> Most of the Tailscale SSH issues we've identified concern privilege escalation. In some circumstances, someone already authorized to connect over Tailscale SSH may be able to perform actions beyond the permissions of their configured local user, including potentially gaining elevated privileges.
There is some weaselly language.
In some circumstances default config? with password? this is a condition leading to the next
someone already authorized to connect over Tailscale SSH they have access, but it may be limited or restricted, although scope could be beyond the intended
may be able to perform actions beyond the permissions If there is a full moon and your brother in law's second cousin is wearing a hat, he may be able to use your upstair's thermostat provided you have a second story.
> Organizations using headscale v0.29.5 have no mechanism to disable the forwarding behavior at the center of the finding.
https://techjacksolutions.com/scc-vendor-rollup/tailscale-he...
I wasn't using any of the additional features, I can get away with exposing a port on my router and I am changing devices rarely.
News like this make me happy I removed a lot of complexity and attack surface
using wireguard is awesome, but I wouldn't say deploying and maintaining it lacks complexity exactly. and you didn't get rid of attack surface, you just made it your responsibility ;)
I use it extensively, and I would rather pay them a fee if they could review thr code.
Another possibility is as lock down mode, disabling fancy and risky features.
wslh•55m ago