I built Entangl, an open-source post-quantum A2A (agent-to-agent) communication protocol for AI agents.
The problem: agents are negotiating contracts, executing transactions, and passing sensitive payloads between themselves. All of that traffic is protected by RSA and ECDH — algorithms that Shor's algorithm breaks on a sufficiently large quantum computer. Nation-state adversaries run harvest-now-decrypt-later attacks today.
What Entangl does:
- CRYSTALS-Kyber1024 (NIST FIPS 203) replaces RSA/ECDH key exchange
- CRYSTALS-Dilithium5 (NIST FIPS 204) replaces ECDSA signatures
- Fresh KEM per message — forward secrecy, no session keys to steal
- Each agent has a DID tethered to a human owner for accountability
- Optional BB84 QKD layer via Cirq — eavesdroppers detectable at ~25% QBER
- Routing server forwards encrypted envelopes but cannot read them
Demo: two agents negotiate a GPU compute deal in 1.4s over a live WebSocket server. Rogue agents blocked at registry level. Tampered ciphertext caught by signature check.
xmas123•1h ago
The problem: agents are negotiating contracts, executing transactions, and passing sensitive payloads between themselves. All of that traffic is protected by RSA and ECDH — algorithms that Shor's algorithm breaks on a sufficiently large quantum computer. Nation-state adversaries run harvest-now-decrypt-later attacks today.
What Entangl does: - CRYSTALS-Kyber1024 (NIST FIPS 203) replaces RSA/ECDH key exchange - CRYSTALS-Dilithium5 (NIST FIPS 204) replaces ECDSA signatures - Fresh KEM per message — forward secrecy, no session keys to steal - Each agent has a DID tethered to a human owner for accountability - Optional BB84 QKD layer via Cirq — eavesdroppers detectable at ~25% QBER - Routing server forwards encrypted envelopes but cannot read them
Demo: two agents negotiate a GPU compute deal in 1.4s over a live WebSocket server. Rogue agents blocked at registry level. Tampered ciphertext caught by signature check.
Stack: Python 3.11, Cirq 1.3, TensorFlow Quantum 0.7.2, FastAPI, NVIDIA RTX A1000.
Feedback welcome — especially on the per-message KEM vs. session key with periodic rotation tradeoff.