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Chrome DevTools Keyboard Shortcuts

https://developer.chrome.com/docs/devtools/shortcuts
1•gregsadetsky•1m ago•0 comments

JavaScript vs. Java

https://discuss.google.dev/t/trusted-automation-with-google-antigravity-scaling-secure-finance-in...
1•foobarsimon•2m ago•0 comments

I had AI read my field

https://science.caseyhandmer.com/physics/
2•gcoguiec•4m ago•0 comments

Fortune Telling and Speculative Design

https://maggieappleton.com/fortune-telling
1•duck•6m ago•0 comments

Intellij-Elm – Elm Plugin for IntelliJ Platform IDEs

https://github.com/elm-tooling/intellij-elm
2•TheWiggles•7m ago•0 comments

Show HN: Yantra – an assistant that works in your own browser tab, with your OK

https://yantra.app/new
1•stackflow1•9m ago•0 comments

Optimjack from the Outside: The Hijacked Script Was on Our Radar

https://blog.fortirix.com/blog/optimjack/
1•SecurityNinjaGu•9m ago•0 comments

Classical Energies Learn to Reason 1k× Faster Than Looped Models

https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.17309
1•espeed•18m ago•0 comments

Interviewed at a YC startup, found out they used my LinkedIn without permission

https://reddit.com/r/recruitinghell/comments/1xyr6ml/interviewed_at_a_yc_startup_spent_30_hours/
8•throwawaysleep•19m ago•0 comments

Engineers Who Won't Commit

https://www.seangoedecke.com/taking-a-position/
1•prakashqwerty•21m ago•0 comments

Horizon Opens to Early Users: America's Most Powerful Academic Supercomputer

https://news.utexas.edu/2026/11/17/horizon-opens-to-early-users-americas-most-powerful-academic-s...
1•jonbaer•22m ago•0 comments

Purpose-Governed Agents: who reviews how an AI agent describes its own proposals

https://zenodo.org/records/23778866
1•douglasjrodrigu•24m ago•0 comments

Btrfs Seeks to Deal with AI and Newbies Without Common Sense

https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/df1c1fa031ba7e66486348dc37d1a7be53c18e43.1794894953.git.wqu@suse.com/
1•thunderbong•28m ago•0 comments

Inside the $900B data centre bet behind Anthropic's IPO

https://www.ft.com/content/559c13f1-0888-47e5-b6ce-523309a37193
1•1vuio0pswjnm7•28m ago•0 comments

Microsoft's agent-framework PyPI package Compromised with Credential Stealer

https://socket.dev/blog/agent-framework-pypi-package-compromised-with-credential-stealer
3•roseway4•28m ago•2 comments

A Review of Alfred North Whitehead's "Introduction to Mathematics"

https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.19675
1•Alien1Being•31m ago•0 comments

Protein and amino acid restriction in aging and longevity

https://www.cell.com/cell-press-blue/fulltext/S3051-3839(26)00077-0
1•Alien1Being•34m ago•1 comments

Crocker's Land Expedition

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crocker_Land_Expedition
1•silver92bullet•35m ago•0 comments

Show HN: Hacker Series on AWS in zines way

https://securityzines.com/aws/
1•r0hi7•35m ago•0 comments

Cover Your Tracks See how trackers view the browser

https://coveryourtracks.eff.org/
1•colinprince•39m ago•0 comments

A typing idler game about fast takeoff

https://mbuffett.com/takeoff/
1•marcusbuffett•41m ago•2 comments

Show HN: WalletFeed, Apple Card Transactions to Webhooks, Sheets and S3

https://walletfeed.app/
1•phlhr•43m ago•0 comments

LeetCode adds vibe coding challenges now

https://leetcode.com/discuss/post/8614473/project-challenge-can-you-build-a-produc-27kz/
3•keyle•44m ago•2 comments

Show HN: AgentShield Zero-dep secret redactor and shell firewall for Claude

https://github.com/RitualDev-Lab/AgentShield
1•RitualDev•51m ago•0 comments

California state AG sues OpenAI over rogue agent incidents

https://techcrunch.com/2026/11/16/california-state-ag-sues-openai-over-rogue-agent-incidents/
1•gmays•52m ago•0 comments

AI-assisted code at scale: provenance, quality, centrality and review time

https://donsbot.com/2026/11/17/ai-assisted-code-at-scale-provenance-quality-centrality-and-review...
1•gbacon•56m ago•0 comments

Hex: Voice Dictation

https://anoma.ly/hex/
2•handfuloflight•1h ago•0 comments

AV1 vs. AV2: Which Video Codec Should You Use in 2026?

https://www.red5.net/blog/av1-vs-av2/
3•mondainx•1h ago•0 comments

How are large companies not ripshit about the frontier labs?

4•siraris•1h ago•0 comments

Skill Studio

https://verified-skill.com/desktop
1•handfuloflight•1h ago•0 comments
Open in hackernews

CRLF Injection in `–proxy-header` allows extra HTTP headers (CWE-93)

https://hackerone.com/reports/3133379
11•oblivionsage•1y ago

Comments

blueflow•1y ago
Check the man-page first. You need to know how a program is supposed to behave before you can know that an observed behavior is off-spec and warrants a bug.
robertlagrant•1y ago
I don't understand the "This is not supposed to happen". Can someone explain?

To me this is the same as

  --proxy-header "X-Test: hello" --proxy-header "X-Evil: owned"
flotzam•1y ago
Imagine running

  curl --proxy-header "X-Test: $UNTRUSTED_USER_INPUT"
wang_li•1y ago
That is not a bug in curl, at most it's a bug in whatever gathered $UNTRUSTED_USER_INPUT.
flotzam•1y ago
People still expect an API to reject illegal values. Calling the parameter --proxy-header (singular) could lead someone to assume that multiline strings are illegal values, even if there's a note in the docs somewhere saying otherwise.
blueflow•1y ago
Then the people assuming random things without doing research are to blame, not curl.
flotzam•1y ago
Apportioning blame doesn't get rid of bugs; misuse resistant APIs do.
blueflow•1y ago
Reading docs ("research") is essential part of engineering.

Lets ask the question reversed: How did people know in the first place what kind of string they need to give to --proxy-header?

flotzam•1y ago
> Reading docs ("research") is essential part of engineering.

Sure, but so is safety engineering. Making mechanisms more obvious to use correctly or fail safe if used incorrectly improves outcomes when flawed human beings use them. It also makes them more pleasant to use in general.

Besides, look at the man page in question. It's talking about this in terms of encoding niceties and doesn't even spell out the possibility of deliberate, let alone malicious multiline values:

"curl makes sure that each header you add/replace is sent with the proper end-of-line marker, you should thus not add that as a part of the header content: do not add newlines or carriage returns, they only mess things up for you."

That's inducing a wrong/incomplete mental model of how this parameter works.

jeroenhd•1y ago
I suppose it kind of depends. I agree with the curl team here that this is a case of garbage in/garbage out, but I can imagine this going wrong with a binary protocol like HTTP2 on the front and a text protocol like HTTP 1.1 behind a reverse proxy. The \r\n will make it to the proxy as a separate header, but will be turned into two headers on the upstream.

That said, this would be a (reverse) proxy vulnerability, not one in curl.

ale42•1y ago
I'm not sure where is the security issue here. As already noted, one can just put several --proxy-header arguments, so the functionality is equivalent.

The only way this would do something unexpected (and not necessarily dangerous besides breaking the service) would be if the curl command would be used in a scenario like: (1) curl is used by some script to access some API or other URL, (2) a user can configure the script to give a specific value to an header, let's say an authentication token or similar, but the user can't directly alter the curl command (e.g. because they can only change URL and TOKEN with a web interface). Here the user would be able to add an header IF the script is not properly sanitizing the input (so the supposed security issue IMHO would be in the script), but if adding an additional header breaks security, the underlying system has a problem too...

In a very far-stretched scenario, one can possibly add two CRLFs and have the rest of the header (if any) considered by the server as data. IF the request is a POST/PUT/... request, and IF the server returns (or allows later access to) the data, and IF the attacker manipulating the supposedly-restricted single-header can see the output of the call (or retrieve the saved data), then we'd have an information disclosure issue. Would it disclose anything sensitive? Not sure, unless there's an auth token or something AFTER the header. And again, I'd rather incriminate the curl caller for not sanitizing the input if this happens.

blueflow•1y ago
> doesn't even spell out the possibility of deliberate, ... multiline values

It does for me, as any kind of extra newlines results in a multi-line string.

> ... malicious ...

Like Daniel said, garbage in, garbage out. If you pass user inputs to curl, one should check what curl does with these values and take proper care.

robertlagrant•1y ago
> do not add newlines or carriage returns, they only mess things up for you

I disagree, but I would say that curl might as well add this as a validation check than a documentation warning.

blueflow•1y ago
This is explained in the ticket:

  One of the reasons we still allow that is that this "feature" was used quite deliberately by users in the past and I have hesitated to change that for the risk that it will break some users use cases.
robertlagrant•1y ago
Yes, I'm not sure if I agree with this or not. Those users don't have to upgrade. But obviously I'm not maintaining a key tool for the world. It's just my opinion.
soraminazuki•1y ago
One shouldn't construct shell commands from untrusted user input in the first place unless they know exactly what they're doing and is aware of all the pitfalls. It's the worst possible tool to be using if the aim is to avoid security issues with minimal effort. Debating about this particular curl quirk distracts from the bigger issue IMO.
robertlagrant•1y ago
> That is not a bug in curl, at most it's a bug in whatever gathered $UNTRUSTED_USER_INPUT.

But that could just contain the bad header only, could it not?