You absolutely could. It'd be cool (not easy from security/compliance perspective) to be able to deeply "scan" your prod-deployed app.

There are a quite a few startups created by connecting relevant eBPF/OTel traces e.g. in response to uncaught exceptions (traditional RAG-based bug-fix generation).

Maybe they have limited the MCP endpoint to reject any query that modifies the db. With sqlite that's probably easily achieved by opening the db in read-only mode (as opposed to the role-based approach you'd take with most other dbs)

@neil_naveen The read-only mode wongarsu mentions closes the direct modification vector, but there's a subtler one not addressed: prompt injection via the telemetry itself. If the MCP server traces arbitrary workloads, a malicious process can craft CUDA kernel names, string arguments, or function identifiers that produce adversarial text in the trace DB. The LLM reads those verbatim as part of its context and may follow embedded instructions.

This is indirect prompt injection through the observation channel rather than through user input. Read-only access and invocation logging both assume the threat arrives from outside the pipeline. When the observed data itself is the attack surface, you need output sanitization or context sandboxing before telemetry reaches the model. Multi-tenant or production environments where the MCP server traces workloads from multiple teams would be particularly exposed.

Every week these model providers are coming out with new toys. I don't fault orgs for minimally investing in MCP when the space is moving so fast and there's no telling whether or not MCP is here to stay.

Why?

It could be a cli tool, and it should be a cli tool, for exactly this reason.

Let the LLM work in code mode. Don't make it have to be the execution engine too. It can do it but it's slow and giving it tools script what it wants will go far better.

I do think there's an interesting possibility where we turn MCP into something composable. Capnproto has promise pipelining where you can issue new instructions with results you don't have yet. If MCP could copy those tricks, & express promises... and those promises worked across MCP servers ("third party handoff", https://github.com/capnproto/go-capnp/issues/597)... you'd start to have something as compellingly composable as the shell.