The 737 was designed using light tables and slide rules, to use low-bypass turbofans and direct controls with avionics only on board to optionally aid the pilots.
The A320 was designed in CAD and using CFD, with full digital fly-by-wire, and designed from the start for high-bypass turbofans.
Both designs have been updated plenty since, but because the basic design is much more modern, the A320 is much more amenable to being updated. There are elements of the 737 design that still exist on every new MAX coming off the line that would completely doom the certification chances of any new design, but are still there because they got grandfathered in for 737.
The wonder is not that the A320 finally caught up in sales, it's that the 737 can still be legally sold.
What’s wrong with the 737 design that it wouldn’t pass today as a new aircraft? (Ignoring the disaster that was the MAX.)
So you have to constantly apply some controls to fly, done by software.
I love stupid car comparisons so imagine a car with a new engine that is more economical to run, but very heavy on the left so the car constantly want to turn left. But if you apply force to the steering wheel manually or the car does it for you with software, all good. Still a shit car though.
I think they added redundant sensors which should theoretically prevent this in future. IMHO, I think several issues compound here. They should have redesigned the fuselage. The engineering compromise is bad, but if handled with care, could have been done relatively safely. They opted for no additional pilot training re MCAS. This was a fatal mistake, compounded by them relying on a single sensor. Nothing in avionics relies on a single sensor for remaining in the air. That was insane. There MUST have been engineers screaming about safety who were ignored.
How anyone thought making critical decisions on a single sensor reading made sense is beyond me.
I remember when I first heard about the MCAS issue and thought "Why didn't the pilots just pull up?" and someone explained to me that MCAS worked by trimming, and it would trim nose-down so hard that even with full elevation to try to nose back up, it wasn't enough to overcome the extreme amount of nose-down from the trim.
And since pilots weren't trained on the new MCAS system, they weren't aware that the trim would have been automatically moved.
Not only that, but Boeing is actually limited in how much they can "modernize" the 737, because doing too much might exceed the limits of the 737's type certificate. This is the reason behind the current engine inlet overheating worries, which has led to an airworthiness directive for the 737 MAX (https://aerospacenews.com/faa-airworthiness-directive_boeing...) and is also one of the reasons for the delay certifying the MAX 7 and MAX 10. This would be a complete non-issue for other planes, because all modern designs have a switch position that only turns on the engine anti-ice system when it's needed, but the 737 MAX can't have that because the 1967 737 didn't.
I know that it's a complete nightmare to certify anything. However I apparently don't understand some underlying principle that allows to certify some things and not the others.
MCAS was implemented to make sure the control forces increase going into a stall, this is a requirement in the regulations. Without MCAS the control forces would drop on the way into a stall, which is an issue that would prevent certification of the aircraft.
(Was on a transatlantic one once. Never again.)
Well they did bet on the Dreamliner, fell on their nose and still recovered.
“By 1988, when Airbus launched its new A320 narrowbody jet, Boeing had already established a strong lead, having delivered around 1,500 of its popular jets”
So, Boeing sold about 1,500 767s in the first 20 years and over 10,500 in the < 40 years since. Airbus sold about 12,000 in the < 40 years since.
So, to catch up, Airbus produced about 15% more than Boeing did.
Source: my brother worked for Boeing in sales and has been in the industry 30 years.
I mean realistically in this particular category (narrow-bodies) they've essentially been playing catchup for the last _40 years_; ever since it was released they've really had trouble competing with the A320. Their inability to do basically anything right feels newer, but the 737 has long been a weak spot.
An issue like MCAS would be much less likely if the aircraft was designed to be fully fly-by-wire - but a fully fly-by-wire single-aisle would have to be recertified from scratch.
The problem with jetliner manufacturing is that you kind of have to bet the company on every single new model you release, just because the process of designing a new plane is so cumbersome and difficult that you can't really afford to be doing it very often.
Only if a company is completely blind to buy Boeing planes in 2025! It does not matter if the places are millions of dollars cheaper, all the money spent with lawsuits and lawyers when things go sideways, plus the airline name dragged to shit, I don't think it is worth.
But that RyanAir didn’t happen to have a version of the design that was extremely unsafe doesn’t mean that the family of planes is safer than the competition. It just means that it got lucky that it didn’t have the flawed planes.
That mitigates the risk of buying untested tech with first-iteration demons
That's probably the biggest reason for their safety record: the same plane means common maintenance, training and operations, giving much less risk.
The flying public generally does not know or care what the model of plane they're on is. I almost never see anyone actually pull out the safety card from the seatback pocket to check. I'm not sure if it can be a reputational risk.
(They do, however, use Dublin airport's worst 'gate', 335, which is _actually_ a bus to a small fake terminal separate from any of the main ones.)
Gate 335...I've experienced it hah
EDIT: after researching a bit more, it looks like the initial order was from 2023 (https://simpleflying.com/lufthansa-40-boeing-737-max-40-airb...), so "cozying up to Trump" was probably not a factor at the time. Also, I imagine that order being passed around like the proverbial hot potato between all the airlines in Lufthansa group, until it finally landed in Eurowings' lap: "Interested in some brand new state of the art 737 MAXes? No? Why? What do you mean, `You take them if you're so fond of them`? We would, gladly, but we have an all-A320 fleet and would like to keep it that way. Oh, you too, really?".
It's likely this. Airbus has a backlog of ~7500 A32x orders right now, and produces about 75 a month, so if you order one today, you're looking at eight years.
Though also some budget airlines like the 737 because it's _short_; it's not as high off the ground as an A320, making access via airstairs more feasible.
Some MBA types might also see the opportunity to lay off experienced expensive Airbus pilots and hire new cheaper Boeing pilots, classic strategic gambling, not sure those things ever pay off.
PaulRobinson•5mo ago
The interesting thing for me about this particular tale is the commercial genesis of Airbus and the incentives of the management team have led it to catch up despite Boeing have a 20-year head start.
When you're not totally absorbed by the share price, and instead you're trying to build a sustainable long-term business that can pay off decades (or generations), later, you get to make decisions that lead to a more sustainable and trusted business.
themafia•5mo ago
FirmwareBurner•5mo ago
So when is it gonna kill Google?
svelle•5mo ago
alexey-salmin•5mo ago
Not that it must kill Google, they can still pivot and e.g. Google Cloud is already non-negligible in their revenue structure. But I'm relatively confident that search/ads duo won't be their main earner anymore just like Windows is not the main earner of Microsoft.
FirmwareBurner•5mo ago
People have been saying the same about Microsoft for 20+ years. Now it's again, the most valuable company in the world.
At what point do people admit they're just bad at predicting the future?
alexey-salmin•5mo ago
FirmwareBurner•5mo ago
greg_V•5mo ago
Now, everyone who's running a website for a living is doing platform-native content for traffic and pairing it up with a newsletter-backed website or straight up investing in brand advertising campaigns to have access to their own audiences still, without relying on Google to deliver them.
My guess is that we're in for the second wave of Big Aggregators, but it's tough to say what the technological twist behind it will be, so it's not just a reddit 2.0.
acchow•5mo ago
pjjpo•5mo ago
Agree with the sentiments of the sibling posts that monopolies seem as great for business as ever.
PedroBatista•5mo ago
themafia•5mo ago
tempodox•5mo ago
But sadly not fast enough. The monopolies get to make everyone else miserable for far too long.
g9yuayon•5mo ago
MaKey•5mo ago
scrlk•5mo ago
There's a Chinese saying: "Wealth does not pass three generations". Three generations of Intel CEOs after Grove: Craig Barrett, Paul Otellini and Brian Krzanich (the progenitor of much of the mess that Intel is in today).
targadany•5mo ago
dude250711•5mo ago
Surely, Google here is the cautionary tale? Though I guess it started with the cloud for them.
Pavilion2095•5mo ago
But Boeing introduced several new planes during these 20 years. If anything, they abandoned the idea of a new design and introduced 737 MAX as a response to the competition - A320neo.
Gravityloss•5mo ago
First you have rapid iteration and lots of innovation.
Then the projects become more complex, there's less quick wins, and cycles get longer.
Then it gets so bad you won't have anyone working anymore who has finished any new projects during their career, everybody's been working on the same decades long projects since time immemorial. Some new ones are started, some are cancelled every now and then but none are finished.
Then the organization will not even try anymore and accept to live in the ruins created by past generations.
Then it could happen that all artifacts crumble, all documentation disappears and even the people propagating the intergenerational verbal history forget or die and nobody will even know that anything existed.
Frieren•5mo ago
The problem with Boeing is mostly a business side one, not an engineering problem. Boeing invested in buy backs instead of creating good products, and that has been its philosophy for a while.
Interesting read: https://qz.com/1776080/how-the-mcdonnell-douglas-boeing-merg...
"Since the start of the jet age, Boeing had been less a business and more, as writer Jerry Useem put it in Fortune in 2000, “an association of engineers devoted to building amazing flying machines.”
"Everything seemed to be changing—the leadership, the culture, even the headquarters, with a move from Seattle to Chicago in 2001."
"Many employees struggled to adjust, or resented what they saw as a changing of the guard, where investors took priority over passengers."
Gravityloss•5mo ago
kamaal•5mo ago
Most of Boeing's Ls seem to have come from quality issues, and that seems to come downstream to cutting spending on engineering, testing and in general overall technical ecosystem.
There is no point in making 20 or even 200 new planes, if you don't make them well.
“People think focus means saying yes to the thing you've got to focus on. But that's not what it means at all. It means saying no to the hundred other good ideas that there are. You have to pick carefully. I'm actually as proud of the things we haven't done as the things I have done. Innovation is saying no to 1,000 things.” - Steve Jobs