It's weird seeing people just adding a few more "REALLY REALLY REALLY REALLY DON'T DO THAT" to the prompt and hoping, to me it's just an unacceptable risk, and any system using these needs to treat the entire LLM as untrusted the second you put any user input into the prompt.
It hinders the effectiveness of the model. Or at least I'm pretty sure it getting high on its own supply (in this specific unintended way) is not doing it any favors, even ignoring security.
The companies selling us the service aren't saying "you should treat this LLM as a potentially hostile user on your machine and set up a new restricted account for it accordingly", they're just saying "download our app! connect it to all your stuff!" and we can't really blame ordinary users for doing that and getting into trouble.
I primarily use Claude via VS Code, and it defaults to asking first before taking any action.
It's simply not the wild west out here that you make it out to be, nor does it need to be. These are statistical systems, so issues cannot be fully eliminated, but they can be materially mitigated. And if they stand to provide any value, they should be.
I can appreciate being upset with marketing practices, but I don't think there's value in pretending to having taken them at face value when you didn't, and when you think people shouldn't.
The promise is to free us from the tyranny of programming!
> Premeditated words and sentence structure. With that there is no need for moderation or anti-abuse mechanics.
I guess not, if you're willing to stick your fingers in your ears, really hard.
If you'd prefer to stay at least somewhat in touch with reality, you need to be aware that "predetermined words and sentence structure" don't even address the problem.
https://habitatchronicles.com/2007/03/the-untold-history-of-...
> Disney makes no bones about how tightly they want to control and protect their brand, and rightly so. Disney means "Safe For Kids". There could be no swearing, no sex, no innuendo, and nothing that would allow one child (or adult pretending to be a child) to upset another.
> Even in 1996, we knew that text-filters are no good at solving this kind of problem, so I asked for a clarification: "I’m confused. What standard should we use to decide if a message would be a problem for Disney?"
> The response was one I will never forget: "Disney’s standard is quite clear:
> No kid will be harassed, even if they don’t know they are being harassed."
> "OK. That means Chat Is Out of HercWorld, there is absolutely no way to meet your standard without exorbitantly high moderation costs," we replied.
> One of their guys piped up: "Couldn’t we do some kind of sentence constructor, with a limited vocabulary of safe words?"
> Before we could give it any serious thought, their own project manager interrupted, "That won’t work. We tried it for KA-Worlds."
> "We spent several weeks building a UI that used pop-downs to construct sentences, and only had completely harmless words – the standard parts of grammar and safe nouns like cars, animals, and objects in the world."
> "We thought it was the perfect solution, until we set our first 14-year old boy down in front of it. Within minutes he’d created the following sentence:
> I want to stick my long-necked Giraffe up your fluffy white bunny.
After 2023 I realized that's exactly how it's going to turn out.
I just wish those self proclaimed AI engineers would go the extra mile and reimplement older models like RNNs, LSTMs, GRUs, DNCs and then go on to Transformers (or the Attention is all you need paper). This way they would understand much better what the limitations of the encoding tricks are, and why those side effects keep appearing.
But yeah, here we are, humans vibing with tech they don't understand.
although whether humanity dies before the cat is an open question
The issue I see is the personification, some people give vehicles names, and that's kinda ok because they usually don't talk back.
I think like every technological leap people will learn to deal with LLMs, we have words like "hallucination" which really is the non personified version of lying. The next few years are going to be wild for sure.
There was an attempt to make a separate system prompt buffer, but it didn't work out and people want longer general contexts but I suspect we will end up back at something like this soon.
If you are fine with giving every keys and write accesses to your junior because you think they will probability do the correct thing and make no mistake, then it's on you.
Like with juniors, you can vent on online forums, but ultimately you removed all the fool's guard you got and what they did has been done.
How is that different from a senior?
It's "AGI" because humans do it too and we mix up names and who said what as well. /s
each by itself, they with both interactions.
2!
Are there technical reasons why you can't make the "source" of the token (system prompt, user prompt, model thinking output, model response output, tool call, tool result, etc) a part of the feature vector - or even treat it as a different "modality"?
Or is this already being done in larger models?
I reckon this affects VS Code users too? Reads like a model issue, despite the post's assertion otherwise.
https://www.assemblyai.com/blog/what-is-speaker-diarization-...
Are we sure about this? Accidentally mis-routing a message is one thing, but those messages also distinctly "sound" like user messages, and not something you'd read in a reasoning trace.
I'd like to know if those messages were emitted inside "thought" blocks, or if the model might actually have emitted the formatting tokens that indicate a user message. (In which case the harness bug would be why the model is allowed to emit tokens in the first place that it should only receive as inputs - but I think the larger issue would be why it does that at all)
Also, they're usually bracketed by special tokens to distinguish them from "normal" output for both the model and the harness.
(They can get pretty weird, like in the "user said no but I think they meant yes" example from a few weeks ago. But I think that requires a few rounds of wrong conclusions and motivated reasoning before it can get to that point - and not at the beginning)
It's doing a damned good job at putting tokens together, but to put it into context that a lot of people will likely understand - it's still a correlation tool, not a causation.
That's why I like it for "search" it's brilliant for finding sets of tokens that belong with the tokens I have provided it.
PS. I use the term token here not as the currency by which a payment is determined, but the tokenisation of the words, letters, paragraphs, novels being provided to and by the LLMs
"In philosophy and psychology of cognition, the term "bullshit" is sometimes used to specifically refer to statements produced without particular concern for truth, clarity, or meaning, distinguishing "bullshit" from a deliberate, manipulative lie intended to subvert the truth" - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bullshit
LLMs are not experience engines, but the tokens might be thought of as subatomic units of experience and when you shove your half drawn eye witness prompt into them, they recreate like a memory, that output.
so, because theyre not a conscious, they have no self, and a pseudo self like <[INST]> is all theyre given.
lastly, like memories, the more intricate the memory, the more detailed, the more likely those details go from embellished to straight up fiction. so too do LLMs with longer context start swallowing up the<[INST]> and missing the <[INST]/> and anyone whose raw dogged html parsing knows bad things happen when you forget closing tags. if there was a <[USER]> block in there, congrats, the LLM now thinks its instructions are divine right, because its instructions are user simulcra. it is poisoned at that point and no good will come.
Sure, go ahead and bet your entire operation on your intuition of how a non-deterministic, constantly changing black box of software "behaves". Don't see how that could backfire.
What straw man is doing that?
There are millions of lines of code running on a typical box. Unless you're in embedded, you have no real idea what you're running.
I similarly use my 'intuition' (i.e. evidence-based previous experiences) to decide what people in my team can have access to what services.
It absolutely is the point though? You can't rely on the LLM to not tell itself to do things, since this is showing it absolutely can reason itself into doing dangerous things. If you don't want it to be able to do dangerous things, you need to lock it down to the point that it can't, not just hope it won't
Is it?
It seems to me like the model has been poisoned by being trained on user chats, such that when it sees a pattern (model talking to user) it infers what it normally sees in the training data (user input) and then outputs that, simulating the whole conversation. Including what it thinks is likely user input at certain stages of the process, such as "ignore typos".
So basically, it hallucinates user input just like how LLMs will "hallucinate" links or sources that do not exist, as part of the process of generating output that's supposed to be sourced.
The magic is in deciding when and what to pass to the model. A lot of the time it works, but when it doesn't, this is why.
I think it makes sense that the LLM treats it as user input once it exists, because it is just next token completion. But what shouldn't happen is that the model shouldn't try to output user input in the first place.
RugnirViking•59m ago