I imagine that folks like journalists could have that type of attack in their threat model, and EFF already do a lot of great stuff in this space :)
0. https://isc.sans.edu/diary/31998
1. https://www.cloudflare.com/cloudforce-one/research/svgs-the-...
It is a passion project and will always be free because commercial CDR[1] solutions are insanely expensive and everyone should have access to the tools to compute securely.
1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Content_Disarm_%26_Reconstruct...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Traitor_tracing#Watermarking
https://arxiv.org/abs/1111.3597
The watermark can even be contained in the wording itself (multiple versions of sentences, word choice etc stores the entropy). The only moderately safe thing to leak would be a pure text full paraphrasing of the material. But that wouldn't inspire much trust as a source.
I don't think watermarking is a winning game for the watermarker, with enough copies any errors can be cancelled.
This is a very common assumption that turns out to be false.
There are Tardos probabilistic codes (see the paper I linked) which have the watermark scale as the square of the traitor count.
For example, with a watermark of just 400 bits, 4 traitors (who try their best to corrupt the watermark) will stand out enough to merit investigation and with 800 bits be accused without any doubt. This is for a binary alphabet, with text you can generate a bigger alphabet and have shorter watermarks.
These are typically intended for tracing pirated content, so they carry the so-called Marking Assumption (if given two or more versions of a piece of content, you must choose one. A pirate isn't going to corrupt or remove a piece of video, that would be unsuitable for leaking). So it would likely be possible to get better results with documents, may require larger watermarks to get such traitors reliably.
And specifically about them not being hacked by malicious code. I'm not seeing anything that suggests it's about trying to remove traces of a file's origin.
I don't see why it would need a warning for something it's not designed for at all.
> Dangerzone works like this: You give it a document that you don't know if you can trust (for example, an email attachment). Inside of a sandbox, Dangerzone converts the document to a PDF (if it isn't already one), and then converts the PDF into raw pixel data: a huge list of RGB color values for each page. Then, outside of the sandbox, Dangerzone takes this pixel data and converts it back into a PDF.
With this in mind, Dangerzone wouldn't even remove conventional watermarks (that inlay small amounts of text on the image).
I think the "freedomofpress" GitHub repo primed you to think about protecting someone leaking to journalists, but really it's designed to keep journalists (and other security-minded folk) safe from untrusted attachments.
The official website -- https://dangerzone.rocks/ -- is a lot more clear about exactly what the tool does. It removes malware, removes network requests, supports various filetypes, and is open source.
Their about page ( https://dangerzone.rocks/about/ ) shows common use cases for journalists and others.
It doesn't seem to be meant for usage at scale -- it's not for general-purpose conversion, as the resulting files are huge, will have OCR errors, etc.
How hard did you look the other times?
https://github.com/caradoc-org/caradoc
http://spw16.langsec.org/slides/guillaume-endignoux-slides.p...
https://github.com/mate-desktop/atril
A crafted PDF can potentially exploit a bug in atril to compromise the recipient's computer since writing memory-safe C is difficult. This approach was famously used by a malware vendor to exploit iMessage through a compressed image format that's part of the PDF standard:
https://projectzero.google/2021/12/a-deep-dive-into-nso-zero...
The Chrome PDF parser, originating from Foxit (now open-sourced as PDFium), has been the source of many exploits in Chrome itself over the years.
For some reason, printing 1 page of an Excel or Word document to a PDF often gets up to around 4MB in size. Passing it through this compresses it quite well.
Just ran a quick test:
- 1-page Excel PDF export: 3.7MB
- Processing with Dangerzone (OCR enabled): 131KB
dfajgljsldkjag•2h ago
gleenn•1h ago
akersten•1h ago
gleenn•34m ago
bob1029•1h ago
Gigachad•31m ago
But probably the main security here is just using the chrome pdf viewer instead of the adobe one. Which you can do without google drive. The browser PDF viewers ignore all the strange and risky parts of the PDF spec that would likely be exploited.
venusenvy47•16m ago