Further, some solutions are like running a maze. If you know all the wrong turns/next words to say and can just brute force the right ones you might find a solution like a mouse running through the maze not seeing the whole picture.
Whether this is thinking is more philosophical. To me this demonstrates more that we are closer to bio computers than an LLM is to having some sort of divine soul.
The base models are trained to do this. If a web page contains a problem, and then the word "Answer: ", it is statistically very likely that what follows on that web page is an answer. If the base model wants to be good at predicting text, at some point learning the answer to common question becomes a good strategy, so that it can complete text that contains these.
NN training tries to push models to generalize instead of memorizing the training set, so this creates an incentive for the model to learn a computation pattern that can answer many questions, instead of just memorizing. Whether they actually generalize in practice... it depends. Sometimes you still get copy-pasted input that was clearly pulled verbatim from the training set.
But that's only base models. The actual production LLMs you chat with don't predict the most probable word according to the raw statistical distribution. They output the words that RLHF has rewarded them to output, which includes acting as an assistant that answers questions instead of just predicting text. RLHF is also the reason there are so many AI SIGNS [1] like "you're absolutely right" and way more use of the word "delve" than is common in western English.
(†And even then is kind of overly-dismissive and underspecified. The "most probable word" is defined over some training data set. So imagine if you train on e.g. mathematicians solving problems... To do a good job at predicting [w/o overfitting] your model will have to in fact get good at thinking like a mathematician. In general "to be able to predict what is likely to happen next" is probably one pretty good definition of intelligence.)
It just changes the probability distribution that it is approximating.
To the extent that thinking is making a series of deductions from prior facts, it seems to me that thinking can be reduced to "pick the next most probable token from the correct probability distribution"...
As typically deployed [1] LLMs are not turing complete. They're closer to linear bounded automaton, but because transformers have a strict maximum input size they're actually a subset of the weaker class of deterministic finite automaton. These aren't like python programs or something that can work on as much memory as you supply them, their architecture works on a fixed maximum amount of memory.
I'm not particularly convinced turing complete is the relevant property though. I'm rather convinced that I'm not turing complete either... my head is only so big after all.
[1] i.e. in a loop that appends output tokens to the input and has some form of sliding context window (perhaps with some inserted instructions to "compact" and then sliding the context window right to after those instructions once the LLM emits some special "done compacting" tokens).
[2] Common sampling procedures make them mildly non-deterministic, but I don't believe they do so in a way that changes the theoretical class of these machines from DFAs.
Great! It will now correctly structure chess games, but we've created no incentive for it to create a game where white wins or to make the next move be "good"
Ok, so now you change the objective. Now let's say "we don't just want valid games, we want you to predict the next move that will help that color win"
And we train towards that objective and it starts picking better moves (note: the moves are still valid)
You might imagine more sophisticated ways to optimize picking good moves. You continue adjusting the objective function, you might train a pool of models all based off of the initial model and each of them gets a slightly different curriculum and then you have a tournament and pick the winningest model. Great!
Now you might have a skilled chess-playing-model.
It is no longer correct to say it just finds a valid chess program, because the objective function changed several times throughout this process.
This is exactly how you should think about LLMs except the ways the objective function has changed are significantly significantly more complicated than for our chess bot.
So to answer your first question: no, that is not what they do. That is a deep over simplification that was accurate for the first two generations of the models and sort of accurate for the "pretraining" step of modern llms (except not even that accurate, because pretraining does instill other objectives. Almost like swapping our first step "predict valid chess moves" with "predict stockfish outputs")
But that does not mean that the results cannot be dramatic. Just like stacking pixels can result in a beautiful image.
Well, if in all situations you can predict which word Einstein would probably say next, then I think you're in a good spot.
This "most probable" stuff is just absurd handwaving. Every prompt of even a few words is unique, there simply is no trivially "most probable" continuation. Probable given what? What these machines learn to do is predicting what intelligence would do, which is the same as being intelligent.
Overall I'm going with unsolved, because Knuth is a smart person who I'd expect to not miss the above. I'm also sure he falls for the above all the time even though the majority of the time he doesn't.
> Shock! Shock! I learned yesterday that an open problem I’d been working on for several weeks had just been solved by Claude Opus 4.6— Anthropic’s hybrid reasoning model that had been released three weeks earlier! It seems that I’ll have to revise my opinions about “generative AI” one of these days. What a joy it is to learn not only that my conjecture has a nice solution but also to celebrate this dramatic advance in automatic deduction and creative problem solving.
The issue to my mind is a lack of data at the meeting of QFT/GR.
Afterall few humans historically have been capable of the initial true leap between ontologies. But humans are pretty smart so we can't say that is a requirement for AGI.
LLMs are at least designed to be intelligent. Our monkey brains have much less reason to be intelligent, since we only evolved to survive nature, not to understand it.
We are at this moment extremely deep into what most people would have been considered to be actual artificial intelligence a mere 15 years ago. We're not quite at human levels of intelligence, but it's close.
We need enough experimental results to explain to solve these theoretical mismatches and we don't and at present can't explore that frontier.
Once we have more results at that frontier we'd build a theory out from there that has two nearly independent limits for QFT and GR.
What we'd be asking if the AI is something that we can't expect a human to solve even with a lifetime of effort today.
It'll take something in par with Newton realising that the heavens and apples are under the same rules to do it. But at least Newton got to hold the apple and only had to imagine he could a star.
But we can not yet experiment at the GR/QFT frontier.
To do so with a particle accelerator it would need to be the size of the milky way.
Time to sit down, read, digest and understand it without the help of LLM.
mccoyb•2h ago
Before, we didn't have a fast (we had to rely on human cognition) way to try problems - even if the techniques and workflows were known by someone. Now, we've baked these patterns into probability distributions - anyone can access them with the correct "summoning spell". Experts will naturally use these systems more productively, because they know how to coerce models into the correct conditional distributions which light up the right techniques.
One question this raises to me is how these models are going to keep up with the expanding boundary of science. If RL is required to get expert behavior into the models, what happens when experts start pushing the boundary faster? In 2030, how is Anthropic going to keep Claude "up-to-date" without either (a) continual learning with a fixed model (expanding context windows? seems hard) or (b) continual training (expensive)?
Crazy times.
Aerroon•1h ago
bitexploder•52m ago
anematode•42m ago
Jweb_Guru•9m ago
mlyle•26m ago
Sure, it's not how we work, but I can imagine a system where the LLM does a lot of heavy lifting and allows more expensive, smaller networks that train during inference and RAG systems to learn how to do new things and keep persistent state and plan.
charcircuit•12m ago
dtj1123•15m ago
lxgr•1h ago
I could totally imagine "free" inference for researchers under the condition that the reasoning traces get to be used as future training data.
mccoyb•1h ago
As far as I understand RL scaling (we've already maxxed out RLVR), these machines only get better as long as they have expert reasoner traces available.
Having an expert work with an LLM and successfully solve a problem is high signal data, it may be the only path forward?
My prior is that these companies will take this data without asking you as much as they can.
lxgr•35m ago
And importantly, this can be cross-lab/model too. I suspect there's a reason why e.g. Google has been offering me free Claude inference in Google Antigravity on a free plan...
DeathArrow•1h ago