Also, in addition to it being another "look at this wacky LLM output" post, many of OP's summaries of what the agents did are egregious caricatures of the actual output if you bother to look at the actual linked details.
Compare...
OP's summary says:
> Dr. Chen: "If 16% of entry-level jobs disappeared, why is labor force participation only down 0.3%?
vs
https://cameron.stream/docs/econ-seminar/seminar-1-ai-labor/... says...
> "You've documented displacement in specific occupations and entry-level hiring patterns, but where's the aggregate labor market story? If AI genuinely reduces entry-level hiring in exposed sectors, are these 22-25 year-olds reallocating to non-exposed industries, or does your data suggest actual structural unemployment—and if so, shouldn't we see that reflected in your own aggregate wage and employment figures rather than the modest changes you cite?"
Neither the thesis evidence nor the actual agent output claim that "16% of entry-level jobs disappeared". That's only in OP's caricature summary.
> Dr. Roberts: "If AI complements experienced workers, their wages should be rising.
HAHAHAHAHAHA. *SNORT*. HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA.
Sorry, sorry. Now compare that vs:
https://cameron.stream/docs/econ-seminar/seminar-1-ai-labor/...
> "If AI truly is substituting for entry-level labor in high-wage occupations while complementing experienced workers, then by basic microeconomic theory—shifting the relative marginal products—we should observe wages for experienced workers in those occupations rising faster than wages for new entrants elsewhere. Yet your own evidence shows within-occupation wage inequality declined in AI-exposed fields. What's the theoretical mechanism that reconciles selective displacement of entry-level workers with flat or compressed wage differentials?"
Anyway.
I said the opposite.
clbrmbr•3w ago
cpfiffer•3w ago