After reading about a 3-person startup that received an $82,000 Gemini
API bill in 48 hours (normal monthly spend: $180), I started building
CloudSentinel.
The core problem: GCP has no native kill switch. Budget alerts send an
email. Quota limits throttle requests. Neither revokes a key
automatically. And billing data is delayed by hours — useless for
real-time protection.
The architecture:
CloudSentinel monitors raw API request count — updated in near
real-time. We create an Alerting Policy inside the user's own GCP
project using MQL. When the request threshold is crossed, Google fires
a Pub/Sub webhook to CloudSentinel. We receive it and revoke that exact
key automatically.
The security decision I'm most proud of:
Revoke-Only IAM model. The Custom IAM Role has three responsibilities:
- Read API key IDs and metadata (never key values)
- Create monitoring rules inside the user's project
- Revoke a specific key when a threshold is crossed
The permission apikeys.create is not in the role. Not restricted —
absent. Even if CloudSentinel is fully compromised, an attacker can
only remove access, never create keys or touch anything else.
daudmalik06•2h ago
After reading about a 3-person startup that received an $82,000 Gemini API bill in 48 hours (normal monthly spend: $180), I started building CloudSentinel.
The core problem: GCP has no native kill switch. Budget alerts send an email. Quota limits throttle requests. Neither revokes a key automatically. And billing data is delayed by hours — useless for real-time protection.
The architecture:
CloudSentinel monitors raw API request count — updated in near real-time. We create an Alerting Policy inside the user's own GCP project using MQL. When the request threshold is crossed, Google fires a Pub/Sub webhook to CloudSentinel. We receive it and revoke that exact key automatically.
The security decision I'm most proud of:
Revoke-Only IAM model. The Custom IAM Role has three responsibilities: - Read API key IDs and metadata (never key values) - Create monitoring rules inside the user's project - Revoke a specific key when a threshold is crossed
The permission apikeys.create is not in the role. Not restricted — absent. Even if CloudSentinel is fully compromised, an attacker can only remove access, never create keys or touch anything else.
Early access open at https://cloudsentinel.dev
Have you ever dealt with a GCP billing surprise or a leaked key? Happy to hear your experience and discuss the architecture.