I don't have a problem with it, specifically. Seems odd that they don't advertise it, though.
It makes me wonder how much is motivated by stuff other than what’s actually the best outcome.
Yeah. I too, hate the Rust Evangelically Orthodox Later Day Christians.
Oh, wait... You're serious. What is religious about rewriting tools in Rust? Isn't that what most programmers do for fun and learning?
Is it any more religious than worshiping Alan Kay or Dijkstra?
> It makes me wonder how much is motivated by stuff other than what’s actually the best outcome.
Looks in the thread... Sees https://www.sudo.ws/security/advisories/
Are you sure the status quo is the better outcome?
"Religious" isn't being used to refer to people rewriting tools in Rust.
It's used to refer to people zealously commenting on message boards that every single tool ever built should be rewritten in Rust, and if you aren't rewriting your tool in Rust, you're an idiot.
But I'm aware that some people are frightened of new languages and paradigms especially if they're 'harder' than what they're used to.
I genuinely hadn't thought of this point of contention beforehand, but oof he did not care for that.
It is only "religious" if you think it in such a way.
I'd say the amount of skepticism (rather than valid criticism) has been no less than enthusiam in the community.
As the saying goes, there are two kinds of languages...
I think they just want to ditch GNU tools and lots of young, low level programmers want to use Rust (same rationale for Linus accepting Rust code into the kernel).
I found an alternative implementation that doesn't rely in being a setuid binary like systemd-run0 much more interesting from a security perspective, but I am no security expert.
I think the main benefit of eliminating setuid binaries is that you can forbid them system-wide (e.g. via mount flags), as a hardening measure.
The original unix process abstraction was extremely simple; the entire spec is a few pages.
The problem is that Linux keeps adding more and more levels of Rube Goldberg machine to its security model, so now literally no one understands how a default minimal install of, say, Ubuntu works.
Adding a magic daemon that runs stuff as root to this pile of complexity probably won’t help. Ripping out almost all the cruft that’s accumulated over the years, and adding back something sane (maybe BSD jails) would work a lot better.
Rotundo•2h ago
stop50•2h ago
XorNot•1h ago
Filligree•1h ago
fluidcruft•51m ago
JoshTriplett•32m ago
> In practice, there are few installations that use sudo-ldap. Most installations that use LDAP as a directory service and sudo have now opted for sssd, sssd-ldap and libsss-sudo.
> The Debian sudo team recommends the use of libsss-sudo for new installations and the migration of existing installations from sudo-ldap to libsss-sudo and sssd.
dec0dedab0de•20m ago
ch_123•52m ago
This makes me wonder:
1) Would a hypothetical "sudo-lite" with these features removed lead to better security without a rewrite?
2) If these features are useful in the real world, will a Rust rewrite of sudo inevitably gain these features over time and end up with similar problems?
throw0101a•46m ago
OpenBSD did this with their doas utility:
* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doas
Dylan16807•29m ago
mid-kid•2h ago
[1]: https://www.sudo.ws/security/advisories/
[2]: https://www.sudo.ws/security/advisories/unescape_overflow/
Maxatar•13m ago
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2021-3156