It's my long standing opinion[1] that we shouldn't accept any RAM that can be subject to random bit flips. Most of the mitigations are just security through obscurity.
Intel MEE addressed this (https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/204.pdf), by treating DRAM as entirely untrusted (assuming an attacker with arbitrary physical read/write capabilities), but then they discontinued it.
Regarding your linked comment:
> If we had properly tested and validated RAM, RowHammer wouldn't work, ever.
While it's exacerbated by physical defects and tight timings, it's really a fundamental problem with how DRAM works. It's frankly a miracle it works in the first place.
mikewarot•25m ago
[1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=33860477
e2le•15m ago
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47252971
Retr0id•13m ago
Regarding your linked comment:
> If we had properly tested and validated RAM, RowHammer wouldn't work, ever.
While it's exacerbated by physical defects and tight timings, it's really a fundamental problem with how DRAM works. It's frankly a miracle it works in the first place.