frontpage.
newsnewestaskshowjobs

Made with ♥ by @iamnishanth

Open Source @Github

fp.

Start all of your commands with a comma

https://rhodesmill.org/brandon/2009/commands-with-comma/
100•theblazehen•2d ago•22 comments

OpenCiv3: Open-source, cross-platform reimagining of Civilization III

https://openciv3.org/
654•klaussilveira•13h ago•189 comments

The Waymo World Model

https://waymo.com/blog/2026/02/the-waymo-world-model-a-new-frontier-for-autonomous-driving-simula...
944•xnx•19h ago•549 comments

How we made geo joins 400× faster with H3 indexes

https://floedb.ai/blog/how-we-made-geo-joins-400-faster-with-h3-indexes
119•matheusalmeida•2d ago•29 comments

What Is Ruliology?

https://writings.stephenwolfram.com/2026/01/what-is-ruliology/
38•helloplanets•4d ago•38 comments

Unseen Footage of Atari Battlezone Arcade Cabinet Production

https://arcadeblogger.com/2026/02/02/unseen-footage-of-atari-battlezone-cabinet-production/
48•videotopia•4d ago•1 comments

Show HN: Look Ma, No Linux: Shell, App Installer, Vi, Cc on ESP32-S3 / BreezyBox

https://github.com/valdanylchuk/breezydemo
227•isitcontent•14h ago•25 comments

Jeffrey Snover: "Welcome to the Room"

https://www.jsnover.com/blog/2026/02/01/welcome-to-the-room/
14•kaonwarb•3d ago•17 comments

Monty: A minimal, secure Python interpreter written in Rust for use by AI

https://github.com/pydantic/monty
219•dmpetrov•14h ago•113 comments

Show HN: I spent 4 years building a UI design tool with only the features I use

https://vecti.com
327•vecti•16h ago•143 comments

Sheldon Brown's Bicycle Technical Info

https://www.sheldonbrown.com/
378•ostacke•19h ago•94 comments

Hackers (1995) Animated Experience

https://hackers-1995.vercel.app/
487•todsacerdoti•21h ago•241 comments

Microsoft open-sources LiteBox, a security-focused library OS

https://github.com/microsoft/litebox
359•aktau•20h ago•181 comments

Show HN: If you lose your memory, how to regain access to your computer?

https://eljojo.github.io/rememory/
286•eljojo•16h ago•167 comments

An Update on Heroku

https://www.heroku.com/blog/an-update-on-heroku/
409•lstoll•20h ago•276 comments

Vocal Guide – belt sing without killing yourself

https://jesperordrup.github.io/vocal-guide/
21•jesperordrup•4h ago•12 comments

Dark Alley Mathematics

https://blog.szczepan.org/blog/three-points/
87•quibono•4d ago•21 comments

PC Floppy Copy Protection: Vault Prolok

https://martypc.blogspot.com/2024/09/pc-floppy-copy-protection-vault-prolok.html
59•kmm•5d ago•4 comments

Where did all the starships go?

https://www.datawrapper.de/blog/science-fiction-decline
3•speckx•3d ago•2 comments

Delimited Continuations vs. Lwt for Threads

https://mirageos.org/blog/delimcc-vs-lwt
31•romes•4d ago•3 comments

How to effectively write quality code with AI

https://heidenstedt.org/posts/2026/how-to-effectively-write-quality-code-with-ai/
250•i5heu•16h ago•194 comments

Was Benoit Mandelbrot a hedgehog or a fox?

https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.01122
15•bikenaga•3d ago•3 comments

Introducing the Developer Knowledge API and MCP Server

https://developers.googleblog.com/introducing-the-developer-knowledge-api-and-mcp-server/
56•gfortaine•11h ago•23 comments

I now assume that all ads on Apple news are scams

https://kirkville.com/i-now-assume-that-all-ads-on-apple-news-are-scams/
1062•cdrnsf•23h ago•444 comments

Why I Joined OpenAI

https://www.brendangregg.com/blog/2026-02-07/why-i-joined-openai.html
144•SerCe•9h ago•133 comments

Learning from context is harder than we thought

https://hy.tencent.com/research/100025?langVersion=en
180•limoce•3d ago•97 comments

Understanding Neural Network, Visually

https://visualrambling.space/neural-network/
287•surprisetalk•3d ago•41 comments

I spent 5 years in DevOps – Solutions engineering gave me what I was missing

https://infisical.com/blog/devops-to-solutions-engineering
147•vmatsiiako•18h ago•67 comments

Show HN: R3forth, a ColorForth-inspired language with a tiny VM

https://github.com/phreda4/r3
72•phreda4•13h ago•14 comments

Female Asian Elephant Calf Born at the Smithsonian National Zoo

https://www.si.edu/newsdesk/releases/female-asian-elephant-calf-born-smithsonians-national-zoo-an...
29•gmays•9h ago•12 comments
Open in hackernews

Of Boot Vectors and Double Glitches: Bypassing RP2350's Secure Boot

https://streaming.media.ccc.de/39c3/relive/2149
141•aberoham•1mo ago

Comments

michaelt•1mo ago
Seems a bit of a strange feature to even want on a product targeting the education market. In a classroom setting you don't really want students to be able to set fuse bits so the device can't be re-programmed.

Presumably this is a sign RPi are deliberately aiming to straddle the hobby and light commercial markets?

rcxdude•1mo ago
They have absolutely been aiming at industrial customers already. It would be hard for them to justify the cost of a custom die without having some volume to businesses. (And the previous raspbarry pis have absolutely been popular in industry as well, I would be surprised if hobbyists and learners are even half of their volume)
Tharre•1mo ago
If that's a concern, you can lock the OTP either permanently or with a password, before you hand them out. Or just use the older RP2040.

But I don't think that "targeting the education market" is accurate in the first place. They certainly make sure to serve that market with their very nicely priced Pico boards but it hardly seems to be their only goal. You don't go through the effort of spinning up a new revision to fix security holes if there aren't at least some industry customers.

SequoiaHope•1mo ago
They have been serving enterprise markets for a long time. Back in 2020-2021 when there was a chip shortage, Raspberry Pi shorted their consumer availability to make sure enterprise customers could still get compute modules. The fusible bits on the RP2350 are very much an enterprise feature.
guenthert•1mo ago
Are you perhaps confusing the Raspberry Pi Foundation with the Raspberry Pi Holdings?
JayHLee77•1mo ago
Security is an essential feature for everyone, not just Enterprise. Can you trust the code your device is running? Can your device keep a secret? These capabilities are needed universally.

As to students being able to set the efuse so the device can't be reprogrammed, sure but they're $5 each so it's not like they're destroying a $500 Chromebook (which they do, look on YouTube). That risk is the cost of attempting to educate though (and it's worth it).

Retr0id•1mo ago
Seems like a small risk compared to students creating a trivial short-circuit and letting out the magic smoke, and at $1/part it's not a big deal even if they do.
londons_explore•1mo ago
Real security processors never give big bounties because when bugs are discovered all the buyers immediately cancel their orders of the 'faulty' secure chips.

They'd prefer to live in ignorance.

compsciphd•1mo ago
really big bounties would then be appropriate, as they would come with NDAs. Small bounties would just encourage others to make them public / sell them to more malicious actors.
Thorrez•1mo ago
What if multiple people discover the same vulnerability. What do you do?

Do you pay out to all of them? Do you make them sign an NDA without guaranteeing you'll pay them? Do you tell the 2nd etc discoverers to go away and hope they don't reveal it?

If you pay out to all of them, there's a strong incentive to leak info and collect multiple bounties for the same vulnerability.

londons_explore•1mo ago
You hire a salaried security researcher and forget the idea of bounties.
lll-o-lll•1mo ago
What an interesting talk, and an interesting concept also. Open source hardware security; get the security researchers interested and fix the security defects.

The “read the data out with a super expensive microscope” remained. Is there any way to defeat that attack I wonder? I suppose the hsm model of “destructive tamper detection” is one way.

regularfry•1mo ago
I patented something that had a countermeasure for this, which was a bit impractical but fun to think about. Basically you put the sensitive data in an eeprom layered with a chemical that emits UV when exposed to air or, optionally, visible light - chemically more entertaining, hard to manufacture. But it's a just an arms race at that point.
klysm•1mo ago
Cool idea, but seems pretty straightforward to bypass and definitely an arms race
michaelt•1mo ago
> The “read the data out with a super expensive microscope” remained. Is there any way to defeat that attack I wonder?

Get your chip made with the latest TSMC process and get features so small nobody else, even superpowers and trillion-dollar tech companies working together, can manipulate them :)

shash•1mo ago
A good scanning electron microscope costs at most a few million? And is pretty common in a decently funded lab pretty much anywhere? Resolutions of 5nm is not uncommon. A scanning tunnelling microscope can go much lower (single atom types) and isn’t all that much more expensive either (comparatively I mean).

I think it’s common knowledge by now that the smallest feature in a 5nm chip isn’t really 5nm. So that’s not (yet?) a viable strategy.

rcxdude•1mo ago
Manipulating features smaller than what TSMC manufacture is possible in many places (just at great expense), TSMC's special sauce is being able to manufacture it in quantity and economically. Ultimately it's always going to be difficult to completely protect storage at rest, because it is possible to take something apart atom by atom, but it does raise the cost of the attack substantially.
jnwatson•1mo ago
The current solution is obfuscation. They make the mapping from physical state to actual key complicated enough that you have to reverse engineer a lot of the logic.
avidiax•1mo ago
You can also bury the fuse array inside the chip. So in addition to the microscope, you will also have to non-destructively etch or mill the chip to expose the fuses. This also renders the chip non-functional, so if the secret is unique per chip, then the leaked secret can't be used to bootstrap to other secrets on the die.
IlikeKitties•1mo ago
There's a lot of people that believe that hardware remote attestation will be the end of computational freedom. I'm glad to see that bypasses are still quite possible.
lysace•1mo ago
I've had a bit of a difficulty of understanding the actual benefits of proper secure boot vs zero protection.

I've arrived at this understanding: secure boot sometimes allows you to recover a compromised fleet without recalls. Instruct the customer to disconnect the device, reboot it and then somehow reflash it before getting infected again? Seems fraught with errors though.

When I worked with IoT HW companies in Taiwan their understanding tended to be along the lines of: "it makes the device secure" or "it prevents the firmware from being used by clone devices".

(It's been a while since I worked in this area.)

avidiax•1mo ago
It also prevents "contempt of business model". Makes a SW or HW bypass for ink cartridge pairing or game piracy or monthly widget subscription difficult or impossible. May also make any vulnerability patchable.

If you depend on your firmware remaining secret, however, you have to contend with the black hat version of the presenters. They are expert at extracting firmware and cloning. Some applications choose FPGAs in part because the equivalent of their firmware (the bitstream) is itself nearly impossible to reverse engineer. That means that a one-for-one clone is possible, but you can't alter the design, and have to use the exact same part.