As soon as the quadratic decrease is more than my marginal tax rate, I’m better off buying an NFT from the cause I want to support than making a donation.
It’s a much simpler idea to just have citizens vote for what they want their tax money spent on, by voting for candidates who will represent their interests.
Note that I don't really disagree with your second. Just pointing out that your two options for how government got money is not complete.
https://jonathanwarden.com/quadratic-funding-is-not-optimal/...
In the original paper, the authors acknowledge this is a problem: "...once we account for the deficit, the QF mechanism does not yield efficiency.
Well, yes, but those many more people getting more utility didn't contribute. If the same contribution was spread out over 10x the people each contributing $10, they'd get 10x the funding.
Their complaint here is really that ideal QF would also require assuming people actually get involved with it. I agree it has issues, but this isn't what I'd lead with. Coordination seems like a much larger threat to the concept.
Agree, coordination is a larger threat to QF. But this issue has been discussed extensively. In this article I wanted to point out all the other assumptions behind QF and what happens when they don't hold.
Setting aside the emotional content and looking only at the math, it’s not at all obvious to me that the project with 100 donors was somehow shorted.
Is the art museum or the pipes project more important?
It matters some that their multiplier is different , but in absolute numbers its still more to the program that benefits fewer people. The "utility function" is not accurate because the wealthy's utility starts out with a massive advantage.
So yes, I think it would still be unfair if you switched it given the poor majority genuinely would rather have art than lead free pipes.
The problem is that their voices are counted less due to not starting with money.
But regardless, that would be a silly thing to switch because that's not a situation that ever comes up, while the original framing is a genuine problem in our society right now.
This proposal's pairing of hypothetical projects levels the playing field by a factor of 10 versus the starting point. That seems like a pretty good improvement over the purely monetary starting point.
If your objection is that government can't work this way, because some projects need to be done for the benefit of people who literally cannot even contribute so much as a penny, while other projects are optional, then I'll agree with you. It means that this funding mechanism is fundamentally flawed in regards to required projects.
But if you want to augment government spending with private contributions for certain public-private partnership projects, this might be a good way to allocate government matching funds for these optional projects.
You can't treat a lead pipe replacement project as an optional project (the responsible government or utility just has to do it), but if you wanted to trade off funds towards a skate park versus towards an art museum, this process seems better than a straight matching funds percentage process.
Or, if you want to have no partnership projects and use existing government mechanisms exclusively, that also avoids this problem.
Yes, that goes against the idea that "money has utility" but the point the article was making was that its not socially optimal anymore not that is regressive compared to whatever other strategy, like straight matching funds. There's no math claim that straight matching funds is optimal either.
I think maybe we're speaking past eachother? Because yea totally I'd rather there be a multiplier based on the # of people than not given either that or a straight match. And your other options sound good too: "always fix non-optional things" and "do things democraticly (so 1 person 1 vote, not 1 dollar)"
But the article is making a very specific point about a claim of QF being mathematically socially optimal that isn't being met.
Let's say there were only 10 poor people that contributed to the pipes. The total funding would be $10,000 -- a subsidy of $9,000. So 10x multiplier both for the pipes and the art.
Then let's also say that the marginal utility of $100 for a poor person is equivalent to the marginal utility of $1,000,000 for a rich person.
So we have the same number of contributors for each project, but a much higher marginal utility-per-dollar for lead pipes. But the socially optimal funding would be at the point where the marginal utility-per-dollar are equal for both projects (per the Equimarginal Principle).
Consider that any of those 100 people might have a kid who would be the next Einstein, if only they hadn't been lead-poisoned. But these hundred people also have rent to pay and food to buy, and can only set aside $100 to deal with the lead-pipes problem. The existing distribution of wealth is not a good measure of the importance of the problems that these different individuals are experiencing. And the existing distribution of wealth is thus not a great way to prioritize solving problems for maximum societal benefit.
However, the optimality of QF does assume wealth equality. When you drop that assumption and assume diminishing marginal utility of wealth, you can show that QF is not optimal.
But I think you are right that the example in this article doesn't necessarily show that clearly. The example leans heavily on intuition (or emotional appeal). I think I will try to improve that section.
It's not a good way to allocate funds, but I don't think it's a slam dunk to say it multiplied a larger group's money more than it did a smaller group's.
Sounds like a contradiction to me. Nothing about cryptocurrency should be considered a public good, even if wealthy donors are struggling to efficiently donate money to its development.
I am far from denying that in our system equilibrium analysis has a useful function to perform. But when it comes to the point where it misleads some of our leading thinkers into believing that the situation which it describes has direct relevance to the solution of practical problems, it is time that we remember that it does not deal with the social process at all and that it is no more than a useful preliminary to the study of the main problem.
But, to start chipping away… For the wealth inequality section, I gather the goal is to let people provide a signal based on how much they are willing to spend. Shouldn’t that be corrected for their wealth, because that shows how much they value the thing? If the art patrons are all 1B-aires, and the anti-lead-pipe folks are 100k-aires (just to make the math easier), we could do:
Art:
10*(sqrt(1M/1B)^2) = 1/100
Pipes:
100*(sqrt(100/100k)^2) = 1/10
Now we’ve got some measure of everybody’s preference, and can allocate the budget appropriately. Whatever the overall budgets is, 10x more for pipes than art seems… well, at least a lot closer to reasonable than ~100x more on art than pipes
But yes, that part does seem solvable with a correction like that even if my preferred fix would be removing the billionaires ;)
> Three art patrons each contribute [money] to the local public art museum. [...] They each expect to experience [money] worth of individual utility from enjoying the [...] art.
> [...] utility of saved lives is experienced only once by each of the cancer patients – the three contributors don’t experience that utility (other than feeling good about those lives being saved, but that’s not the kind of utility we’re trying to maximize).
This approach of intellectual unsoundness - i.e., accepting the social and individual utility of enjoying the arts, but denying any such utility for enjoying the saved lives – is present throughout the article. And I haven't started with the author comparing random cases of contributions that differ in multiple dimensions where using a ceteris paribus approach would immediately show that his arguments are shallow...
the challenge is that measuring benefit is hard.
I think the article was going for a comparison between extrinsic motivation (which they seem to claim the original quadratic funding requires) and intrinsic motivation. It seems they just chose a poor example. The article attempts to quantize the expected reward for the extrinsic motivation ("They each expect to experience €6,000,000 worth of individual utility") while it fails to quantize the expected reward for the intrinsic motivation ("But in the selfish scenario, total utility is 3 times higher, because the utility is experienced independently by each contributor, whereas utility of saved lives is experienced only once by each of the cancer patients).
I believe, it has to do with their narrow conception of "experience". I don't know how any rational person could expect to "experience" €6,000,000 worth of art as my first criticism. Now, it would be fair to say that the implication that the wealthy benefactors expect that experience could be seen as a criticism of quadratic funding. But to roll with that ludicrous expectation for the sake of argument and then to fail to give a similar expectation of reward from the experience of saving 60 lives is not a fair argument.
If I can "imagine" the benefactor expecting €6,000,000 worth of experience for knowing the art is on display at the local museum, I could "imagine" the benefactor expecting some non-zero-euro amount of experience for knowing 60 people survived cancer.
If we quantify the "experience" in euros for the first scenario, it seems unfair not to quantify the "experience" for the second scenario. In this case it is about being consistent in argument, which the article fails to do.
But in the part of the article you quoted above, the author (me) specifically acknowledges the utility of enjoying saved lives. But this is a critique of the quadratic funding mechanism, which is a public goods funding mechanism meant to maximize the utility each individual independently derives from enjoying public good.
The whole point of the article is to critique this assumption -- to point out that people's motives are sometimes altruistic (they derive utility just from knowing other people benefit), but the optimality of QF assumes this vicarious utility does not exist. As the article states "When individuals make contributions for purely altruistic reasons, they don’t directly experience the utility themselves. And yet the optimality of QF assumes that all utility is direct utility, benefiting the contributor only."
(Which is why no one should ever even be allowed to have that much money)
Also this article is explicitly challenging these assumptions.
QF assumes that you can know for sure who is an individual. Yet how would you know that with crypto funding?
Let's say I'm malicious and I want to pillage a QF. What stops me from setting up a bogus social project/company, registering it, and then taking my $1000 and splitting it into 1000 wallets with $1 a piece which all contribute to my scam project?
If I know a QF fund is getting setup, it'd be pretty easy to create 1000s of wallets, vary the money in them, and have them all fund my scam. I can even automate some trading between these wallets to make the source of the funds look somewhat organic.
Pillaging these funds seems like it's almost a trivial endeavor assuming you can get your own scam company associate with them. And the more money you have, the easier it'd be to pillage.
For example Gitcoin uses passport.xyz to determine if your account is considered legitimate.
It is, and in fact the authors point this out in the original paper:
"…if the size of this group is greater than 1/α and the group can perfectly coordinate, there is no limit (other than the budget) to how much it can steal."
> I have to say that the biggest flaw I see isn't theoretical, it's practical.
Exactly. The theory is fine -- given all these assumptions hold. In practice, these assumption don't hold.
For example, one of the assumptions is absence of sybil attacks, fraud, or collusion. Obviously, these assumptions may not hold.
You can defend against sybil attacks in various ways. But how do you stop people from colluding (e.g. I $10 to 1000 friends, tell them they can keep $5 if they contribute $5 to my project)? There are collusion-resistant forms of quadratic funding, such as COCM, but these do not have the desirable theoretical properties (such as optimality) that vanilla QF has.
There are also issues plaguing the ecosystem like delayed or missing payments
cleak•3h ago
bts•3h ago
Here's an explanation of Quadratic Funding from their website[1], which I guess they now refer to as "Plural Funding":
[1] https://www.radicalxchange.org/wiki/plural-funding/EDIT: formatting
jppittma•3h ago
jwarden•3h ago
nightpool•2h ago
jwarden•2h ago
timerol•2h ago
sokoloff•2h ago
jppittma•1h ago
jwarden•3h ago
Quadratic Funding is a mechanism where individuals voluntarily contribute funds for some public good (e.g. an open source software project), and then these are matched such that the total funding amount is equal to the square of the sum of the square roots of the individual contributions. Under certain assumptions, this formula results in an optimal outcome, where each individual contributes an amount that maximizes their individual utility (given what others are contributing), and total utility for society is also maximized.
jovial_cavalier•2h ago
https://vitalik.eth.limo/general/2019/12/07/quadratic.html