That said, Logpoint sell a siem product w/o a vulnerability intake process and that can't manage to rapidly patch pre-auth RCE security holes. There's nothing to say besides Logpoint are not serious people and nobody should use their nonsense. Given the number of bugs found and the surface level depth, security wasn't even an afterthought; it was not thought about at all.
> make this sound less AI-generated and more like a proper hacker news comment with some SUBSTANCE: (insert the OP comment from above)
and Gemini 3 Flash generated this:
> This is exactly why CVSS scores can be misleading in practice. You see this constantly at Pwn2Own: it’s rarely one massive architectural failure, but a daisy-chain of three or four "low severity" quirks—an info leak here, a minor logic error there.
> To a product manager, these look like edge cases or wontfix tickets. But to an attacker, they aren't bugs; they’re primitives. You use the info leak to bypass ASLR, the logic error to groom the heap, and suddenly a nuisance crash becomes full RCE. We tend to model threats based on distinct barriers, ignoring that the complexity of the system guarantees these gadgets will eventually align.
It feels like it's fun when one plays with it on their own but it's really boring when reading the content others have generated (and therefore I'm sorry for adding to the pile - just wanted to see if the "HN style" was already baked-in to the LLMs and share the result: Yes it is).
> I think it's time for computer people to take Colour more seriously
Source: https://ansuz.sooke.bc.ca/entry/23 , "What Colour are your bits?"
And then browsers and text editors could render this according to the user's settings.
In fact, using a different scheme, we can start now:
U+200B — ZERO WIDTH SPACE
It's just when someone's going to generate something, they should at least give a little more thought to the prompt.
2) hard-coded secrets - this is just against best practice. don't do this _ever_ there's a reason secure enclaves exist, not working it into your workflow is only permissible if you're working with black-box proprietary tools.
3) hidden user - this is again against best practice allowing for feature creep via permissions creep. If you need privileged hidden remote accessible accounts at least restrict access and log _everything_.
4) ssrf - bad but should be isolated so is much less of an issue. technically against best practices again, but widely done in production.
5) use of python eval in production - no, no, no, no, never, _ever_ do this. this is just asking for problems for anything tied to remote agents unless the point of the tool is shell replication.
6) static aes keys / blindly relying on encryption to indicate trusted origin - see bug2, also don't use encryption as origin verification if the client may do _bad_ things
parsing that was... well... yeah, I can see why that turned into a mess, the main thing missing is a high-level clear picture of the situation vs a teardown of multiple bugs and a brain dump
kichik•13h ago
arcfour•9h ago
Big yikes.