These things are often used because of contractual requirements. Mainstream media including video games are often contractually protected: you must not let it run/play on any device without sufficient hardware protections. So vendors have to include these protection systems even if they don't want to. If the systems were useless, this might end.
You might have mistaken it for say Intel ME and the AMD equivalent.
https://www.netspi.com/blog/executive-blog/hardware-and-embe...
Therefore requiring physical assess is still low complexity in context.
With that said, I'd rather see it broken than not, considering it's mostly used for negative stuff, and it isn't open enough to evaluate if it actually is secure enough.
Not only, it has many purposes. I'm also the administrator of my computer, and some things I want to be unchangable by software, unless I myself unlock it, like I don't want anyone to be able to boot or install other OSes than the ones I've installed myself. The secure enclave and secure boot is perfect for this, even if my computer gets malware they won't be able to access it, and even if someone gets physical access to my computer, they won't be able to boot their OS from a USB.
But also: TPMs could be used to prevent evil maid attacks and to make it uneconomical for thieves who stole your device to also steal your data. It makes it possible for devices to remotely arrest to their owners that the OS had not been compromised, which is relevant to enterprise IT environments. There are a lot of good uses for this technology, we just need to solve the political problems of aggressive copyright, TIVOization, etc.
No need for the keys or decryption to touch easily intercepted and rowhammered RAM.
IMO Amazon is the obvious choice for TEE because they make billions selling isolated compute
If you built a product on Intel or AMD and need to pivot do take a look at AWS Nitro Enclaves
I built up a small stack for Nitro: https://lock.host/ has all the links
MIT everything, dev-first focus
AWS will tell you to use AWS KMS to manage enclave keys
AWS KMS is ok if you are ok with AWS root account being able to get to keys
If you want to lock your TEE keys so even root cannot access I have something i the works for this
Write to: hello@lock.host if you want to discuss
And so there is no case where you find a Nitro TEE online and the owner is not AWS
And it is practically impossible to break into AWS and perform this attack
The trust model of TEE is always: you trust the manufacturer
Intel and AMD broke this because now they say: you also trust where the TEE is installed
AWS = you trust the manufacturer = full story
So, working as intended.
ForHackernews•3h ago
If an attacker with time and resources has physical access, you are doomed.
immibis•3h ago
beeflet•2h ago
i80and•3h ago
PaulHoule•2h ago