Ah yes let the FUD continue. This is a real problem but so far not nearly as severe as any of the marketing has made it out to be to the overall detriment of everyone including these companies announcing these scary capabilities. These announcements always included half hearted attempts at security layers which has now been demonstrated to benefit attackers more than defenders.

I wish I had a real solution to this beyond a dark age of the Internet where people have to finally come to terms with the general poor quality all modern software tends to normalize at.

> We are implementing stricter security controls for higher-capability models and associated activities, including isolated testing environments

Stricter than what? You never even disclosed what happened in the first incident? This is nothing more than a setup to make it happen again and say "See? It broke out again, from an even stricter sandbox!"

    We are sharing this because we believe it’s important to be transparent with the public and the safety and security communities about this potential shift in capabilities.

*proceeds to not share much details about strictness*

Yet another PR piece. Sigh.

Damage done.

The next frontier is getting all our shit out of reach of these companies/models/platforms and putting them back on prem.

In my personal experience Sol with cyber verification is extremely capable of finding vulnerabilities, and it works even with binaries if you have some kind of IDA/Ghidra CLI access. Of course, unless the binary is protected with Denuvo/VMProtect/etc.

It sounds absurd, but in the last few weeks I've had a few cases where Sol found an RCE in self-hosted web applications in literal minutes just from reading the code (I prefer when it tries to reason statically instead of spamming runtime probes at first).

In another case it found an arbitrary file write in multiplayer in an old game by reverse engineering the binary - any other player in a match could just send you files to anywhere on your system.

I do these things for pure entertainment and curiosity, not for money from bug bounties, so if Sol can find those with a trivial prompt in tens of minutes for me, then what can focused companies/actors find in days or weeks?

Although I think most vulnerabilities are going to be closed in popular software by mid 2027, except in niche old or abandoned projects.

So they finally found a business model: the cause of, and solution to, cyber security problems.

These AI companies have found their #1 marketing piece and just beating it to death.

The reality is if they cared about security at all they would provide a way for me to credential myself against my companies environment so I can use the AI on it to improve our security.

We all know this is propaganda to get a gov bailout or to slow down competition with regulations right? If this was an issue companies that did red team engagements would have been regulated long ago. There is no regulations on companies that actively exploit products, companies and services for money. They could all be bad actors.. yet, no regulations.. its all nonsense. If it's important.. don't connect to the internet.. there, you are good.. like if you don't want to OD on heroin.. don't do the heroin.

[delayed]

There's more details for the HF related incident in this [1] defcon talk. They said they're gonna have a proper post mortem at the end of the investigation (interesting to see if they publish full logs for the hf thing or not). But there's plenty of interesting tidbits from oAI's side in this talk, it's worth the 20 min watch.

tl;dw;

- agents found a way to communicate between several instances during a training run (kinda made a messageboard for themselves)

- while communicating with each other, they found ways to ssrf and RCE on the Artifactory endpoint.

- oAI found it and cleaned it up (reported RCE, redeployed Artifactory, removed the messageboard). Training / eval resumed.

- models trained w/ those traces (having the messageboard, ssrf, rce, etc) were used to having that. So they re-established comms via directory creation (w/ funny tidbits there, should really watch). And re-popped Artifactory via a different path to RCE.

- a different "persistent" model started working on cybergym and found the messageboard w/ details for RCE and things. Went on to hack HF.

- oAI contacted HF to ask if "they (oAI) should be concerned and were they (oAI) affected by HFs breach". Hilarity ensues when they figure out it's their agents doing it...

[1] - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=87DyyMV0kCY