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OpenCiv3: Open-source, cross-platform reimagining of Civilization III

https://openciv3.org/
399•klaussilveira•5h ago•90 comments

The Waymo World Model

https://waymo.com/blog/2026/02/the-waymo-world-model-a-new-frontier-for-autonomous-driving-simula...
755•xnx•10h ago•462 comments

Show HN: Look Ma, No Linux: Shell, App Installer, Vi, Cc on ESP32-S3 / BreezyBox

https://github.com/valdanylchuk/breezydemo
133•isitcontent•5h ago•14 comments

Monty: A minimal, secure Python interpreter written in Rust for use by AI

https://github.com/pydantic/monty
123•dmpetrov•5h ago•53 comments

Why I Joined OpenAI

https://www.brendangregg.com/blog/2026-02-07/why-i-joined-openai.html
20•SerCe•1h ago•15 comments

Dark Alley Mathematics

https://blog.szczepan.org/blog/three-points/
33•quibono•4d ago•2 comments

Show HN: I spent 4 years building a UI design tool with only the features I use

https://vecti.com
235•vecti•7h ago•114 comments

A century of hair samples proves leaded gas ban worked

https://arstechnica.com/science/2026/02/a-century-of-hair-samples-proves-leaded-gas-ban-worked/
60•jnord•3d ago•3 comments

Microsoft open-sources LiteBox, a security-focused library OS

https://github.com/microsoft/litebox
302•aktau•11h ago•152 comments

Sheldon Brown's Bicycle Technical Info

https://www.sheldonbrown.com/
305•ostacke•11h ago•82 comments

Show HN: If you lose your memory, how to regain access to your computer?

https://eljojo.github.io/rememory/
162•eljojo•8h ago•123 comments

Hackers (1995) Animated Experience

https://hackers-1995.vercel.app/
381•todsacerdoti•13h ago•215 comments

An Update on Heroku

https://www.heroku.com/blog/an-update-on-heroku/
310•lstoll•11h ago•230 comments

Show HN: R3forth, a ColorForth-inspired language with a tiny VM

https://github.com/phreda4/r3
45•phreda4•4h ago•7 comments

I spent 5 years in DevOps – Solutions engineering gave me what I was missing

https://infisical.com/blog/devops-to-solutions-engineering
103•vmatsiiako•10h ago•34 comments

How to effectively write quality code with AI

https://heidenstedt.org/posts/2026/how-to-effectively-write-quality-code-with-ai/
173•i5heu•8h ago•128 comments

Learning from context is harder than we thought

https://hy.tencent.com/research/100025?langVersion=en
139•limoce•3d ago•76 comments

Understanding Neural Network, Visually

https://visualrambling.space/neural-network/
225•surprisetalk•3d ago•30 comments

I now assume that all ads on Apple news are scams

https://kirkville.com/i-now-assume-that-all-ads-on-apple-news-are-scams/
963•cdrnsf•14h ago•413 comments

Introducing the Developer Knowledge API and MCP Server

https://developers.googleblog.com/introducing-the-developer-knowledge-api-and-mcp-server/
10•gfortaine•3h ago•0 comments

FORTH? Really!?

https://rescrv.net/w/2026/02/06/associative
37•rescrv•13h ago•17 comments

PC Floppy Copy Protection: Vault Prolok

https://martypc.blogspot.com/2024/09/pc-floppy-copy-protection-vault-prolok.html
7•kmm•4d ago•0 comments

Evaluating and mitigating the growing risk of LLM-discovered 0-days

https://red.anthropic.com/2026/zero-days/
33•lebovic•1d ago•11 comments

Show HN: Smooth CLI – Token-efficient browser for AI agents

https://docs.smooth.sh/cli/overview
76•antves•1d ago•56 comments

The Oklahoma Architect Who Turned Kitsch into Art

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2026-01-31/oklahoma-architect-bruce-goff-s-wild-home-desi...
17•MarlonPro•3d ago•2 comments

I'm going to cure my girlfriend's brain tumor

https://andrewjrod.substack.com/p/im-going-to-cure-my-girlfriends-brain
31•ray__•2h ago•7 comments

Show HN: Slack CLI for Agents

https://github.com/stablyai/agent-slack
38•nwparker•1d ago•8 comments

Claude Composer

https://www.josh.ing/blog/claude-composer
98•coloneltcb•2d ago•68 comments

Evolution of car door handles over the decades

https://newatlas.com/automotive/evolution-car-door-handle/
38•andsoitis•3d ago•61 comments

Planetary Roller Screws

https://www.humanityslastmachine.com/#planetary-roller-screws
34•everlier•3d ago•6 comments
Open in hackernews

Cloudflare zero-day: Accessing any host globally

https://fearsoff.org/research/cloudflare-acme
75•2bluesc•2w ago

Comments

nick-sta•2w ago
I’m not sure what the nextjs vulnerability is supposed to showcase - they’re putting secrets on their 404 page and relying on cloudflare to not show it?
cowsandmilk•2w ago
All their examples rely on having poorly configured origins. At least the PHP and Tomcat ones might be blocked by a WAF, but the Next.js one would rely on the WAF blocking responses that included secrets (which I’m not sure they do).
nightpool•2w ago
I think the idea for the NextJS example was that there might be some configuration variables that are not sensitive for internal / staff users, but would be problematic if exposed externally—basically, relying on Cloudflare's WAF as a "zero trust" endpoint solution, like Google IAP.

I'm not sure how realistic this is in practice. Does anyone actually configure Cloudflare WAF this way? (As opposed to, e.g., Cloudflare's dedicated zero-trust networking product, which I think works completely differently?)

nightpool•2w ago
Basically, it shows that Cloudflare's WAF (which is supposed to intercept requests before they make it to the origin server), is trivially bypassable by using the `.well-known/acme_challenge` path.

That means that any client that relies on this WAF to authenticate users (like with the NextJS example, where some information that would not be considered sensitive "internally" is exposed externally) or cover over security holes in their application (like with the Spring example, where the path traversal vulnerability in Spring is normally caught by Cloudflare before Spring can see it) would have this assumption violated

tracker1•2w ago
It's possible you're rendering more than just a simple 404, such as an SPA response or other result as part of an application response that may leak more information...

I think it's not a severe issue in most cases, and maybe something worth noting or addressing if you are at least aware of it, you can just 404 without content, for example in the .well-known/ path. I run most of my apps behind Caddy, which handles that path itself and doesn't forward requests to that path, so I'm curious how it handles it tbh.

I'm also not sure that there's a clear/good fix for this, since CF is allowing the traffic through so that ACME negotiation can work against the final application host.

jorams•2w ago
What a frustrating article. There was an interesting bug here. It's trivial to explain. It's not a zero-day, this was fixed months before disclosure. Most of the article is basically: "Imagine you were running software with horrific security holes behind this WAF. We even made some examples. It had a flaw. If your entire security posture depended on this WAF, imagine how much damage could have been done. Imagine if AI were involved!"
bpt3•2w ago
On top of that, AI was clearly used to write it which made it longer than necessary and harder to read.
mannyv•2w ago
The point is that WAF didn't block everything, and that if your app had some kind of default/error handler that non-blockage would have unexpectedly exposed something.

Not that big of a deal, but interesting.

cube00•2w ago
> The CA fetches that token over plain HTTPS

The HTTP-01 challenge can only be done on port 80.

https://letsencrypt.org/docs/challenge-types/

mmsc•2w ago
The article was clearly written by an LLM. It would make no sense to use https for a challenge like that, indeed.
amluto•2w ago
The one thing that I find bizarre about this: why did Cloudflare feel inspired to special-case /.well-known/acme-challenge at all? The only thing I can think of is that clients were having caching issues (Cloudflare caching the challenge value, clients forgetting to set cache-control headers, and challenges therefore failing), but that seems like a bit of a weak reason to special-case anything. Anyone using Cloudflare should already know how to set cache control headers.
Dylan16807•2w ago
My guess would be that aggressive blocking was causing verification to fail, since it gets verified from multiple well-separated locations.
amluto•2w ago
If a user’s verification attempts fails because their own rules block access, that doesn’t sound like a Cloudflare bug. If a user’s verification attempt fails because of Cloudflare’s built in rules, maybe that’s an issue, and maybe Cloudflare tried to fix that and messed up.

All that being said, this workflow is rather odd. We’re talking about a customer who uses an HTTP-01 challenge to get a certificate for a domain that is proxied by Cloudflare’s TLS-terminating proxy. Setting this up in a way that is useful is dramatically harder than letting Cloudflare deal with the certificate. Maybe the idea is that the user could example proxying and get something vaguely secure without any reconfiguration at all all on the origin machine? How many users have ACME configured and are willing to run a wide-open origin behind Cloudflare anyway?

jerrythegerbil•2w ago
There’s a lot going on in this blog. Interestingly, the core mechanism at play here is the http-01 challenge validations which they state is fetched by the CA over HTTPS. This is particularly amusing when you consider that http-01 is explicitly NOT HTTPS (it’s HTTP), and this is actually the entire reason there’s a different code path to take.

The modern web requires secure (HTTPS) context for many things to work, so it’s commonplace to do so “HTTPS enforcement”; all requests are forcibly upgraded to HTTPS. However, you can’t do that to the CA when it’s performing a http-01 challenge validation. This necessitates a “well known” URL route be used for challenges so that they can very deliberately take a different code path that doesn’t enforce HTTPS (and be routed differently).

This is true of basically every ACME client used for http-01 challenges, not just cloudflare. So while they’ve unfortunately missed the mark on correctly explaining the mechanism at play here, I hope that I succeeded in making it a bit more clear. Other implementations are, of course, similarly exploitable.

computerfriend•2w ago
> We wish to express our deep gratitude to Jason Lau, CISO and the Crypto[.]com Security Team, who we approached first to help independently verify this zero-day vulnerability.

Bizarre choice.