But even if it was only an expression of popular rage, the author implies that such an expression would be justifiable. I'd submit that if his moral framework can justify that, then why is any other violent expression of rage unjustified? I don't personally believe that Israel's retaliation against Hamas is primarily for revenge or rage, although I'm sure those play a role. But surely that rage is legible to him as well, so on what grounds would the author criticize it?

It seems to me that by justifying murder by one side of the conflict, he leaves himself no moral authority to comdemn the other side. I suppose that implicit, but never really stated, is that the weaker side's rage is morally defensible while the stronger side's is not. But this is why he takes pains to describe Gaza before 10/7 as an "open-air prison" and to specifically negate the influence of Iran. In a larger scope, Israel is the weaker party in the Middle East, and if smallness justifies rage which justifies killing, then the logic of what is legible would certainly have to extend to Israel's response as well.

Which is ironic compared to the NYT, because I think the New Yorker tends to slip under the conservative media's radar, whereas the NYT has conspicuously attempted to appeal to conservatives but in doing so has only alienated some more liberal readers while still catching a whole lot of conservative ire.