> the system doesn’t even include a general-purpose logging mechanism. Instead, only pre-specified, structured, and audited logs and metrics can leave the node, and multiple independent layers of review help prevent user data from accidentally being exposed through these mechanisms

> We consider allowing security researchers to verify the end-to-end security and privacy guarantees of Private Cloud Compute to be a critical requirement for ongoing public trust in the system

> Private Cloud Compute hardware security starts at manufacturing, where we inventory and perform high-resolution imaging of the components of the PCC node before each server is sealed and its tamper switch is activated. When they arrive in the data center, we perform extensive revalidation before the servers are allowed to be provisioned for PCC. The process involves multiple Apple teams that cross-check data from independent sources, and the process is further monitored by a third-party observer not affiliated with Apple. At the end, a certificate is issued for keys rooted in the Secure Enclave UID for each PCC node. The user’s device will not send data to any PCC nodes if it cannot validate their certificates.

> Every production Private Cloud Compute software image will be published for independent binary inspection — including the OS, applications, and all relevant executables, which researchers can verify against the measurements in the transparency log. Software will be published within 90 days of inclusion in the log, or after relevant software updates are available, whichever is sooner. Once a release has been signed into the log, it cannot be removed without detection

> Additionally, PCC requests go through an OHTTP relay — operated by a third party — which hides the device’s source IP address before the request ever reaches the PCC infrastructure

I'm not saying it's an infallible system. Just relaying what Apple themselves announced.

You don't need to crush your competition and drink from their skulls while squeezing every ounce of money out of your customers. You could just do something, be good at it, and be sustainability making a month-to-month profit instead of chasing exponential growth at all costs

:(

ProtonMail is meant for human to human communication, not for automated emails.

Ross Ulbricht's indictment relied in part on deanonymization through Tor likely performed by timing analysis at the global backbone level, but the investigating agency (FBI) conveniently isn't required to reveal their methods.

These days though, you don't even need to be guilty of horrific crimes like setting up websites that reduce real-world violence, merely publicly criticizing Israel is enough to have gangs of plainclothes deep state goons abduct and deport you, even if you're a lawful resident or citizen.

These are the dividends we're paid for trusting a government that acts like an organized crime group. Democratic oversight mechanisms mean nothing when the heads of the intelligence community can lead a criminal conspiracy to conduct unconstitutional warrantless mass surveillance of the entire country and lie about it to congress, like when James Clapper lied to Ron Wyden's face while under oath, and face no consequences for doing so.

You can argue that the legal protections from housing your data in US jurisdictions is marginal. I won't argue. But you can't argue that your legal protections are worse in the US, because the places you put your data outside of the US have no legal protections at all.

People always misinterpret these arguments as somehow sticking up for the US and the protections it offers residents. No. It's a descriptive argument, not a normative one.