Not wishing to undermine the central point, NAT for v6 is a thing. The point of the article is that it's not "NAT by default" the way home IPv4 is because so few places worldwide get more than a single IP per customer: The NAT is not there in v4 for security, it's to provide for multiple devices inside the home. Or, in the case of Carrier-Grade NAT, to manage multiple customers, behind a small pool of v4.

NAT doesn't exist to be secure. If it is, (and that is debatable because NAT busting is a thing) then, it's a side-effect.

NAT for v6 is not common. If you use ULA, you'd possibly use NAT for v6 in some circumstances.

https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6296

> The consequence of this is that when receiving inbound traffic, the router needs needs to be configured with where to send the traffic on the local network. As a result, it will drop any traffic that doesn’t appear in the “port forwarding” table for the NAT.

As I keep trying to explain each time this comes up: no, it doesn't and it won't.

When your router receives incoming traffic that isn't matched by a NAT state table entry or static port forward, it doesn't drop it. Instead, it processes that traffic in _exactly_ the same way it would have done if there was no NAT going on: it reads the dst IP header and (in the absence of a firewall) routes the packet to whatever IP is written there. Routers don't drop packets by default, so neither will routers that also do NAT.

Of course, this just strengthens your point that NAT isn't security.