I think I talked about this possibility with Bunnie Huang about 15 years ago. As I recall, he said it was conceptually achievable. I guess it's also practically achievable!

I find it reassuring that you can still get access to the data running on your own device, despite all the tens of thousands of engineering hours being poured into preventing just that.

Is this making confidential computing obsolete?

I'm kind of confused by AMD's and Intel's response. I thought both companies were building technology that allows datacenter operators to prove to their customers that they do not have access to data processed on the machines, despite having physical access to them. If that's out of scope, what is the purpose of these technologies?

> No, our interposer only works on DDR4

Not surprising - even having 2 DDR5 DIMMs on the same channel compromises signal integrity enough to need to drop the frequency by ~30-40%, so perhaps the best mitigation at the moment is to ensure the host is using the fastest DDR5 available.

So - Is the host DRAM/DIMM technology and frequency included in the remote attestation report for the VM?

I like how the FAQ doesn't really actually answer the questions (feels like AI slop but giving benefit of the doubt), so I will answer on their behalf, without even reading the paper:

Am I impacted by this vulnerability?

For all intents and purposes, no.

Battering RAM needs physical access; is this a realistic attack vector?

For all intents and purposes, no.