The experienced navigator refusing to fly with her was correct, but I do wonder if he had been there if he would have been smart enough to save them.
In short: there's plenty of evidence Amelia Earhart was reckless. I'm sad that she paid with her life, but that is sometimes what happens when you're reckless while using dangerous machines.
Yes, it is. Otherwise, "any carelessness, incapacity or neglect" wouldn't be so "terribly unforgiving".
The pilots who died in the 787 MAX crashes would disagree. They did everything exactly as they were trained to do and still crashed.
You are thinking of the 737 MAX [0]. There is no such thing as a 787 MAX yet [1].
Same with aviation. The DHL Flight 611 over Überlingen, Iran Air Flight 655, Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752, American Airlines Flight 5342, Pan Am Flight 1736 are just the few easy ones which comes to mind immediately.
> if you do everything right, you'll land safely.
You. And the people who designed your aircraft. The people who maintain your aircraft. And the ATC. And other pilots. And the people on the ground operating anti-aircraft missiles.
https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/1993/d...
An example: she or somebody had a retractable antenna optimized for long-range high-frequency/shortwave radio removed prior to the flight—crazy!
HN discussion: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39239964
(The linked article says Earhart didn't know enough about radio, either to convert from wavelength to frequency, or to match an antenna to the transmitter. Such knowledge was probably rare in 1937.)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diaeresis_(diacritic)
In fact, the lede paragraph of the Wikipedia article notes its retention by The New Yorker manual of style, despite being considered archaic.
Direct cited source: https://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/the-curse-of-...
https://www.technologyreview.com/2025/05/22/1117294/a-new-at...
> It’s the third-dimensional counterpart to latitude and longitude, says Sanchez, who helps coordinate the standardization effort.
https://www.technologyreview.com/2024/12/09/1108076/satellit...
> Now, the scientists were poised to catch this reentry as it happened.
https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2018/12/11/america-...
> The compact is far from perfect. It is vague about how countries should cooperate on many issues, such as border management and access to public services.
The New Yorker is famous for its commitment to unreality on this issue. It's only the New Yorker.
Do you pronounce the “oo” in “coordination” the same way as you do in “bookkeeper”? Because that is a very weird mispronunciation. https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/coordination
It can't emphasize that; there's nothing to suggest that "naive" would rhyme with those words. It emphasizes that it doesn't rhyme with "glaive" and "waive"...
Indicates that the two o's are separate syllables.
It's pointless in English because we have nothing remotely close to phonetic spelling.
If we want to bring back cool things from French can we start with reverting to spellings like "connexion", "reflexion" etc.?
It’s in use. It hasn’t disappeared. It’s not the norm, but it is definitely still in use.
It was hard for me to type those on my English keyboard. That's reason enough for me to say they are not really part of English any more and haven't been for decades. I do like writing connexion sometimes, and I note that this isn't even considered a spelling error in my installed dictionary, unlike coördinate, but I'm not going to claim that it's "still in use" because I read a dictionary one time.
It’s not “still in use” because it’s in the dictionary.
It’s “still in use” because it’s still in use.
It's a similar kind of conservative affectation as The New York Times referring to people as "Mr. Putin" or "Mrs. Clinton". I find it hilarious that the NYT will never refer to someone by their first name, even when it's contextually more apt to do so, and will often use a stiffly formal version of their full name ("Vladimir V. Putin") that nobody else in the world bothers with outside encyclopedias.
I am also constantly called sir and I cannot say "ma'am" like the people out here so I don't bother with that frivolity. They also say "no" with extra vowels that are somewhat silent, like noueh, it ends more in the nose than a normal "no"
So that's the link I drew.
Secondly, the NYT is not in the deep south and doesn't abide by local conventions, so it stands out relative to its peers (e.g. LA Times, etc.).
I've surely conflated Earhart with Lindbergh, who was known for his solo marathon flights, and somehow absorbed decades' worth of pop-culture "Amelia Earhart" legends that left Captain Noonan as a remarkably obscure footnote in history.
And even more interesting still were the accounts that a disastrous landing in Hawaii carried a crew of four, and her penultimate attempt had a crew of three, with an aborted takeoff that severely damaged her Electra, and the third man had refused/declined to continue as the odds were increasingly not in their favor.
One is doing something that nobody knows if it's going to work, and probably won't - Lindberg, perhaps.
Another is doing something you should KNOW isn't going to work, but you don't bother or care.
I think some janky editor messed with it last year and nobody has noticed or checked the sources.
And concerns/mockery of “the flying housewife” alone in close quarters with a handsome navigator, gave way to an affair while en route, a love-child, and divorce? And there is a post on the Talk page from someone claiming to be that child... bonkers!
And Wikipedia says [unsourced] they “reached Japan [having flown northeast from Calcutta and Vietnam] but were denied permission to cross Russia [known in the 1940s as the Soviet Union]” — so what parts of “Russia” were east of Japan in 1948?
As it says she flew from Japan to the Aleutian islands, it would have probably been safer to fly via the Kamchatka peninsular instead of direct.
Wikipedia isn't concerned with that kind of thing.
Compare https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Absolute_configuration , where the article states "R and S refer to rectus and sinister, Latin for right and left, respectively", despite the facts that (1) it's not like the Latin word for right is obscure; (2) the claim was highlighted as false (in a different section of the article, where it still also appears) on the talk page in 2018.
The other option is through the Aeutians, but they famously have some of the worst weather in the world and there aren’t that many places to land.
Especially back then when weather reports were terrible and radionavigation wasn’t that accurate, it was extremely chancy to fly somewhere like that without a big fuel reserve, ideally enough to get back to your origin if the weather at the destination turned out to be unlandable. Stopping in the Russian far east gives you a shorter leg to the Aelutians.
Apparently he made it as far Ambon Island in Indonesia, so he indeed circled the globe in nine years starting and ending in the East Indies.
WalterBright•1d ago
WalterBright•1d ago
My dad flew B-17s, and with 3 engines out and just an outboard engine running, it took all of a man's strength to keep it straight. Usually, the pilot and copilot would trade off each 10 minutes.
When planes got larger, like the B-29, boost had to be added.
To accommodate female pilots, Boeing reduced the flight control forces in the 757.
Waterluvian•1d ago
I’ve got to imagine that put into a fast enough dive, nobody’s pulling up?
WalterBright•1d ago
A Boeing airliner has a travel limiter on the control surfaces that is automatically adjusted based on the speed. Exceeding that travel puts enough torque on the airplane to literally tear the structure apart.
There was an Airbus incident years ago where the pilot stamped on the rudder pedals to violently move the rudder full travel lock to lock, and it tore the rudder vertical stabilizer off.
There are also situations where no amount of control input is going to wrest control back from an uncontrolled dive.
In other words, designing the "feel forces" and travel has a large number of variables to it, and is not simple at all to get right.
For a dive fast enough, you run into an effect called "separation". This is where the air flowing over the wing no longer converges at the trailing edge, but separates. This separation can engulf the elevators such that even at full travel, the elevators are operating in dead air and from then on, you're just along for the ride into a crash.
This is a problem for many, many aircraft designs. You always gotta watch your airspeed.
This happened to a 727 once, where the autopilot went berserk and sent the airplane in a dive so bad that separation happened. The quick thinking pilot decided to lower the landing gear in a desperate attempt to slow the airplane down. He succeeded, although the slipstream tore the doors off and bent the gear backwards, and saved everyone.
It also happened to a 707, where the pilots weren't paying attention and the airplane slipped into a dive. By the pilots realized what had happened, they no longer had pitch control. One of them desperately began cranking the trim wheel by hand, and they managed to pull it up just before it hit the ocean.
Yeager's X1 rocket aircraft had this problem, as did the F-86 jet fighter.
For another fun anecdote, the F-80 Shooting Star had a problem in that its engine was too powerful. If you oversped the airplane, it would go unstable and pitch up, tearing the wings off. That meant the pilot always had to have one eye on the airspeed (yes, my dad was an F-80 pilot, and flew them in combat). One day, a pilot had a Mig on his tail he couldn't shake. He thought, I'm dead anyway, let's see if I can pitch up and lose the Mig. So he firewalled the throttle, and sure enough the F-80 went through a violent maneuver and miraculously the wings stayed on and he shook the Mig off his tail. When he landed, the wings were bent up and the airplane was scrapped.
Dive bombers used "dive brakes" to keep from overspeeding the airplane. My dad's favorite method for attacking an anti-aircraft gun emplacement was to dive straight down on it. AA gunners did not want to fire vertically (think about it). But it required my dad to have one eye on the target, one eye on the airspeed, and his third eye on the altitude.
PNewling•1d ago
Could you link-to/tell-us more about the 727 affair? I've always had a fascination with autopilot (and autoland) systems, so I would love to read/hear more about this incident.
WalterBright•1d ago
But you might try googling "727 autopilot landing gear dive".
WalterBright•1d ago
Thank you. I enjoy relating them. There are other airplane junkies who come to our monthly D Coffee Haus meeting, and we often wind up talking shop about airplane engineering.
nayuki•1d ago
Does this refer to the deep stall that affects T-tail aircraft ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stall_(fluid_dynamics)#Deep_st... ), or is it a phenomenon that applies to nearly all fixed-wing subsonic aircraft?
WalterBright•1d ago
The separation affects the ailerons as well, so you lose roll control.
potato3732842•1d ago
Most higher speed subsonic aircraft recycle the design principals from supersonic aircraft to alleviate the problem. You could on paper dive a Learjet or 747 or other "designed for the higher end of subsonic" aircraft to Mach 2 and retain control authority if you wanted and if the airframe could take it.
unsnap_biceps•1d ago
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DcB31RgeL50 is the full video, well worth watching IMHO, but the talk about the fatal trim is at 51:00 to 53:00
WalterBright•1d ago
The instructions were:
1. restore normal trim with the thumb switches
2. turn off the trim system
throwaway5752•1d ago
signatoremo•1d ago
Why do you think it’s badly designed? The implementation was badly done for sure.
filleduchaos•1d ago
Some designs are so poorly thought through (and/or conceived for the wrong reasons to begin with, like MCAS was) that they cannot help but yield poor implementations.
(Also, input from one or two sensors was far from the only problem with MCAS' implementation. The fact that it could activate multiple times and that it could trim far harder and faster than human pilots could manually trim were equally contributors to making the saga a tragedy).
WalterBright•1d ago
The reasons were correct. Making the MAX behave, as far as the pilots were concerned, like other models of the 737 makes the airplane safer. Many crashes have resulted from pilots getting confused about which airplane they are flying.
The design particulars, however, were incorrect. That is Boeing's fault.
> trim far harder and faster
The 737 has only one electric trim rate - on and off. It does not trim harder or faster than the autopilot trim or the thumb switch trim. The signal all boils down to a wire that has signals "trim on / trim off". The thumb switches sit on the path of that wire, so when they activate they override the autopilot and MCAS. The cutoff switch is downstream of that.
Part of the reason the manual trim wheel could not be moved is the airplane was overspeeding due to being (incorrectly) at full throttle. Overspeeding greatly increases the force on the stabilizer, making it much harder to move. In the EA flight, the overspeed warning horn could be heard on the voice recorder.
anonymars•1d ago
wat10000•21h ago
WalterBright•1d ago
After the first crash, Boeing sent around an Emergency Airworthiness Directive to all MAX pilots with the two steps I showed.
There's no excuse for MAX pilots not reading, understanding, and remembering Emergency Airworthiness Directives.
It's not just me. I've talked to two 737 pilots who said the same thing.
throwaway5752•1d ago
The aircraft should have never been declared airworthy. There should have been no need for an EAD in the first place. There is no excuse for putting a control system that flies the craft into the ground when there is a failure in a nonredundant sensor on a commercial aircraft.
The high standards required for pilots, like Amelia Earhart, do not obviate the even higher standards for quality and safety from manufacturers.
WalterBright•1d ago
The stab trim cutoff switch is in a prominent position on the central console (not overhead or behind the crew).
In the first Lion Air crash, the airplane dipped and recovered (via the thumb switches) 25 times over a period of 11 minutes. They never thought to turn off the stab trim system. It boggles the mind. Would you want to fly with a crew that didn't know what the switches on the console were for? Not me.
Both Boeing and the crew are at fault. Some percentage also for whoever made the faulty sensor and the failure to see that it worked correctly after it was installed.
genewitch•1d ago
I've been in a car when the throttle got stuck open, we crashed, I hit the windshield. It happened in about 5 seconds, and the driver spent most of those giving steering inputs to avoid hitting people and furiously working the break and kicking the gas pedal. It happened because enough engine mounts were broken or broke because of a hard throttle push.
Also my dad died in a single seat plane crash because the engine died several times in flight, according to a witness interviewed by a local paper; there was no investigation at all so I'll never know what really happened. At least the company that made the plane changed their name!
WalterBright•17h ago
The brakes are much stronger than the engine (proof: you can brake in a much shorter distance than you can accelerate).
On my current car, I have inadvertently hit the edge of the gas pedal while I stepped on the brake a couple times, as those pedals are too close together and I have wide feet. My reaction was to instantly move my foot.
A number of those "surging" incidents are suspected of being the driver had their foot on the gas rather than the brake.
Glad to hear you're all right after the crash. I nearly died in a car crash.
Sorry to hear about your dad. It must be very frustrating to not know the cause. I thought all GA accidents were officially investigated.
genewitch•13h ago
If memory serves there was an instance in southern california where the driver called 911 or some other recorded line (they died); but it may have just been a witness statement i remember.
quesera•12h ago
I had a stuck accelerator on an old Ford F-150. The throttle inside the carb got stuck. I was lucky to have the Toyota case in my memory, so I just shifted into neutral.
It was an automatic, which I think is another factor -- the more direct control you remove from the driver, the less intuitive it becomes to compensate for a single system failure. Obviously a standard transmission driver would just hit the clutch.
(And I've had a similar failure on an unfamiliar motorcycle that just came out of storage. Pulling the clutch bail was the instinctive response, after manually untwisting the throttle did not work. I learned my lesson about old vehicles eventually. Trust nothing, verify everything.)
Very sorry to hear about your dad!
throwaway5752•19h ago
2. The 737 MAX was unstable because Boeing wanted to milk the 737 airframe further than it should have been for financial reasons and oversized engines were mounted forward on the wings.
3. Since the plane was unstable in this way, it would pitch up when climbing. MCAS would detect this through the angle of attack (AoA sensors) and automatically engage, forcing the nose down.
4. When the single, nonredundant AoA sensor failed, MCAS would misinterpret this and try to continuously force the nose down in normal operations. Or more plainly, it would fly the plane into the ground for no reason.
5. This happened at least 3 times. In two cases, it caused crashes, killing everyone - almost 350 men, women, and children - aboard.
6. Boeing strenuously blamed the crew in the first crash, and did not ground the planes.
7. Boeing did not ground the 737 MAXes after the second crash, either. The FAA only grounded the aircraft after much of the rest of the world already had.
As you noted previously, MCAS existed to make the 737 MAX fly like prior versions of the plane. Boeing, in fact, lobbied for this outcome so it would not affect certification or require separate pilot training, which would have cost time and money. So while MCAS was documented, pilots were not required to be trained on the system, because of Boeings efforts.
One cannot put a "don't crash the plane button" on a plane, even if it is well documented. It is particularly disgraceful if the "don't crash the plane" button only exists because the plane's manufacturer added the button to increase their own profits.
I have to admit, you have made me lose my composure here a bit. I thought anyone this knowledgable about flying would not blame pilot error in the 737 MAX crashes. The plane was grounded for almost 2 years, this was arguably the greatest scandal in the production and regulation of commercial aircraft in history. Boeing paid $20 billion in fines and restitution, and pled guilty to criminal charges.
For the benefit of anyone else curious about this, good starting points are
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737_MAX_groundings
"hours after the approval for MCAS's redesign was granted, Boeing sought, and the FAA approved, the removal of references to MCAS from Boeing's flight crew operations manual (FCOM)"
"Boeing wanted the FAA to certify the airplane as another version of the long-established 737; this would limit the need for additional training of pilots, a major cost saving for airline customers. During flight tests, however, Boeing discovered that the position and larger size of the engines tended to push up the airplane nose during certain maneuvers. To counter that tendency and ensure fleet commonality with the 737 family, Boeing added MCAS so the MAX would handle similar to earlier 737 versions."
"The MAX was exempted from certain newer safety requirements, saving Boeing billions of dollars in development costs."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Boeing_737_MAX_groundi...
https://www.amazon.com/Flying-Blind-Tragedy-Fall-Boeing/dp/0...
WalterBright•16h ago
The first error was the claim that the MAX was "unstable". It just behaved differently due to the engine placement. I see this error all the time. And so on.
The errors in the MCAS design were not to save money. They were just sloppy engineering. There was nothing wrong with the MCAS concept. The proof is MCAS is still there, it just had its flaws corrected.
As for knowledgeable, I've talked with two 737 pilots. One told me it was pilot error and never would have happened to him. The other told me that his pilot buddies agreed with me but were afraid to speak up against the tidal wave of bad press. I also spent 3 years working on the 757 stab trim system, at one point I knew more about it than about anyone else. The 737 system is more primitive, but is easily understandable. (The 757 uses dual hydraulic motors driving a differential gearbox, the 737 has a single electric motor with manual drive for the backup. Both have a console mounted cutoff switch. Both have column thumb switches.)
> Boeing added MCAS so the MAX would handle similar to earlier 737 versions.
Which improves safety. This is never mentioned. (The 757 and 767, very different airplanes, were designed to fly similarly and have the same cockpits. It did save money on training because of that, saved money on production, and improved safety.)
throwaway5752•5h ago
I think interested parties should look at the JATR report (Joint Authorities Technical Review Observations, Findings, and Recommendations) -https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/2021-08/Final_JATR_S...
With respect to "unstable", I will quote the findings
"Observation O3.4-B: Extension of MCAS to the low-speed and 1g environment during the flight program was due to unacceptable stall characteristics with STS only. The possibility of a pitch-up tendency during approach to stall was identified for the flaps-up configuration prior to the implementation of MCAS"
Regarding flight crew expectations, this is dry, but I will quote it in its entirety, anyway,
"Recommendation R6.1: The FAA should ensure applicants improve adherence to failsafe design concept principles when designing or modifying systems. The FAA should encourage applicants not to design only for compliance, but also to follow basic principles to design for safety when developing or changing system functions. This should include elimination of hazards and use of design features, warnings, and procedures.
- Observation O6.1-A: Proper flight crew action was considered an adequate mitigation to risks such as erroneous activation of MCAS.
- Finding F6.1-A: The JATR team identified that the design process was not sufficient to identify all the potential MCAS hazards. As part of the single-channel speed trim system, the MCAS function did not include fault tolerant features, such as sensors voting or limits of authority, to limit failure effects consistent with the hazard classification.
- Finding F6.1-B: The use of pilot action as a primary mitigation means for MCAS hazards, before considering eliminating such hazards or providing design features or warnings to mitigate them, is not in accordance with Boeing’s process instructions for safe design in the conception of MCAS for the B737 MAX.
- Finding F6.1-C: The JATR team found that there was a missed opportunity to further improve the system design through the use of available fail-safe design principles and techniques presented in AC 25.1309-1A and in EASA AMC 25.1309 in the MCAS design"
and further, on flight crew expectations
"Finding F6.4-A: When all flight deck effects are considered, the introduction of the MCAS function invalidated aircraft-level assumptions for flight crew responses related to erroneous AOA failures under certain conditions. A complete workload assessment was not performed for validation of the erroneous AOA effects with the added MCAS functionality. The same assumptions for flight crew responses to erroneous AOA were carried over from previous programs without formal validation."
The Technical Advisory Board's report is also interesting - https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/2022-08/737_Technica...
The discussion around AOA DISAGREE conditions is educational regarding MCAS for others who might not be familar with the technical root cause. But I would specifically encourage you to read the Flight Controls and Flight Deck Interface Assessment and Training Evaluations. They don't avoid the issue of flight crew training and trim system awareness, but I they illustrate how workload created by the erroneous MCAS activation was contributing.
As for your pilot conversations, I will make two short points. First, pilots don't always suffer for a lack of self-confidence. Maybe it would have never happened to them, maybe not, and thankfully we will not get to find out. Second, passengers are owed a safe aircraft based on the full range of quality flight crews, with a wide margin for error. I do care if a highly skilled qualified crew would have avoided the accident, I care if the least-skilled qualified crew would have. And 610's captain had 5,176 hours on the 737 and 302's captain had 4,120 hours.
filleduchaos•1d ago
Actually watching the linked video (or barring that, actually reading the final report) would dispense with this widely spread inaccuracy in fairly short order and make it quite obvious why they turned ON the stab trim system, which is what ultimately killed them.
But of course, "the pilots were simply stupid" is a psychologically easier conclusion to walk away with.
WalterBright•1d ago
jajko•1d ago
consumer451•20h ago
kashunstva•15h ago
Temporarily, right? Using the pitch trim switches on the yoke suppresses MCAS, but in order to remain at even net zero stabilizer position change, the duration of trim input would have to be of equivalent duration to the reciprocal MCAS-driven change. This is part of what made the problem so insidious - running trim for that long is rarely needed and rarely done. I haven’t flown the MAX but I can’t think of any type I have flown in which continual pitch trim input of 5+ seconds at a time would be required in flight.
cameldrv•1d ago
If you flip the stab trim cutout switches, you can turn the wheel manually, but if there have already been a couple of cycles of MCAS, the plane may be so out of trim that you need too much force to move the trim wheel manually.
In that case there is one thing that could save you which would be to do the so called rollercoaster procedure, where you push the yoke forward to unload the trim and then crank the trim up while you hurtle towards the ground. This was a documented procedure in the 737-300 manual, but was later deleted.
The real crime was that Boeing deliberately removed all mention of MCAS from the flight manual. The problem was that if there were procedures that pilots needed to know in order to recover from an MCAS failure, they would have been required to practice these procedures in a simulator, and Boeing’s contract with Southwest had financial incentives if the MAX didn’t require any additional sim time for pilots to transition from the NG to the MAX.
We know that the information about MCAS was deleted from the manual because the only occurrence of the term MCAS in the MAX flight manual is in the glossary where it is a defined term. The tech writers obviously put it in there because it was described in an earlier version of the manual, but later deleted, but the glossary entry wasn’t deleted when the description was.
sokoloff•22h ago
What is inexplicable is that they stopped doing that while leaving the trim system enabled after correctly disabling it via the memory item checklist.
Boeing’s not blameless here, nor should the crew of ET302 bear the primary fault, but they seem to have understood the issue (and it’s not possible they didn’t know about MCAS) and were frustratingly close to saving the flight.
WalterBright•16h ago
This is simply wrong.
The electric trim switches override MCAS regardless of whether MCAS is trying to drive the trim or not. Timing it for when the MCAS was not engaged is completely unnecessary.
rtkwe•12h ago
Had they known about MCAS they could have potentially known they could override it then disbale the trim system but that information was hidden by Boeing so they didn't do it..
cornholio•1d ago
So the electronic control route was fried, any normal person in that situation and physical and mental overload would conclude that trim controls are not functional.
The manual route, which they tried, involved at that speed an undocumented "roller coaster maneuver", pitching forward (!!) to release pressure on the trim mechanism and allow manual adjustment. It goes without question it's impossible the pilots could have come up with that solution in the mere seconds they had at their disposal, let alone the high risk it entailed.
Reducing the throttle early would have saved the plane, but it would have also resulted in immediate pitch down due to the torque the engines create against the body of the plane, as they are mounted off axis. The autothrottle was left to near 95% for the entire ~250s duration of the flight (the setting necessary for take off at the particular altitude of the airport) and once the cascading failures consumed all their situational awareness it stands to reason why they failed to adjust it and then hesitated to perform an action that would have (in the short run) worsened the problem in a near crash situation.
The MCAS as designed was a ticking timebomb that killed two plane loads of people in mere months, and Boeing accepted full responsibility for that, even if they are still denying criminal charges.
coredog64•20h ago
WalterBright•17h ago
This is utterly false. The trim rate has two speeds - on and off.
> would automatically re-engage repeteadly
This is called "runaway trim". The procedure to counter it is to turn it off. The same procedure for every airplane.
> any normal person
Pilots are required to read and understand and remember Emergency Airworthiness Directives.
Don't forget the first MCAS incident, where normal trim was restored with the column trim switches and then the trim was turned off and the airplane landed safely.
Or the second where normal trim was restored 25 times, but never turned off.
I would expect a MAX pilot to have paid attention to that crash, and the followup EAD which instructs them to restore normal trim with the column switches and then turn it off.
cornholio•16h ago
This is wrong and easy to disprove. The trim rate for a pilot issued trim command starts at 0.4 degrees/second at low air speeds and tappers off to zero as the speed increased towards Mach 0.68. The MCAS had a fixed rate of 0.27 degree/second that did not depend on airspeed. Here is the relevant quote from the FAA report on the 737MAX:
> “If activated by a high AOA, MCAS moves the horizontal stabilizer at a rate of 0.27 degrees per second, which is the same trim rate as Speed Trim with flaps down. The magnitude of the MCAS command is a function of Mach and angle of attack. At higher airspeeds, flight‐control surfaces are more effective than at lower airspeeds. Therefore, a smaller MCAS command at higher airspeeds has the same effect as a larger MCAS command at lower speeds."
So the trim rate is fixed but the magnitude (duration) of the original MCAS is variable to account for airspeed. Because the MCAS reengaged repeatedly due to erroneous AOA sensor data and faulty design logic, the duration became irrelevant. However, as the plane speed exceeded 0.6 Mach, the rate of pilot trim substantially decreased, meaning that a full 10s second activation of the MCAS could no longer be negated by a 10s trim command from the pilot. The flight recorder shows trim commands of up to 4 seconds, which in fact allowed the MCAS to re-engage and issue a fresh 10s opposite command, at a higher rate. This is a disastrous succession of events that can't be blamed on the pilot.
I won't go down the rabbit hole with the rest of your comment, enough to say you need to better vet your sources and reevaluate your claims. The Ethiopian Airlines pilots fought for their lives for a few desperate minutes and lost, quite possibly made some mistakes but overall many other qualified pilots would have failed too in the same scenario.
glitchc•19h ago
WalterBright•16h ago
arunabha•13h ago
rtkwe•12h ago
snozolli•19h ago
The Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) is a flight control law built into the Boeing 737 MAX's flight control computer, designed to help the aircraft emulate the handling characteristics of the earlier Boeing 737 Next Generation.
Merad•8h ago
However this was a real problem during WW2, and high speed dives killed more than a few pilots. By 1942-43 most fighter planes were able to dive fast enough to get into trouble (500+ mph/800 kph) but weren't designed for it at all. The aerodynamics of supersonic flight just weren't understood at the time. In some cases the design of the plane made it essentially impossible to pull out once you went beyond a certain speed, all you could do was attempt to slow down enough to regain control. The P-38 Lightning was notorious for this. I don't have any specific sources handy but I recall reading accounts of things like pilots bracing their feet against the control panel trying to pull the control stick with all their strength, taking extreme measures like lowering the landing gear to slow down (risking it being ripped off and maybe tearing the whole plane apart), or only surviving due to sheer luck - sometimes the thicker air at lower altitudes would slow them down enough before it was too late.
dlcarrier•7h ago
Airplanes' control surfaces have have smaller control surfaces inside them called tabs. Just as a small movement in a control surface is amplified into the larger movement of the entire airplane, a control tab's even smaller movement is amplified into the movement of the rest of the control surface, which in turn is amplified into the movement of the entire airplane.
Here's a good descriptions of different types of control tabs: https://www.boldmethod.com/learn-to-fly/systems/4-types-of-t...
Many small airplanes, and pretty much every large airplane, effectively use tabs as a gross adjustment and the yoke/rudder as a fine adjustment, so under normal operation there shouldn't be large forces on the yoke or rudder. The only time it takes a lot of force to control an airplane is when the tab can't be easily controlled. Flying even a small Cessna 152 out of trim can take tens of pounds of force and be impossible to sustain for long periods of time. I once tried flying a 152 from one airport to another, only a few minutes away, without adjusting the elevator trim, and my arms were sore the next day.
Going into too fast of a dive has two much larger dangers, one is that the aircraft can break up from the aerodynamic forces, and the other is that the air becomes turbulent near the trailing of of a control surface, making it no longer able to control the aircraft. When the later happens, the controls don't take much force to move, but they also don't do much.
StanislavPetrov•1d ago
vunderba•1d ago
Summers spent parallel parking that pig left me pouring sweat.
WalterBright•1d ago
Steering wheels for manual steering tend to be larger, giving more leverage, and the steering gearbox is geared differently.
StanislavPetrov•1d ago
I had disk brakes on my '67 Firebird. Not only was the pedal pressure much higher, but you better have your crash helmet on when it snowed!
RankingMember•20h ago
This is a myth. Power steering and power brakes were developed to make driving easier and safer for all drivers as vehicles became larger and heavier. Some of the advertising from the era framed the features as helpful to female drivers, but this was just that- advertising.
WalterBright•16h ago
They also wanted to sell cars to little old ladies.
crossroadsguy•1d ago
selimthegrim•23h ago
alnwlsn•21h ago
HeyLaughingBoy•14h ago
bqmjjx0kac•1d ago
I challenge you to consider that men and women's strength have overlapping distributions.
ses1984•1d ago
HideousKojima•21h ago
dahart•19h ago
ses1984•18h ago
You’re right, it’s subjective, but that’s not what I would call a decent overlap.
dahart•18h ago
BTW, the 0.1% number may be sampling noise, as similar studies have come up with numbers like 1% or 3%. While they’re all small, 3% is 30x larger than 0.1%. Don’t put a lot of stock in that number; it’s trying to draw conclusions from the noisiest lowest-data part of the distribution, and therefore is highly prone to error.
fawley•1d ago
This is true. However, most pilots in the early days came from the military, which likely selects towards the stronger end of the men's distributions.
WalterBright•1d ago
In the military, they have standards for fitness.
dlcarrier•6h ago
Also, averages change over time, as the environment we are raised in changes, so what was designed around an average height in the 1920's required shorter than average pilots by the 1940's.
Here's an article on the topic: https://www.thestar.com/news/insight/when-u-s-air-force-disc...
Here's a book with several chapters going even more in depth: https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/24186666-the-end-of-aver...
myrmidon•1d ago
HideousKojima•21h ago
dahart•19h ago
Importantly, those stats you brought up are limited to upper body. When it comes to lower body, the ratio of female strength to male is more like 80% and your stddev number is smaller, so at the very least your conclusion should preserve that qualifier: average man’s grip or upper body strength is higher than 99% of women’s grip or upper body strength. It’s not quite true to generalize to an across-the board statement that avg man is stronger than 99% of women. It appears most studies widely agree the discrepancy is due primarily and simply to body weight / muscle mass; this is all mostly a simple byproduct of women being smaller than men on average.
Googling I see some results on grip strength (GS) saying mean male GS is higher than 97% of females. The graph/study in this article happens to have an even smaller ratio than what you mentioned with male GS at higher than 99.9% of females. But look at the rather large overlap of the distributions (first image). Saying the average male is strong than either 97% or 99% or 99.9% of women one might not realize that each distribution overlaps with something like 30% of the area. (@bqmjjx0kac is correct - the distributions do overlap) https://briefedbydata.substack.com/p/female-vs-male-grip-str...
542354234235•18h ago
But muscle is closely tied to testosterone, something men have much more of. It makes me think of the iconic study [1] where men were compared with/without testosterone injections, and with/without exercise. The men given testosterone that did nothing grew more muscle mass than men strength training in the gym. So it isn’t women being smaller, it is that most men build more muscle laying on the couch than women going to the gym.
[1] https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJM199607043350101
dahart•17h ago
myrmidon•18h ago
But pointing out that there is a 30% area overlap glosses over the main point in this context in my opinion: If you are going to have any benchmark ("need to be this strong to safely pilot"), then that benchmark is either going to be trivial for most men or it's going to be almost impossible to meet for almost every woman.
I put this number here because it was quite surprising to me when I learned about this; naively, I would have expected something like 1/10 women to be stronger than an average man, but that is off by a lot.
dahart•18h ago
This is actually why IMO saying women are 65% as strong as the average man is the better framing. It gives you an immediate, practical, and tangible goal. If the force required to do a given operation is acceptable for men and not acceptable for women, then we don’t need to reduce the force by 100x, we need to reduce it by 1.5x, which is not very much.
Talking about the standard deviation doesn’t give you a usable result, while talking about the ratio of means does.
BTW this argument should be moot. It’s very, very poor safety design to suggest that controlling a vehicle or doing anything else safety critical should require more than 50% of my maximum strength. My own strength varies considerably based on how much I have to use it. I can’t maintain my max strength if I have to do it repeatedly, and it will affect my ability to think if I have to use my max strength in a crisis situation. There simply should not be controls that require more force than most women can apply, not even close.
glowiefedposter•20h ago
ahmeneeroe-v2•14h ago
rpmisms•1d ago
WalterBright•1d ago
rpmisms•1d ago
WalterBright•1d ago
caycep•1d ago
WalterBright•1d ago
NASA picked exactly the right man for the job.
richwater•1d ago
WalterBright•1d ago
ivanech•20h ago
WalterBright•16h ago
caycep•1d ago
gonzobonzo•1d ago
I was surprised to learn the same once I started diving into her history. She definitely was a media phenomenon, with her public image largely manufactured by her publicist husband.
Her story actually feels very similar to the fake YouTube personalities of today. What's funny is that, for all the complaints about people today being too gullible about modern influencers, the ones from history often succeed in fooling far more people.
> Lest you think he was sexist, he professed admiration for Jacqueline Cochran.
It's understandable why this needs to be said - unfortunately, these accusations accusations are the default reaction many people have to this criticism (I've seen them before in discussions about Earhart and others). Once someone is given a status of an icon for a particularly identity, people have an unpleasant habit of believing criticism of the icon is criticism of the identity. It would be nice if we were able to judge people as individuals.
genewitch•1d ago
Yeah a large portion of humans have flaws, do bad things (3 felonies a day!), etc. But I think art (as it were) transcends the artist, especially in audiovisual stuff where it's much more likely there are other people involved that actually make the art memorable; however even a self-published asshole can produce something great.
I guess I could just suffer the weird al trapped in the drive-through, to placate such people, or can ignore them. R Kelly got no money from me, anyhow, I bought it all secondhand. My conscience is clear enough, I think.
WalterBright•1d ago
He didn't hesitate: "Spacial disorientation"
Aka pilot incompetence. Airplanes don't care if you're a celebrity or not.
beedeebeedee•1d ago
WalterBright•1d ago
My dad worked for a while as an instrument flying instructor. He said the big hurdle was to learn to trust the instruments and ignore your body screaming at you that the instruments are lying.
Your dad is exactly correct.
He flew F-104s? I'm so jealous! As a teen, I lived near Luke AFB. I had a military ID, and would bicycle onto the base and head to the flight line. Luke was training Luftwaffe pilots at the time to fly F-104s. They'd start down the runway, and halfway down would light the afterburners. Boom! Followed by a gigantic flame shooting out the back. They'd take off at a steep angle with the most delightful thunder.
I was so sorry to have to turn in my ID when I turned 21.
I wanted to be an AF pilot, but the recruiting officer reluctantly said I could never be a pilot because of my glasses. And so I went into writing compiler :-/
bombcar•1d ago
At night with no visible horizon - you do it to yourself.
WalterBright•1d ago
My dad, against orders, carried a piece of pipe with him, to ensure the student would not panic and kill them both. He said he never had to use it.
wombatpm•1d ago
WalterBright•1d ago
genewitch•1d ago
Lead pipe crash avoidance closest I could get.
wat10000•21h ago
WalterBright•16h ago
genewitch•13h ago
dctoedt•13h ago
In about 1967, my dad (career USAF, fighter jock) was flying in clear, sunny weather. He started to get bad vertigo, so he did an emergency, instruments-only landing at a nearby AF base. He said that on final approach, he "knew" he was upside down, and that it was all he could do to refrain from rolling the airplane "right side up" for touchdown on the runway.
wat10000•21h ago
Getting disoriented in those conditions is expected. Knowingly flying into those conditions without an instrument rating is very bad judgment.
dlcarrier•6h ago
technothrasher•18h ago
Um, what?!? .... ohhhh, you phoned your dad.
WalterBright•16h ago
Why wouldn't I ask his opinion?
HeyLaughingBoy•13h ago
southernplaces7•21h ago
ergsef•21h ago
aaronbaugher•20h ago