This kind of consciousness is relative to an object. Shouldn't Consciousness be more about what separates the self and something else?
So, what author talks about should be probably named "instantaneous understanding of an object in consciousness", not "Consciousness".
Also, I disagree about limiting things with the first premise:
> Everything/object has a description, that is, everything has a definite state (no matter what it is).
"Objects" are not permanent. A definite state is hardly possible, except maybe for sub-atomic particles that are be indivisible (according to our current models). And even then, you should describe how they exist with relation to processes and interactions with other particles.
Consciousness of an "object" is thus, I think, not something that has to do with its definite state. Unless you speak of "consciousness of an object through an instantaneous snapshot".
And, Consciousness is had by an observer about an object (it's a property of the observer, dependent on the state of the object)
And yes the contrast between the self and the object is quite clear here , Consciousness can only be had when an inference has been made, only inferences(whether made in qualia or in a shared language) can lead to consciousness consciousness
Trenthug•6mo ago
Some aspects described about consciousness might seem akin to karl friston's view of defining brains as Bayesian inference machines, Wittgenstein's private language argument and Tononi's IIT usage of a complexity metric(amount of information) for measurement purposes with some subtleties of of it's own to add .
The part about choosing a method of measuring complexity seems to be something that can be looked over by a logician to get it refined for the models usage, some thought experiments with conjectures are there in that regard which might be worth looking into or to check their validity.