I imagine that folks like journalists could have that type of attack in their threat model, and EFF already do a lot of great stuff in this space :)
0. https://isc.sans.edu/diary/31998
1. https://www.cloudflare.com/cloudforce-one/research/svgs-the-...
It is a passion project and will always be free because commercial CDR[1] solutions are insanely expensive and everyone should have access to the tools to compute securely.
1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Content_Disarm_%26_Reconstruct...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Traitor_tracing#Watermarking
https://arxiv.org/abs/1111.3597
The watermark can even be contained in the wording itself (multiple versions of sentences, word choice etc stores the entropy). The only moderately safe thing to leak would be a pure text full paraphrasing of the material. But that wouldn't inspire much trust as a source.
I don't think watermarking is a winning game for the watermarker, with enough copies any errors can be cancelled.
This is a very common assumption that turns out to be false.
There are Tardos probabilistic codes such (see the paper I linked). Which have the watermark scale as the square of the traitor count.
For example, with a watermark of just 400 bits, 4 traitors (who try their best to corrupt the watermark) will stand out enough to merit investigation and with 800 bits be accused without any doubt. This is for a binary alphabet, with text you can generate a bigger alphabet and have shorter watermarks.
And specifically about them not being hacked by malicious code. I'm not seeing anything that suggests it's about trying to remove traces of a file's origin.
I don't see why it would need a warning for something it's not designed for at all.
It doesn't seem to be meant for usage at scale -- it's not for general-purpose conversion, as the resulting files are huge, will have OCR errors, etc.
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