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Caption.me AI Arena – How Funny Are LLMs?

https://www.caption.me/ai-arena
1•cbeach•22s ago•0 comments

Show HN: InvoiceForge – Zero-dependency JavaScript invoicing library

https://www.codester.com/items/75710/invoiceforge-invoice-generator-js-library
1•SAWANs•1m ago•0 comments

Tencent Hy4 Flash

https://openrouter.ai/tencent/hy4-flash
1•theanonymousone•2m ago•0 comments

AttestLink – Your code/VM has a cryptographic identity

https://github.com/rhodey/AttestLink
1•rhodey•2m ago•0 comments

Obituaries

https://stratechery.com/2026/obituaries/
1•Handy-Man•2m ago•0 comments

Show HN: Mac's Notes, Reminders and Photos never reach Android, so I built them

https://github.com/YashwanthKamireddi/Skykeep
1•yashkamireddi•4m ago•0 comments

The Library of Things Toolkit

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1•surprisetalk•6m ago•0 comments

Benchmarking PDF-to-Markdown Tables (Docling, PyMuPDF, MarkItDown, and More)

https://github.com/switchfile/pdf-table-bench
1•florain•7m ago•0 comments

A 512 KiB binary message teaching chess without a shared language

https://artemlegotin.com/golden-board/
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An Open Letter to Apple: Enough Is Enough

https://rhyn0bytes.bearblog.dev/to-apple-enough-is-enough/
2•speckx•7m ago•0 comments

Cartoons on an AI PMs' shifting choices in a low-attention post-AGI era

https://boskykode.com/blog/low-attention-post-agi-world-contrarian-product-perspectives
1•bosky101•8m ago•0 comments

I Am Agent Garrett, and I Am Watching the End of Hacking Happen in Real Time

https://garrettstimpson.ca/posts/2026/11/16/sentinels-and-the-end-of-hacking/
1•gary23w•9m ago•0 comments

Where Are Our 10× Engineers? The Math of AI-Assisted Coding [video]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=go_Fjw_51W4
1•navaro1•10m ago•0 comments

Jensen Huang allies build a "war room" to get him back at Nvidia

https://arstechnica.com/ai/2026/11/jensen-huang-allies-build-a-war-room-to-get-him-back-at-nvidia/
1•daretograsp•11m ago•0 comments

Show HN: BootForm, an MCP-first form back end that works before you sign up

https://bootform.com/
1•melenaos•11m ago•0 comments

Plzdontkillus – experimental creator bootcamp about AI doom

https://plzdontkillus.com/
1•chippy•11m ago•0 comments

U.S. Moves to Close A.I. Chip Loophole Ahead of China Trip

https://www.nytimes.com/2026/11/16/us/politics/trump-china-ai-chip-loophole.html
2•jbegley•11m ago•0 comments

From 'The Pragmatic Programmer' to 'Simplicity'

https://yedhu.me/posts/from-the-pragmatic-programmer-to-simplicity/
1•yedhukrishnan•13m ago•0 comments

I've quit social media with zero willpower

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2•adamci•13m ago•0 comments

Show HN: VioLens– Open-source HTTPS debugging proxy, Fiddler Classic alternative

https://github.com/MarkSPowell/VioLens
1•MSP_Logic•14m ago•0 comments

Ask HN: Why is Stripe dashboard so slow?

1•ghoshbishakh•16m ago•0 comments

Rust – Enabling the parallel front end on nightly

https://blog.rust-lang.org/2026/11/16/enabling-parallel-frontend-on-nightly/
2•afdbcreid•16m ago•0 comments

Proof Automation in a Language

https://www.imperialviolet.org/2026/11/15/proofauto2.html
1•ragall•18m ago•0 comments

AI Video to Text – Free Online Video to Text and Audio to Text Converter

https://www.aivideototext.org/
1•wsm123456•18m ago•0 comments

Build or Buy Manufacturing ERP in the Age of AI

https://www.paxerp.com/blog/build-or-buy-manufacturing-erp-ai
1•robeym•19m ago•1 comments

A human-steered, AI-built freeware hybrid of Ableton, Bitwig, and Renoise

https://edu.morningdewmedia.com/product/morningdaw
2•conner_bw•19m ago•0 comments

My Emacs 31 contributions

https://xenodium.com/my-emacs-31-contributions
2•xenodium•20m ago•0 comments

Can Python Be a Chatbot?

https://github.com/huggingface/pybot
2•lewtun•20m ago•0 comments

Ask HN: Hackers/Coders/Builders – Where do you go in NYC to code?

1•mrburton•21m ago•0 comments

Remote video and microphone on Linux pipewire

https://musings.martyn.berlin/remote-video-and-microphone-on-linux-pipewire
2•speckx•22m ago•0 comments
Open in hackernews

CRLF Injection in `–proxy-header` allows extra HTTP headers (CWE-93)

https://hackerone.com/reports/3133379
11•oblivionsage•1y ago

Comments

blueflow•1y ago
Check the man-page first. You need to know how a program is supposed to behave before you can know that an observed behavior is off-spec and warrants a bug.
robertlagrant•1y ago
I don't understand the "This is not supposed to happen". Can someone explain?

To me this is the same as

  --proxy-header "X-Test: hello" --proxy-header "X-Evil: owned"
flotzam•1y ago
Imagine running

  curl --proxy-header "X-Test: $UNTRUSTED_USER_INPUT"
wang_li•1y ago
That is not a bug in curl, at most it's a bug in whatever gathered $UNTRUSTED_USER_INPUT.
flotzam•1y ago
People still expect an API to reject illegal values. Calling the parameter --proxy-header (singular) could lead someone to assume that multiline strings are illegal values, even if there's a note in the docs somewhere saying otherwise.
blueflow•1y ago
Then the people assuming random things without doing research are to blame, not curl.
flotzam•1y ago
Apportioning blame doesn't get rid of bugs; misuse resistant APIs do.
blueflow•1y ago
Reading docs ("research") is essential part of engineering.

Lets ask the question reversed: How did people know in the first place what kind of string they need to give to --proxy-header?

flotzam•1y ago
> Reading docs ("research") is essential part of engineering.

Sure, but so is safety engineering. Making mechanisms more obvious to use correctly or fail safe if used incorrectly improves outcomes when flawed human beings use them. It also makes them more pleasant to use in general.

Besides, look at the man page in question. It's talking about this in terms of encoding niceties and doesn't even spell out the possibility of deliberate, let alone malicious multiline values:

"curl makes sure that each header you add/replace is sent with the proper end-of-line marker, you should thus not add that as a part of the header content: do not add newlines or carriage returns, they only mess things up for you."

That's inducing a wrong/incomplete mental model of how this parameter works.

jeroenhd•1y ago
I suppose it kind of depends. I agree with the curl team here that this is a case of garbage in/garbage out, but I can imagine this going wrong with a binary protocol like HTTP2 on the front and a text protocol like HTTP 1.1 behind a reverse proxy. The \r\n will make it to the proxy as a separate header, but will be turned into two headers on the upstream.

That said, this would be a (reverse) proxy vulnerability, not one in curl.

ale42•1y ago
I'm not sure where is the security issue here. As already noted, one can just put several --proxy-header arguments, so the functionality is equivalent.

The only way this would do something unexpected (and not necessarily dangerous besides breaking the service) would be if the curl command would be used in a scenario like: (1) curl is used by some script to access some API or other URL, (2) a user can configure the script to give a specific value to an header, let's say an authentication token or similar, but the user can't directly alter the curl command (e.g. because they can only change URL and TOKEN with a web interface). Here the user would be able to add an header IF the script is not properly sanitizing the input (so the supposed security issue IMHO would be in the script), but if adding an additional header breaks security, the underlying system has a problem too...

In a very far-stretched scenario, one can possibly add two CRLFs and have the rest of the header (if any) considered by the server as data. IF the request is a POST/PUT/... request, and IF the server returns (or allows later access to) the data, and IF the attacker manipulating the supposedly-restricted single-header can see the output of the call (or retrieve the saved data), then we'd have an information disclosure issue. Would it disclose anything sensitive? Not sure, unless there's an auth token or something AFTER the header. And again, I'd rather incriminate the curl caller for not sanitizing the input if this happens.

blueflow•1y ago
> doesn't even spell out the possibility of deliberate, ... multiline values

It does for me, as any kind of extra newlines results in a multi-line string.

> ... malicious ...

Like Daniel said, garbage in, garbage out. If you pass user inputs to curl, one should check what curl does with these values and take proper care.

robertlagrant•1y ago
> do not add newlines or carriage returns, they only mess things up for you

I disagree, but I would say that curl might as well add this as a validation check than a documentation warning.

blueflow•1y ago
This is explained in the ticket:

  One of the reasons we still allow that is that this "feature" was used quite deliberately by users in the past and I have hesitated to change that for the risk that it will break some users use cases.
robertlagrant•1y ago
Yes, I'm not sure if I agree with this or not. Those users don't have to upgrade. But obviously I'm not maintaining a key tool for the world. It's just my opinion.
soraminazuki•1y ago
One shouldn't construct shell commands from untrusted user input in the first place unless they know exactly what they're doing and is aware of all the pitfalls. It's the worst possible tool to be using if the aim is to avoid security issues with minimal effort. Debating about this particular curl quirk distracts from the bigger issue IMO.
robertlagrant•1y ago
> That is not a bug in curl, at most it's a bug in whatever gathered $UNTRUSTED_USER_INPUT.

But that could just contain the bad header only, could it not?