I mostly get away with xrdp, it works perfectly.

> xhost + hands that capability to every local user and, if your server listens on TCP, to the network. Even the narrower xhost +local: still trusts every UID on the box.

I'm not defending xhost or advocating to use it but... If you mention narrower version of xhost, then why stop at:

    xhost +local:

and not mention that you can do:

    xhost +si:localuser:jack

As an intriguing unrelated sidenote you can do:

    xhost +si:localuser:jack

open an app, then do:

    xhost -si:localuser:jack

and then user jack cannot, except through the app already launched, display on the X server.

> You'll often see xhost + suggested as the "just make it work" answer, and it does — by turning host-based access control off entirely. Every client from every host can then connect to your display without any cookie at all.

> On a single-user machine that sounds harmless, but X has no isolation between clients: anyone who can reach the server can read your keystrokes, grab the contents of any window, and inject synthetic input. xhost + hands that capability to every local user and, if your server listens on TCP, to the network. Even the narrower xhost +local: still trusts every UID on the box.

Does modern Xorg even support TCP? I know it doesn't default to allowing it, and the last time I actually wanted to run X11 over the network I ended up using socat against the socket file. Controlling access by user could have some value, but only under very specific threat models, especially since containers won't be able to reach the socket unless you give it to them on purpose. (Actually, can you just chmod -o-rwx the socket?)

So I'm really skeptical of ever practically needing a more complicated fix when you can just xhost +