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Australia's Spies Are Joining the Group Chat

https://reclaimthenet.org/australia-ctoc-online-surveillance-children
1•latein•2m ago•0 comments

Engineer's Guide to Career Growth – Advice from My Time at Stripe and Facebook

https://review.firstround.com/the-engineers-guide-to-career-growth-advice-from-my-time-at-stripe-...
1•kurinikku•5m ago•0 comments

Relabel.me

https://relabel.me
1•ghuuuif•6m ago•0 comments

Friendship-BENCH: What if Real-time Conversation Models had more Personality?

https://www.theliva.ai/blog/friendship-bench
1•pr337h4m•6m ago•0 comments

Vite Remote Code Execution

https://github.com/vitejs/vite/security/advisories/GHSA-p4f5-76q4-ffq7
2•ersinesen•7m ago•0 comments

Agentic DNS – Father of Internet and Inventor of DNS Talk

https://agenticiam.ai/father-of-the-internet-talks-agentic-dns-83246654e8f5?sharedUserId=ken.adler
1•Ken_Adler•8m ago•1 comments

Suno MCP

https://suno.com/mcp
1•ersinesen•9m ago•0 comments

Web Design: The First 100 Years (2014)

https://idlewords.com/talks/web_design_first_100_years.htm
1•thamiltonsmith•10m ago•0 comments

Right Code, Wrong Comment: The Pointer Chase Inside Zlib

https://www.dataisland.org/blog/zlib-overlay-chase.html
1•dataisland99•11m ago•0 comments

After 49 Years, Voyager 1 Is a Mind-Blowing One Light Day from Earth

https://www.nytimes.com/2026/11/18/science/nasa-voyager-1-earth-light-day.html
1•juanplusjuan•11m ago•0 comments

Recharge AI-task – Manage 5h/7d quota limit resets

https://github.com/mikkovedru/recharge-ai-task
1•machomaster•12m ago•1 comments

OpenVPN 3

https://github.com/OpenVPN/openvpn3
1•gslin•15m ago•1 comments

This weight does not spark joy

https://ianbarber.blog/2026/11/18/this-weight-does-not-spark-joy/
1•matt_d•17m ago•0 comments

Texas' New Attorney General Was a DBZ Composer

https://variety.com/2026/artisans/news/nathan-johnson-dragon-ball-z-music-texas-attorney-general-...
1•illidan1000•25m ago•0 comments

Fornax's Guide to Fast Ethernet

https://docs.pixeldrain.com/posts/2024-03-07_network_optimizations/
1•chii•27m ago•0 comments

Show HN: What is localhost? An interactive guide

https://whatislocalhost.com/
2•javierluraschi•37m ago•2 comments

Last.fm API keys will require Pro from first December

https://support.last.fm/t/api-keys-will-require-pro-from-1st-december/121030
1•thunderbong•37m ago•0 comments

Show HN: Cyravo SecureBuild AI

https://cyravo-securebuild-a-9jtc.bolt.host/
1•abhijithkrishna•38m ago•1 comments

Build systems à la trace

https://fzakaria.com/2026/11/18/build-systems-a-la-trace
2•setheron•38m ago•0 comments

I Hacked India's Largest Course Platform

2•Kushvinth•39m ago•1 comments

Uruky Site Search indie/small web index has passed 1M URLs

https://uruky.com/whats-new?il=en
1•BrunoBernardino•39m ago•1 comments

Today's IPO as a sign of bearishness on any kind of extreme superintelligence

https://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2026/11/the-anthropic-ipo.html
2•thedreammachine•39m ago•0 comments

iOS 4.2.1 on Old Nintendo 3DS natively

https://www.reddit.com/r/hackios/comments/1xyvcxl/ios_421_on_old_nintendo_3ds_natively/
1•ricobecks•40m ago•0 comments

We pre-registered a benchmark for our agent-memory tool. It tied a NOTES.md file

https://github.com/memrohq/memro
1•subalyo•40m ago•0 comments

FreeBSD GUS: RCU's cool cousin

https://gregoire.dev/writing/gus/
1•signa11•46m ago•0 comments

Sub7: The Only Official SubSeven Website

https://gbppr.net/2600/sub7/index.html
1•o_-_o•46m ago•0 comments

Fisheyes in the Field [pdf]

https://mikkelrj.dk/wp-content/uploads/jakobsen2009-fisheye.pdf
1•ankitg12•46m ago•0 comments

Build a JSON API in Agentica with Bond and Agentica-Db

https://www.agentica-lang.com/blog/json-api-with-bond-and-agentica-db/
1•sonic182•47m ago•0 comments

Wayfinder: Frontier-Level Code Search at a Fraction of the Cost

https://blog.voyageai.com/2026/11/18/wayfinder-code-search/
1•fzliu•47m ago•0 comments

Anthropic raises $81B in record IPO

https://www.ft.com/content/62c0510b-ca65-441e-9baf-675b93903b9e
2•ptsd_dalmatian•53m ago•0 comments
Open in hackernews

CRLF Injection in `–proxy-header` allows extra HTTP headers (CWE-93)

https://hackerone.com/reports/3133379
11•oblivionsage•1y ago

Comments

blueflow•1y ago
Check the man-page first. You need to know how a program is supposed to behave before you can know that an observed behavior is off-spec and warrants a bug.
robertlagrant•1y ago
I don't understand the "This is not supposed to happen". Can someone explain?

To me this is the same as

  --proxy-header "X-Test: hello" --proxy-header "X-Evil: owned"
flotzam•1y ago
Imagine running

  curl --proxy-header "X-Test: $UNTRUSTED_USER_INPUT"
wang_li•1y ago
That is not a bug in curl, at most it's a bug in whatever gathered $UNTRUSTED_USER_INPUT.
flotzam•1y ago
People still expect an API to reject illegal values. Calling the parameter --proxy-header (singular) could lead someone to assume that multiline strings are illegal values, even if there's a note in the docs somewhere saying otherwise.
blueflow•1y ago
Then the people assuming random things without doing research are to blame, not curl.
flotzam•1y ago
Apportioning blame doesn't get rid of bugs; misuse resistant APIs do.
blueflow•1y ago
Reading docs ("research") is essential part of engineering.

Lets ask the question reversed: How did people know in the first place what kind of string they need to give to --proxy-header?

flotzam•1y ago
> Reading docs ("research") is essential part of engineering.

Sure, but so is safety engineering. Making mechanisms more obvious to use correctly or fail safe if used incorrectly improves outcomes when flawed human beings use them. It also makes them more pleasant to use in general.

Besides, look at the man page in question. It's talking about this in terms of encoding niceties and doesn't even spell out the possibility of deliberate, let alone malicious multiline values:

"curl makes sure that each header you add/replace is sent with the proper end-of-line marker, you should thus not add that as a part of the header content: do not add newlines or carriage returns, they only mess things up for you."

That's inducing a wrong/incomplete mental model of how this parameter works.

jeroenhd•1y ago
I suppose it kind of depends. I agree with the curl team here that this is a case of garbage in/garbage out, but I can imagine this going wrong with a binary protocol like HTTP2 on the front and a text protocol like HTTP 1.1 behind a reverse proxy. The \r\n will make it to the proxy as a separate header, but will be turned into two headers on the upstream.

That said, this would be a (reverse) proxy vulnerability, not one in curl.

ale42•1y ago
I'm not sure where is the security issue here. As already noted, one can just put several --proxy-header arguments, so the functionality is equivalent.

The only way this would do something unexpected (and not necessarily dangerous besides breaking the service) would be if the curl command would be used in a scenario like: (1) curl is used by some script to access some API or other URL, (2) a user can configure the script to give a specific value to an header, let's say an authentication token or similar, but the user can't directly alter the curl command (e.g. because they can only change URL and TOKEN with a web interface). Here the user would be able to add an header IF the script is not properly sanitizing the input (so the supposed security issue IMHO would be in the script), but if adding an additional header breaks security, the underlying system has a problem too...

In a very far-stretched scenario, one can possibly add two CRLFs and have the rest of the header (if any) considered by the server as data. IF the request is a POST/PUT/... request, and IF the server returns (or allows later access to) the data, and IF the attacker manipulating the supposedly-restricted single-header can see the output of the call (or retrieve the saved data), then we'd have an information disclosure issue. Would it disclose anything sensitive? Not sure, unless there's an auth token or something AFTER the header. And again, I'd rather incriminate the curl caller for not sanitizing the input if this happens.

blueflow•1y ago
> doesn't even spell out the possibility of deliberate, ... multiline values

It does for me, as any kind of extra newlines results in a multi-line string.

> ... malicious ...

Like Daniel said, garbage in, garbage out. If you pass user inputs to curl, one should check what curl does with these values and take proper care.

robertlagrant•1y ago
> do not add newlines or carriage returns, they only mess things up for you

I disagree, but I would say that curl might as well add this as a validation check than a documentation warning.

blueflow•1y ago
This is explained in the ticket:

  One of the reasons we still allow that is that this "feature" was used quite deliberately by users in the past and I have hesitated to change that for the risk that it will break some users use cases.
robertlagrant•1y ago
Yes, I'm not sure if I agree with this or not. Those users don't have to upgrade. But obviously I'm not maintaining a key tool for the world. It's just my opinion.
soraminazuki•1y ago
One shouldn't construct shell commands from untrusted user input in the first place unless they know exactly what they're doing and is aware of all the pitfalls. It's the worst possible tool to be using if the aim is to avoid security issues with minimal effort. Debating about this particular curl quirk distracts from the bigger issue IMO.
robertlagrant•1y ago
> That is not a bug in curl, at most it's a bug in whatever gathered $UNTRUSTED_USER_INPUT.

But that could just contain the bad header only, could it not?