We were (and still are) considering them as an inference provider and did a quick check first... but kudos to their team for the fast patch

We really are entering the AI economy.

Now if only we knew if the stonks would go up or down (due to global turmoil) before I throw my savings at the SPY

> Baseten handled this well. The timeline was:

> July 13, 11:10 PM: I reported the live basetenbot token, the public Harbor project, and the repository permissions.

> July 14, morning: Baseten made the Harbor project private. I flagged that the token itself still worked.

> July 14, 4:34 PM: Anton from Baseten Security confirmed the issue as critical and said they had made the Harbor project private and rotated the token. He also asked us to securely delete the images we'd pulled.

> July 14, 5:05 PM: We confirmed deletion and sent over two lower-severity findings from the same scan.

> July 17: Baseten closed out the remaining findings.

> September: We let Baseten know we planned to disclose the finding publicly and sent them a draft of this post.

They also sent us some T-shirts and sweatshirts as a thank-you for finding this critical bug.

well done all around. i think my only open question is what default security boundaries should all vibecoded internal agents follow as a learning we can take from this

i quite liked using strix. last time i tried it, deepseek was a mess and bloated the context with nonsense. that was ~5 months ago, i wonder how it performs now

This sounds interesting and twisted in some sense

1. A start up is validating a service provider to ensure that they are secure enough so that they can trust them before signing up for their service

2. The service provider is already trusted by so many big name companies who handed over their data, the customers data to them

Should it not be other way around?

On a different note, the finding is not just one off absolute, rather its a symptom which points to certain experience and expertise level for security practices. To be fair its hard to blame the start up folks, they are running against time and cutting corners is somewhat critical for survival for their business

That is great marketing for strix, pretty bad for baseten. I don't think someone can have a better story to advertise their own security product. Did not know about strix but I am going to look it up now. Might add it to my stack.

Yeah I have seen this issue a few times. If you use Docker build arguments that way add `--provenance=false` to get rid of all that build metadata. Build secrets are still better since they allow you to scope the secret inside of the Dockerfile. Also, the metadata can be useful to inspect images.

Baseten carries the Soc 2 Type II and HIPAA Compliant logos on its front page. They also have logos for customers including: OpenEvidence (medical related, used by almost 2/3 of physicians in the US, claim HIPAA compliance), Harvey (legal related, claim "binding terms on data protection, data access, incident response SLAs, and other controls aligned with SOC2, ISO, GDPR and other standards.")

From TFA:

> That token had admin and push access to Baseten's main product repo, the GitOps repo that drives their clusters, and their Homebrew tap, plus read/write access to other private repositories including specific repos per customers.

> The image build dated to March 2023, and the token still worked when we found it in July 2026.

What are the legal implications here?

A Markdown-as-a-Service where the interface is a Docker container.

I get how these choices might be the local optimum for a desired UX, but damn is it depressing to extrapolate where software as a whole is going.

I wonder what model was used for this. Also as far as I know Baseten does not have any abliterated models in their repertoire.

An easily preventable issue with proper engineering culture around defense in depth and principle of least privilege, awful look on Baseten here.

Kudos for Strix to find it, and especially with how it chose to disclose and report it.

> [pen-testing agent] came back with an active GitHub personal access token for basetenbot. That token had admin and push access to Baseten's main product repo, the GitOps repo that drives their clusters, and their Homebrew tap, plus read/write access to other private repositories including specific repos per customers.

And the agent found the token in Docker build history after finding a Baseten image repository.

I wonder how many of these kinds of agent-driven security exploits we're not hearing about these days (i.e. driven by bad actors), worrying.

Is this legal? I know I can’t try and break into my neighbors house even if I have no intent of going inside and stealing once I break the lock.