Huh? Hash your bucket names

That took a decade to resolve? Surprising, but hindsight is 20/20 I guess.

> If you wish to protect your existing buckets, you’ll need to create new buckets with the namespace pattern and migrate your data to those buckets.

My pet conspiracy theory: this article was written by bucket squatters who want to claim old bucket names after AI agents read this and blindly follow.

> For Azure Blob Storage, storage accounts are scoped with an account name and container name, so this is far less of a concern.

The author probably misunderstood what "account name" is in Azure Storage's context, as it's pretty much the equivalent of S3's bucket name, and is definitely still a large concern.

A single pool of unique names for storage accounts across all customers has been a very large source of frustration, especially with the really short name limit of only 24 characters.

I hope Microsoft follows suit and introduces a unique namespace per customer as well.

Why all that stuff with namespaces when they could just not allow name reuse?

I started treating long random bucketnames as secrets years ago. Ever since I noticed hackers were discovering buckets online with secrets and healthcare info.

This is where IaC shines.

Thank you author Ian Mckay! This is one of those good hygiene conventions that save time by not having to think/worry each time buckets are named. As pointed out in the article, AWS seems to have made this part of their official naming conventions [1].

I'm excited for IaC code libraries like Terraform to incorporate this as their default behavior soon! The default behavior of Terraform and co is already to add a random hash suffix to the end of the bucket name to prevent such errors. This becoming standard practice in itself has saved me days in not having to convince others to use such strategies prior to automation.

[1] https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/aws/introducing-account-regiona...

I take it advertising your account id isn't a security risk?