The first was that 123456 was the credentials for the admin panel.
The second was an insecure direct object reference, where the lead_id querystring parameter can be changed on an API call to retrieve another applicant's data.
"Security through obscurity" isn't really good enough.
UUIDs aren’t “just more difficult to guess.” They are inconceivably harder to guess.
> Put another way, one would need to generate 1 billion v4 UUIDs per second for 85 years to have a 50% chance of a single collision.
Can you tell I've been scarred by discussing designs with folks who focus on the "visible" problems without thinking about the fundamental question of "is this secure"?
The point is not that UUIDs are magically secure, it's that they mean nothing to whoever gains access except a single job app. The assumption is that they will get out (they're in a public URL), and that they will have no meaning when they do.
It's a defense-in-depth thing IMO -- cargo-culting this approach defends you even when you don't do the other things right. It's simple -- with a non-zero probability that the actual access control is faulty, do you want a default that protects you or doesn't. What's the intentional trade we're going for? More DB perf? Easier to type URLs? There are other ways to deal with those
> Can you tell I've been scarred by discussing designs with folks who focus on the "visible" problems without thinking about the fundamental question of "is this secure"?
Yes :(
With HMAC, you can still ask for some sequential IDs
SipHash128(0, KEY) = k_0
SipHash128(1, KEY) = k_1
You get the same number of bits as a UUID.
You can't, however, sort by IDs to get their insertion sequence, however. For that you'd need something like symmetric encryption but this is already a bad idea, no reason to make it worse.
> The first was that 123456 was the credentials for the admin panel.
No. 123456 was the credentials for the test setup, which contained nothing. But you could use the IDOR to access data from the test setup.
If 123456 had been the credentials to the admin panel, there would have been no point in exploiting an IDOR - as an admin, you can just look at whatever you want.
I just looked it up 13 of the 40k francises are in the US. Assuming linearity, thats about 21 million US applicants since they started keeping centralized, digital records.
20% of Americans younger than 40 is not a bad guess.
Seems totally reasonable to me.
2 shifts of 12 employees is 24 employees per day. Assume they all work there for 6 months on average, then if the system's been up for 10 years, that's 480 employees per franchise over a decade. Which means for every employee they hired, 2 were either rejected or chose not to work there.
Working at McD's is something a lot of people do for a few months when they're young.
$ Downloading 64M transcripts...
suhide in magisk makes my banking app work, but not mcdonalds :)
I do computers for a living and can barely navigate and figure out what’s going on.
Are they counting everybody since 1954?
There should be no surprise here.
deafpolygon•3h ago
jonplackett•3h ago
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=a6iW-8xPw3k
dylan604•1h ago
sans_souse•2h ago
bigmattystyles•58m ago
mattl•1h ago