission tied to a specific version with a specific fingerprint/hash? because if it's not then you could still get a surprise come the next update...
wrs•4mo ago
It is by package name, but at least you won't be surprised when left-pad suddenly has an install script.

You can put a fingerprint on the package dependency itself, though, so if you add a fingerprint to anything you approve the install script for, you will get that level of safety.

lrvick•4mo ago
pnpm cannot be built from source without an existing pnpm binary making it ineligible for inclusion in any reproducible Linux distro, for good reason, as there is no way to rule out a trusting trust attack.

Pnpm should be considered for hobby use cases only.

lrvick•4mo ago
And then the vulnerable code will just move to shell execs in the main library that fire the next time you include the library in your project.

If you do not have time to review a library, then do not use it.

singulasar•4mo ago
I'm so sick of people saying this. If you use js for any non-tiny project, you'll have a bunch of packages. Due to how modules work in js, you'll have many, many sub dependencies.

Nobody has time to review every package they'll use, especially when not all sub dependencies have fully pinned versions.

If you have time to review every package, every time it updates, you might as well just write it yourself.

Yes, this is a problem, no reviewing every dependency is not the damn solution

efortis•4mo ago
Show them this Ken Thompson paper of 1984: "Reflections on Trusting Trust"

https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~rdriley/487/papers/Thompson_1984_Ref...

And then hardware compromises…

I don't mean install anything. I mean, it's not a problem particular to the JS ecosystem.

lrvick•4mo ago
I full source bootstrapped a Linux distro from hex0 all the way to nodejs binaries just to deal with trusting trust risks.

"just give up" is not a valid strategy.

https://codeberg.org/stagex/stagex

efortis•4mo ago
where can I follow you? blog, x?
lrvick•4mo ago
https://lance.dev has my mastodon etc. My friends and I also run the #! community, https://hashbang.sh #!:matrix.org
lrvick•4mo ago
I have built and shipped production web applications for many large orgs with millions of users. Used 1-2 libs tops that i reviewed myself.

Also now as someone that runs a security consulting firm, we absolutely have clients that review 100% of dependencies even when it is expensive.

Both are valid options.

Normalized negligence is still negligence.

efortis•4mo ago
I partially agree, but that does mitigate it. The report says the attacker injected a `postinstall` script, which is common.

On the other hand, yes, an attack at code level, or a legit bug wouldn't be prevented.

jimmyl02•4mo ago
this being the 2nd large compromise of the week is not boding well from the NPM ecosystem...

supply chain is and has been the new gold mine for bad actors it seems

seanieb•4mo ago
There have been practical suggestions that could prevent this but NPM has not yet adopted:

- Prevent publishing new package versions for 24–48 hours after account credentials are changed.

- Require support for security keys.

lrvick•4mo ago
The most important is just having authors sign their code and packages, and verifying code that is signed on download, like every sane Linux distro goes.

Except NPM rejected this over and over going back to 2013.

https://github.com/npm/npm/pull/4016

andycaine•4mo ago
Some of the reservations around GPG and PKI are understandable. GPG signing clearly works for OS package managers where there is more control, but it's been a failure on PyPi, RubyGems and Maven.

I'd love to see npm adopt keyless signing like PyPi are doing with https://peps.python.org/pep-0740/.

lrvick•4mo ago
Keyless signing is not a real thing. Trust online is always anchored to keys, even if short lived. Keyless signing just means letting a centralized oracle blind sign for you with trust anchored in a CA key of some kind in most cases, that an unknown number of people can tamper with.

Also GnuPG is not PGP.

My team and I dual PGP sign all packages in stagex with smartcards after confirmed determinstic builds. It works great, and avoids trust in any single party or computer. We even do this for all our python packages as pip will not allow it.

It is a single command with a rust binary to setup a PGP smartcard out of the package, with a backup. (keyfork) All devs should be PGP signing releases, reviews, and commits so we have a paper trail blackhats cannot inject themselves into.

There are no excuses other than misconceptions and misinformation on this topic being normalized.

andycaine•4mo ago
That's great - PGP signing works for you in your org.

But the fact is it hasn't worked for package repos like PyPi, and it won't for npm, because in a distributed, low-trust ecosystem like npm, you can't easily bind identities to PGP keys or have any confidence in the key management practices of package signers.

And of course "keyless" signing isn't literally keyless. But tools like sigstore remove the need for the management of long-lived keys and can bind a signature to an identity verified by a trusted IdP, solving some of the main issues with adopting PGP signatures.

lelanthran•4mo ago
>

NPM has bigger problems - no adults in the room! For example, they've been rejecting signed packages since 2014 or thereabouts?

Expect npm repos to be overflowing with AI-submitted crap that will lower the signal substantially due to not having any sort of identify via signing.

alex_suzuki•4mo ago
Nice little Dune reference in there: The malware installs a Github action if it finds an access token, and names it 'shai-hulud-workflow.yml'. Shai Hulud is the Fremen term for the sandworms on Arrakis.
danieldspx•4mo ago
I if you think that last week attack was s1ngularity that can be related to wormhole, now we get this shai-hulud that is actually a worm. Funny right? They are similar attacks also. This funny coincidence was described by someone at Aikido Security.
ramimac•4mo ago
It's not a coincidence - this attack is directly downstream of s1ngularity