the planner-executor isolation point is what stood out to me. right now most browser agent frameworks treat the LLM as both the decision-maker and the one processing untrusted content — so a prompt injection in page content can hijack the entire control flow.
the paper's recommendation to split planning (trusted inputs only) from execution (handles untrusted web content) mirrors how we think about privilege separation in OS design, but almost nobody building agent frameworks is actually doing it.
the CVE they found is also telling — Browser Use's domain allowlist could be bypassed, which means the "security" feature was essentially decorative. When you give an agent session tokens and let it
navigate freely, the trust boundary problem isn't optional anymore.
tiny-automates•1h ago
the paper's recommendation to split planning (trusted inputs only) from execution (handles untrusted web content) mirrors how we think about privilege separation in OS design, but almost nobody building agent frameworks is actually doing it.
the CVE they found is also telling — Browser Use's domain allowlist could be bypassed, which means the "security" feature was essentially decorative. When you give an agent session tokens and let it navigate freely, the trust boundary problem isn't optional anymore.