EDIT:
- Please do not assume some trivial straw-man implementation of this idea. That includes City organization being hopelessly corrupt or incompetent.
I think we need Vacancy taxes that go up based on the percentage of time vacant over different spans of time. Anything that makes owning an empty building a bad investment in all circumstances. This needs to apply to all units in a multitenant building.
But empty buildings aren't a bad idea under all circumstances. Eg, It might be prudent to have empty living space in a tourist or student area to deal with annual surges in demand. Or maybe someone has a warehouse full of facemasks because they think the price will 10x in the next pandemic. We'd have the same crowd complaining about empty buildings saying they were just doing it to hide the fact that the building is empty when in fact that is a pretty reasonable strategy that would be socially beneficial.
I suppose the model sucks because the community is highly benefited by a low profit cozy coffee shop or book store, which might not be able to afford the property tax rate needed to discourage the "keep it vacant" strategy.
Maybe I changed my mind, and "vacant and/or not being used for its zoning purpose" needs a separate, additional fee.
I had the exact same question before I fully read the article.
This is answered in the article in the "Extend and Pretend" section.
> "And so long as the operator can afford to keep losing $140k per year on the building… they can!"
> [...]
> "The only sticking point here is that the building operator is still losing $140k per year. But remember that, if he gives up, he loses the $4 million he’s already put into the building. Even if he ended up paying $140k per year for 10 years before things turned around, losing $1.4 million is still better than losing $4 million."
Extending the article's example to a scenario where the building was vacant for 15 years, it means the operator was willing to lose $140K per year. In the 15 year scenario, the operator lost $2.1 million ($140K * 15 years) which is still better than losing the $4 million if the operator walked away from the investment.
> Anything that makes owning an empty building a bad investment in all circumstances.
In the final section "This Sucks, What Could We Do About It?", it mentions how adding a vacant store font tax would end up creating more foreclosures. This is the side effect of the financialization of real estate.
Lowering the rent to fill their building reduces the value of that building, which means when they sell it, they will recognize a loss that is likely larger than many years of operating loss from the empty building.
Additionally, lowering the rent for that building will also reduces the value of other nearby buildings that have that building as a comparable property. Then when those buildings come up for refinance, either the borrower will have to come up with more funds so that the loan to value max isn't exceeded or the borrower will default and the bank will lose the income stream and be holding another property where their investment is more than the value.
Borrowers usually don't want to come up with more funds on a property where they're underwater and banks don't want to foreclose on property where the bank will be underwater, so it's in the bank's interest to let things be vacant and keep the valuations based on the previous rent, rather than lowering the rent and facing the music. You'll also see promos like first several months free, rather than reducing the rent, so you can report it's rented at whatever the headline rate is, even if the tenant is effectively paying much less; of course, the tenant will be looking for somewhere else to rent come renewal.
This is far from the only case in banking where taking some action on an asset that would otherwise be reasonable won't be done, because it would trigger a mark to market on too many other assets. Ex: you can't sell realize a loss to sell treasury bonds to satisfy cash flow needs, because you'll have to mark to market all the similar bonds, and then you won't meet your reserve needs.
> Additionally, lowering the rent for that building will also reduces the value of other nearby buildings that have that building as a comparable property
> it's in the bank's interest to let things be vacant and keep the valuations based on the previous rent, rather than lowering the rent and facing the music.
This just seems like everyone involved is playing make-believe about the actual value of their property. A tax on vacant land that increases exponentially year after year might help to correct this behavior, because at some point, it costs less to realize the loss than it does to pay the ever-increasing vacant land tax.
That's precisely what's going on.
It's a common theme among wealthy individuals/organizations to treat property as having value X for some purposes and Y for others - e.g., like pretending stock holdings are worth X for the sake of taxation while being able to secure loans by representing the stock valuation as Y.
I thought it was a really elegant solution, and has made me wonder if a similar program could be used for vacant Commercial Real Estate in the cast of a national vacancy tax, land value tax, or similar value-lowering event.
1: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bank_Term_Funding_Program#Prog...
why a bank would hold a completely vacant building for 15 years.
Allows for inflated valuations and hypotheticals which appear on paper as absolute but in reality are much lower.By leasing for cheaper they effectively capitulate and sell at a loss which will hammer their funding ability. It's land speculation similar to tech speculation. Inflate valuations, get a longer runway from lenders, etc.
At some point it has to come back to reality, but as the saying goes: "The market (land owners) can remain irrational longer than you (businesses) can remain solvent."
It's a no-lose scenario for banks though, which is why it's done that way I guess.
You're right that nobody can predict correctly that far in the future, but ultimately you have to choose whether you think a business decision will be profitable or not, so you have to predict anyways or else you could never do anything. People build lots of models to try to predict better. And market prices reflect a middle point between the pessimists and the optimists.
Also, it's not no-lose for banks. If the owner walks and the property is re-sold for less than it was originally bought for minus the down payment, the bank very much loses. That's a major point of the article, why the bank would prefer the space to continue vacant for a few years than take that loss.
This whole extend and pretend deal seems like it's simply accumulating risk hoping this will pass, while risking an even bigger, potentially systemic crash. Though I honestly don't know that much about the commercial finance world.
Does your car drive worse if no one will buy it?
I'm not saying it doesn't suck to overpay for something, but you can't expect too much pity when you lose money speculating.
Why do you think that's the case? I'm sure it would make the entire city seem like a riskier investment at first, but it seems like in the medium term it would help address the situation described in the article.
And other parties further can be say pension funds, which on paper are forced to search for anything that make their goals look good enough. Thus not doing enough due diligence.
Everything is fine until it is not. And this has been seen time after time.
If the space is vacant, and the last known rent was $X, the assumption is that borrower is bad at advertising space, but a successor would be able to get it rented again at that rate.
OTOH, if the space is rented at 0.7 times $X, the tenants may have a long term lease that fixes that price for a significant time and even a savvy successor would have a hard time raising rents, so the valuation needs to be calculated based on current rent.
Wouldn't banks want to accurately assess these valuations so these types of "bad loans in actuality, good loans on paper" don't become a large portion of their balance sheet?
Maybe not all at once, but over time it seems like banks would want more accuracy on this.
Are we cooked chat?
There is basically no way for real estate to not be a complex financial product, because almost no one can pay cash-up-front for it. If it wasn't financialized, nobody could ever afford to own anything and we'd all be feudal serfs renting from a couple landlords.
Not that whole sector isn't over financialised.
I have a side business of a small e-commerce shop. I would consider having physical space just for the sake of luxury, but now I would rather spend that monthly rent on marketing online rather than paying for physical space.
IMHO, that's what is happening. Bank problems or anything else are secondary; if it were profitable to be at the physical location for the businesses, other factors would vanish.
Apartment complexes could also be 50% vacant and still "worth" their original value if the asking rents remain high.
Office buildings that got cleared out after covid, same thing.
Brick and mortar retail are the same.
The article is more of a criticism of how asset values are calculated and loans are managed to avoid foreclosure. Which results in financially valid buildings/loans that are underutilized because the other option is creating economic equilibrium at the cost of lenders and debt holders.
Since when did "taking a loss" get written out of the definition of "investing"?
This phenomenon is going on in the downtown of my city - decreased foot traffic leads to tenants leaving, and the cycle continues. It's a miserable place to live or work that basically becomes a ghost town at 5pm. They're trying to do some office-to-residential conversions, but they're not very desirable because the entire neighborhood feels hollow and abandoned.
Instead of delaying these defaults and accumulating systemic risk until there's a massive correction, someone should be enforcing accounting that marks to market the actual rental value. That would force banks to be honest about the real level of risk on their balance sheets.
Perhaps if we split off commercial lending arms, allowed them unbounded LTVs, and then allowed them to fail we would get better performance?
It does seem like a pretty complicated problem. We want banks to be reliable, we don't have a pricing mechanism because the market is illiquid, and we have incentives to keep the Potemkin story alive.
Everyone (especially us) wins!
The problem is that if you don't update values continuously, you are surprised when you finally are forced to. Some stock on the public market that isn't doing well goes from 100 to 90, 80, 70... etc, and people thinking about the stock have to make decisions accordingly.
A private loan against that business can sit at 100 until the company decides it can't pay, and suddenly the loan is worth 20.
Say a bank is sitting on a pile of very safe bonds. If the interest rate suddenly increases, the mark-to-market value of the bonds goes way down. The bank would still expect to get the full value of all the bonds at maturity. But if the bank has to mark-to-market, the current value may be low enough that capitalization requirements force the bank to sell all the bonds in a fire sale. So even though the bank in theory could have held onto the assets and gotten exactly what it had expected from the start, it instead ends up taking a big loss.
You could probably make this work by donating office space to nonprofit organizations while maintaining high nominal rent (and maybe this already happens) but it's not as practical for storefronts etc.
Basically, the buildings cashflow solely on the residential, but the commercial space is/was valued optimistically (especially leading up to the 2020 pandemic). So a building's owner isn't in a financial bind, and if they were to lower rent on the commercial space, even if they didn't lose the building, it would be much harder to refinance the next time their loan matured. (Commercial loans are frequently "balloon" loans that have payments like they're amortizing over 30 years, but they mature before then, meaning the borrower either has to pay the remaining amount of the loan, or refinance.)
Possible Solution:
I've been thinking about a cumulative vacancy tax that increases every year a space is vacant (and decreases for every year it's occupied). So a building owner or loan underwriter could project when a vacancy would become more costly than lowering rent.
You could charge the tax on the assessed value of the vacant space. Increase it by 100 basis points for every year that a space is vacant. Decrease it by 200 basis points for every year that it's rented.
And it is precisely why a lot of people hate capitalism.
Adam Smith himself would would disapprove: "As soon as the land of any country has all become private property, the landlords, like all other men, love to reap where they never sowed, and demand a rent even for its natural produce."
polalavik•1h ago
In Los Angeles I’ve watched business after business close because their rent was increased by their commercial landlord only for the property to sit vacant in some cases (no exaggeration) for over 5 years!
Thats absurd. Also as a business owner who would like some space to work out of your only options are endless swaths of vacant industrial buildings that are tens of thousands in rent a month. I don’t quite get how anyone runs a brick and mortar or has space to do anything profitable.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Land_value_tax
zem•1h ago
anigbrowl•1h ago
dec0dedab0de•1h ago
harmmonica•1h ago
Prop 13 is like the anti land value tax. Makes places like Texas look downright progressive.
spankalee•1h ago
ricksunny•1h ago
Can you walk through the scenario that younger neighbors pay a tech of the property tax you do? Are they legacies and benefiting from some sort of inherited trust or something?
shaftway•53m ago
All of this is subject to limits and rules and stuff. I think prop 19 made it so that you have to use it for your primary residence for the first year. And I think there's a cap on the difference between property value and tax basis of ~$1m.
dragonwriter•43m ago
margalabargala•1h ago
Piecemeal reform is much easier to swallow. Especially if you start with something like commercial properties, and especially since the increased income that results can be used to create tangible community improvements.
So even if your ultimate goal is full repeal, the correct strategy to make that come about is piecemeal reform, and pushing for a full repeal is counterproductive to that happening.
nradov•42m ago
epistasis•1h ago
One of the biggest objections to a straight repeal Prop 13 on commercial property is that most commercial leases are triple-net, meaning that the businesses directly pay the taxes. Which means that a bunch of small businesses that are just barely on the edge of profitability will shut down when they finally have to pay their fair share of property tax.
Agreed on the need to do it though (and also Texas typically has higher taxes for a normal person, with worse services than California). We might just want to pass a gradual phase in or a requirement that landowners pay it without increasing rent )and doing reach through to modify all those triple net leases... or something. Or we just let the businesses fail, but the public tends to not like lots of small businesses failing.
avidiax•1h ago
For personal property, raise the taxes, and give the home owner the option to defer the raise as a lien against the property, accruing fair interest. Nobody gets kicked out of their home, and the taxes get paid when the home is sold. If it is inherited, then the inheritors will have to increase their taxes paid at least so that the lien amount no longer increases relative to the home value.
For commercial property, cap the property tax paid by the lease-holder to the historic rate + a several percent growth to gradually meet the current tax bill. The rest of the tax becomes a lien on the property to be paid on sale, with forced payment increases if the lien to value ratio becomes too large. It would be up to the property owner whether they pay the additional tax or take it as a lien. Ultimately, commercial prop 13 was a mistake, and businesses that can't compete on a level playing field need to be gradually pressured to improve profitability or make the space available to someone that can.
toast0•1h ago
You could probably adjust the annual percentage increase and find a balance between pre-prop13 problems of rapidly increasing property tax and the post-prop13 problems of significant gap between capped assessment and actual value.
Probably also need to do something about transfers via holding companies as well, since there's a ton of commercial properties that have never had their assessment cap reset because of the way the beneficial holding rules apply to corporations. OTOH, if the capped assessment grows at something like 5% per year, maybe it can catch up soon enough anyway.
harmmonica•53m ago
Re your NNN comment, would you mind sharing a source for that? My gut says it's not accurate, but happy to be proven wrong. If you meant total square footage of leased space, that would make more sense, but having a hard time believing most leases are NNN (and since your point was about businesses going under what I think matters is the number of leases because (a bit over-simplified) 1 lease = 1 business regardless of the square footage leased by the business.
The ironic thing about this whole topic of businesses going under is that there's no rent control, for the most part, for businesses and yet Prop 13 acts as rent control (i.e., carried cost control) for landlords. If the landlords only charged the market rent that was achievable at the time they bought the property with a nominal capped annual increase that'd be pretty good for operating businesses, just not for the landlord's real estate business.
P.s. I personally benefit from Prop 13 and would be happy to have its market-distorting bullshit eliminated!
coliveira•1h ago
kcplate•1h ago
My guess is a already wealthy landlord would probably be motivated to ride out the remainder of an existing lease and write off any unpaid amount as a loss before lowering the price to attract another business into the space.
PaulHoule•1h ago
It makes me think of the "poker game" model of nuclear power plant construction where the vendor is quoting a price lower than they know it will cost because otherwise they wouldn't make the sale. If commercial buildings were properly priced at the outset, banks would be financing fewer of them.
estearum•1h ago
That is assuming operators are roughly zero-IQ automatons who can't factor future costs into present decisions?
marcosdumay•1h ago
dragonwriter•1h ago
The idea of land value tax is to make the government effectively the universal landowner and everyone else renters, and renters paying a high enough rent that it is economically infeasible to use land for any but the most financially remunerative purpose.
Having it optimizing for social utility rather than maximizing negative externalities requires a finely optimized system of Pigovian taxes and subsidies, otherwise you are nailing the accelerator to the floor on the divergence between market incentives and social utility.
epistasis•1h ago
dragonwriter•1h ago
It is absolutely not orthogonal; LVT by design makes doing things with property that are less financially remunerative unviable, it’s key selling point is eliminating “less productive” uses by that mechanism. This exacerbates any divergence between market incentives and social utility.
spwa4•1h ago
spankalee•1h ago
If it didn't pencil out to just site on empty land, we'd get better development.
spwa4•35m ago
atoav•1h ago
scifi•1h ago
bobthepanda•1h ago
triceratops•46m ago
duskwuff•1h ago
danjl•1h ago
seanmcdirmid•59m ago