Who exactly should and can control the horde of OSS developers?

The Wayland keylogger acts like an application; all Wayland compositors will only send key events to the focused surface, so the user has to focus an active surface in order to get key events. Even in the scenario where you've LD_PRELOAD-hooked all applications, you still will never get the lock screen password, as the compositor never sends it out across the wire.

LD_PRELOAD is problematic from a security perspective, but it's not Wayland-specific: the same issue is true for CLI applications and X11 applications, and any attacker with the ability to write files could also just replace your binaries with malicious ones (stuff them somewhere into ~/.hidden, and then add a $PATH entry to the start).

Xnamespaces looks to be more promising, but as far as I can tell that's still a WIP with little documentation, and from the documentation I can find it looks like it still breaks things like clipboard functionality.

    root       34595  2.7  0.4 26146280 532248 tty4  Sl+  Nov13 783:33 /usr/lib/xorg/Xorg vt4 -displayfd 3 -auth /run/user/1000/gdm/Xauthority -nolisten tcp -background none -noreset -keeptty -novtswitch -verbose 3

Wayland doesn't need X11's vulnerability as its only argument, Wayland is a much simpler design that is easier to iterate on because it doesn't assume the client and server are on different machines. The fact that it moves privileged APIs like screen capture behind portals is a bonus.

I knew someone who worked for a small loan type company. Passwords were stored in plain text, but even worse, the login form didn't actually check the password at all, it created valid sessions as long as you provided a valid user name.

When he informed his boss that was very bad, his boss simply said that nobody has abused it, and nobody would, don't waste time changing it.

The point, of course, is why would you wait until people are getting hacked to address a known vulnerability?

Sure, there are others, and they should be closed too, and they are when they are found. It makes no sense whatsoever to leave one open just because.

Any program you incidentally run within a typical graphical user session will have access to the X socket and a cookie, they will be able to connect. And after they connect... They basically just can do anything they want with zero real restrictions, including most likely some fairly trivial paths to root escalation. Even if they're running inside of a sandbox or container, with only an X11 socket poking through.

This problem was realized a very long time ago with the security extension but most of it never really caught on.

> Any program you run on a computer (especially a Linux computer, which lacks modern OS security measures and has constant privesc kernel holes) exposes you to security flaws. There has yet to be any computer system designed that a hacker can't break out of. If you intentionally download and execute a program, you are rolling the dice, regardless of what the software is.

If you believe this is true, then what exactly is the point of any security measure? Why bother using isolation and sandboxing, or passwords? Why does Windows bother patching flaws if they know there are certainly more of them and they will never fix them?

Do you by chance also smoke because you're going to die anyways?

> What's insane about all these discussions is that NOBODY IS HACKING X SERVERS. There's a thousand other kinds of software on Linux that there is real malware for. But nobody is trying to hijack your X11 session. This imagined threat is a red herring designed to bolster the argument for Wayland's horrible designs.

Lol. That's primarily because the Linux desktop is utterly irrelevant, not because nobody would care to do it. Is it really surprising that attacks against desktop computers would focus almost entirely on the OS that has 90+% of the market share? We don't get free software OS desktop malware for the same reason we don't get free software OS software ports.

Watching and waiting with security was a totally acceptable position in the 90s, but we get the general gist these days. We need security-by-design.

On the server side of Linux where Linux is relevant, the situation is much more impressive; auditing using eBPF, sandboxing with gVisor, microVMs with Firecracker and cloud-hypervisor, isolation using namespaces and seccomp-bpf and more.

On the desktop side, people are still arguing over whether or not it's a problem that any X client can by default silently keylog the entire system trivially. Okay, but a lot of us actually see that as a problem, and we're not interested much in "hearing you out". Most of us recognize that the Wayland protocol has warts (and too many damn protocols), but X11 has many more warts. I didn't care what was the successor to X11 specifically, I just cared that we eventually made some progress. Most people have nothing to offer here and just suggest we should've stuck with X11. Okay dude, but nobody wants to. The X.org devs would like to move on. The desktop environments really would like to move on. There was basically one serious guy that actually wanted to work on improving X11 and he turned out to be kind of crazy and couldn't stop breaking shit anyways.

There's no real reason it can't do any of that, it just doesn't and there are no real plans to add these features.

I'm not convinced by the "if you run a program you should assume you've already been hit by a CIA 0day". Obviously nobody is dialing into your X11 server from the internet, but this is a relatively easy nobody:nobody -> root/wm-session/whatever elevation of privilege.

I feel this is an important detail to keep in mind while choosing a fork.

These are both phrases used by people who are anti-woke (I guess asleep would be the proper term).

So I doubt age is the deciding factor ;)