Did we know it had by 1957, or did that take a little longer to confirm the shape of the decline?
You're kinda making the point I'm making; the sound of an empire collapsing is often a long rumble, not a sudden snap.
As a kid in the 80s/90s who spent a non-zero amount of time in a mall, I just wanted to highlight how great this name is.
> Blinder and Watson reported that budget deficits tended to be smaller under Democrats at 2.1% potential GDP versus 2.8% potential GDP for Republicans, a difference of about 0.7 of a percentage point. They wrote that higher budget deficits should theoretically have boosted the economy more for Republicans, and therefore cannot explain the greater GDP growth under Democrats.[3] Since 1981, federal budget deficits have increased under Republican presidents Ronald Reagan, both Bushes, and Trump, while deficits have declined under Democratic presidents Clinton and Obama. The federal government ran surpluses during Clinton's last four fiscal years, the first surpluses since 1969. The deficit was projected to decline sharply in Biden's first fiscal year.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._economic_performance_by_p...
This has nothing to do with investors' perceptions of U.S. credit and everything to do with the financial rates environment.
[1] https://home.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/...
[2] https://www.global-rates.com/en/interest-rates/cme-term-sofr...
It absolutely is related to investors' perceptions of U.S. credit worthiness. The news is about the 13th of August 2026 auction.
Entities lending money to US want increasingly higher compensation, which is unsurprising considering that the US projected deficits are ballooning (an estimated 7.4% both in 2026 and 27). US has already blown past 1.8T in deficit in the first 6 months of 2026 alone. That's higher than the deficit for the entirety of 2025.
Finding money to absorb all this spending is not easy and lenders are spooked by inflation and borrowing levels.
Related to, not evidence of. I added a CDS reference which isolates the credit component.
> Entities lending money to US want increasingly higher compensation
Entities lending money in dollars want higher compensation. There is no evidence they demand a risk premium from the United States.
What we are seeing is an increasing term premium. But that doesn't have to do with the U.S.'s perceived creditworthiness, it's a function of money supply and demand.
No, at least according to Treasury buyers [1].
The UK bonds are the highest since the 90s and Japanese debt has never been higher.
There is a fiscal problem but it’s not an _American_ one unless you just assume all international finance is a US issue.
Why wouldn't you? 2008's collapse of the US housing market caused a global recession. It's the single largest economy on the planet.
If there is correlation between those things it’s either by choice (the German people tieing their government to the US) or it’s demographic.
I can't even begin to imagine how someone says this with a straight face.
None of these big swings between administrations had much to do with policy:
Clinton inherited the end of the Cold War and resulting “peace dividend”.
Obama inherited a Federal government already spending hundreds of billions to address the GFC.
Similarly, Biden inherited a Covid recovery budget spending an additional trillion or so.
And so much of it has to do with the influence of The Heritage Foundation.
When you break it up that way, there have been several fiscally conservative congresses + good presidency combos, most notably under Clinton where they reformed welfare, increased taxes and managed to get a budget surplus one year. The formula seems to be slim Democratic Party majorities in Congress with a Democrat president.
So yes it’s rare but good governance + rising tides can make a difference.
Clinton changed a 300b deficit into a 100b surplus. Obama reduced it from 1.4t to 500b.
Biden also slashed it but that’s a little unfair due to covid.
The last pre-Covid Trump I year of 2019 had a $984B deficit. After Covid, Biden’s final full year deficit was $1.83T.
There’s a non-zero correlation between any number of policy choices by both parties and the GFC or Covid, but it’s hard to see these primarily as anything but exogenous shocks.
The treasury announces it wants to sell $ 25B of 30Y bonds.
Then investors submit offers saying in effect how much yield they demand to buy them.
Then the treasury fills bids from the lowest yield upwards in tranches.
Yes. What do you think I don't understand?
Do you understand the difference between credit and rates?
Then the treasury fills these orders from the lowest to highest bid.
So all of your post make no sense. US paying the highest rates in 25 years means the buyers are expecting higher premiums.
And they ask them because they are worried about inflation and elevated borrowing levels.
No, it does not. Treasury goes down the list until it has "filled" the auction and then everyone gets the marginal rate. (And that's for competitive bids. You can also submit a non-competitive bid with no price–that gets filled first.)
> US paying the highest rates in 25 years means the buyers are expecting higher premiums
Would recommend looking up credit versus rates. It’s a useful construct.
> they ask them because they are worried about inflation
Nope. Do you know what TIPS are? You can compare the price of a normal Treasury and a TIP to get what Treasury buyers think about inflation. That's the breakeven-inflation rate in my top comment.
If you say you think they're wrong, I think I might agree. But the data–Treasury auction and insurance data–speak unambiguously to these points of investors' views, specicially, creditworthineness and inflation expectation.
This is literally exactly wrong. Which is pretty par for the course when someone asks you if you understand how something works in the internet.
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/econographics/are-risi...
> Several factors have driven the rise in bond yields, including higher inflation expectations amid elevated energy prices following the Iran war and uncertainty surrounding a new Federal Reserve Chair. But the more fundamental concern is the US fiscal position: persistently high budget deficits have reached 6 percent of GDP, while government debt now exceeds the size of the US economy.
> In Fiscal Year 2026, which ends in September, the US Treasury is expected to issue around $2 trillion of securities on a net basis. Gross issuance, meanwhile, could reach a staggering $20 trillion according to the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association. That gap reflects the sheer volume of debt that needs to be rolled over, much of it resulting from the Treasury’s decision under former Secretary Janet Yellen to favor shorter maturities when rates were lower and curves were upward sloping.
> US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has been attentive to the resulting borrowing costs and their impact on the budget deficit, which is why the Treasury has sought to limit pressure on the US bond market from foreign central banks that need dollars. During a recent joint FX market intervention with Japan, the Treasury sold euros for yen rather than dollars, avoiding transactions that would have required selling Treasuries. It has also asked the Fed to raise the limit on its Foreign and International Monetary Authorities repo facility, allowing the Bank of Japan and other foreign central banks to borrow short-term dollars against Treasuries rather than sell them in the open market, which could put further upward pressure on yields.
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-13/us-braces...
> “Investors are being asked to absorb a growing supply of government debt globally at a time when deficits remain large, inflation uncertainty persists” and the Federal Reserve is no longer a major buyer, said Michal Stanczyk, portfolio manager for the global fixed income team at Allspring Global Investments.
> “If investors continue demanding greater compensation for inflation and fiscal risks, long-term yields could move higher and away from 5% even if Treasury auctions remain well covered,” he said.
then in steps kevin warsh... historical backdrop: warsh resigned from the fed in 2011 because the fed owned too many assets. since then the fed bought 4 trillion more more than doubling the size of the fed balance sheet
warsh wants to shrink the balance sheet. only way to do that is to buy less treasuries, but the only reason 30 year mortgage isn't >15% is because the fed is the biggest buyer of long dated treasuries and mortgage backed securities (as in MBS i.e. the paper not the prince) since 2009...
so if warsh gets what he wants the long end is guaranteed to spike
then you add in the executive branch trying to to re-engineer the current account balance w the mar-a-lago accord and the correct reaction is not "wow rates are high" its "wow its kind of amazing rates are as low as they are in the long end", especially with the private markets gulping down as much gpu collateralized debt as it can without dislocating a jaw...
It's objectively not–that's what CDS measure.
> higher inflation expectations
Not reflected in the data [1].
We can reasonably debate if investors should treat the U.S. as a riskier credit. But these auctions, CDS data and other funding rates for high-quality non-U.S. dollar-denominated credits (e.g. Saudi Arabia's dollar-denominated debt [2]) do not show what the article implies they do.
[1] https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/T10YIE
[2] https://live.deutsche-boerse.com/bond/xs2747599509-saudi-ara...
https://www.pgpf.org/programs-and-projects/fiscal-policy/mon...
TIPS are Treasuries. The breakeven-inflation rate is calculated entirely from Treasuries.
> data shows a path to a potential debt spiral and crisis based on yields demanded and debt outstanding
Sure. The data also–unambiguously–show that Treasury prices are not pricing in a U.S. default or runaway inflation.
downrightmike•57m ago