This is now my favorite way to visualize these concepts in practice.

I think this kind of behavior in principle would be detectable but in principle with enough concentration in the market, a fraudulent seller could in practice get brokers and jurors to collude with them.

I respect what you’re trying to do but this feels like a solution in search of a problem.

The kind of markets this would tailor towards already have their own escrow management systems.

I do, however, see this being relevant to MLS and the Housing industry. It’s a shady industry with scammy ads and “handyman special” vibes from people trying to sell legitimate and illegitimate listings.

There's absolutely no need to make a new L1 for that: you can use existing smart contract/dapp platforms, plug into existing stable coin rails, etc.

Also regarding the code, why are you defining private?

  #define private public

This is a massive code smell.

(2) No reason not to adapt existing standards to be compatible with any of the wallets that already exist.

(3) No reason to introduce your own wallet. How many wheels do you want to reinvent here?

(4) No reason to invent your own currency (and in fact this makes your escrow system break completely.)

Btw: the problem you're trying to solve has been "solved" many times over before using various escrow mechanism dating back to the gox era. The reason they all failed is because no protocol can make up for the opacity and unpredictable nature of the real world. If you think about it your solution is more like the opposite of what makes cryptocurrencies valuable: you're essentially increasing transaction costs to try "improve" the physical verifiability of goods. When normal people just use semi-trusted merchants which are faster and cheaper.

By the sound of your protocol it would increase shipping time substantially, increase costs to buyers (I'm assuming they have to pay higher fees to pay the verifiers), and after all that it still doesn't prevent scamming. Because you never know if a verifier prefers to hold on to an item and burn all their collateral based on changing economic conditions. Maybe they end up with an expensive item that holds considerable value relative to the staked currency (which I'm again assuming that you're inventing another wheel and increasing friction even more by introducing your own currency. Not going to even bother to look.)

Your idea resembles a more error-prone version of high-end verification markets like precious metals, gem stones, and art trading. But lacks a lot of the simple guarantees that such markets would provide.