The real problem is that there is nothing novel here. Variants of this type of attack were clear from the beginning.

legit issue for local installs but this is why we run the hosted platform in gVisor. even with the exploit you're trapped in a sandbox with no access to the host node. we treat every container as hostile by default.

Moltbot is a security nightmare, especially it's premise (tap into all your data sources) and the rapid uptake by inexperienced users makes it especially attractive for criminal networks.

I'm curious, outside of AI enthusiasts have people found value with using Clawdbot, and if so, what are they doing with it? From my perspective it seems like the people legitimately busy enough that they actually need an AI assistant are also people with enough responsibilities that they have to be very careful about letting something act on their behalf with minimal supervision. It seems like that sort of person could probably afford to hire an administrative assistant anyway (a trustworthy one), or if it's for work they probably already have one.

On the other hand, the people most inclined to hand over access to everything to this bot also strike me as people without a lot to lose? I don't want to make an unfair characterization or anything, it just strikes me that handing over the keys to your entire life/identity is a lot more palatable if you don't have much to lose anyway?

Am I missing something?

So many people are giving keys to the kingdom to this thing. What is happening with humanity?

Thank you for doing this. I'm shocked that more people aren't thinking about security with respect to AI.

I rushed out nono.sh (the opposite of yolo!) in response to this and its already negated a few gateway attacks.

It uses kernel-level security primitives (Landlock on Linux, Seatbelt on macOS) to create sandboxes where unauthorized operations are structurally impossible. API keys are also stored in apples secure enclave (or the kernel keyring in linux) , and injected at run time and zeroized from memory after use. There is also some blocking of destructive actions (rm -rf ~/)

its as simple to run as: nono run --profile openclaw -- openclaw gateway

You can also use it to sandbox things like npm install:

nono run --allow node_modules --allow-file package.json package.lock npm install pkg

Its early in, there will be bugs! PR's welcome and all that!

https://nono.sh

Things like this are why I don't use AI agents like moltbot/openclaw. Security is just out the window with these things. It's like the last 50 years never happened.

what worries me here is that the entire personal AI agent product category is built on the premise of “connect me to all your data + give me execution.” At that point, the question isn’t “did they patch this RCE,” it’s more about what does a secure autonomous agent deployment even look like when its main feature is broad authority over all of someone's connected data?

Is the only real answer sandboxing + zero trust + treating agents as hostile by default? Or is this category fundamentally incompatible with least privilege?

yikes

do people even care about security anymore? I'll bet many consumers wouldn't even think twice about just giving full access to this thing (or any other flavor of the month AI agent product)