> There are important caveats and limitations to exploiting this latest vulnerability. As noted, some level of control over a local network is a prerequisite. That likely limits exploitation to insiders or attackers, such as nation-states or ransomware operators, who manage to gain low-level access inside a network and are looking for a way to elevate system rights.

so how many firmwares actually compile in this ICMP stuff? because edk2 builds in a way that it will only package the stuff actually used. u include protocola and handles etc.

personally never found a reason why to include icmp in there for what i was building using edk2.

as others noted pxe is also already very fragile and enough network access to perform the icmp attack is likely enough access to mitm the entire pxe run and slap in your own boot image or modules etc.

i dont think most servers boot using PXE so that is grossly overstated? or would it include the attacker going into the boot menu and selecting to pxe boot... because why use an exploit then if you can just point it to your own server and again pull the image like that.

all u need is a konboot or similar tool inserted to then subsequently load the original image -_-

We recently wrote about moving away from OVMF (~1M lines of C) to very minimal and hyperspecific firmware (300 lines of assembly)[1] for our specific confidential VM machine targets, and the idea that "popular" does not automatically mean "secure". You can point an LLM at any large codebase and it will find vulnerabilities, so "patch the planet" isn't very scalable. You can instead just write hyperspecific, small codebases and throw all the security practices at it - like LLMs (economical if it's small), fuzzing, formal methods etc.

[1] https://tinfoil.sh/blog/2026-10-25-less-is-more

How is this a 9.5 if php2shell was a 9.2?