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Launch HN: Tinfoil (YC X25): Verifiable Privacy for Cloud AI

109•FrasiertheLion•11h ago
Hello HN! We’re Tanya, Sacha, Jules and Nate from Tinfoil: https://tinfoil.sh. We host models and AI workloads on the cloud while guaranteeing zero data access and retention. This lets us run open-source LLMs like Llama, or Deepseek R1 on cloud GPUs without you having to trust us—or any cloud provider—with private data.

Since AI performs better the more context you give it, we think solving AI privacy will unlock more valuable AI applications, just how TLS on the Internet enabled e-commerce to flourish knowing that your credit card info wouldn't be stolen by someone sniffing internet packets.

We come from backgrounds in cryptography, security, and infrastructure. Jules did his PhD in trusted hardware and confidential computing at MIT, and worked with NVIDIA and Microsoft Research on the same, Sacha did his PhD in privacy-preserving cryptography at MIT, Nate worked on privacy tech like Tor, and I (Tanya) was on Cloudflare's cryptography team. We were unsatisfied with band-aid techniques like PII redaction (which is actually undesirable in some cases like AI personal assistants) or “pinky promise” security through legal contracts like DPAs. We wanted a real solution that replaced trust with provable security.

Running models locally or on-prem is an option, but can be expensive and inconvenient. Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) is not practical for LLM inference for the foreseeable future. The next best option is using secure enclaves: a secure environment on the chip that no other software running on the host machine can access. This lets us perform LLM inference in the cloud while being able to prove that no one, not even Tinfoil or the cloud provider, can access the data. And because these security mechanisms are implemented in hardware, there is minimal performance overhead.

Even though we (Tinfoil) control the host machine, we do not have any visibility into the data processed inside of the enclave. At a high level, a secure enclave is a set of cores that are reserved, isolated, and locked down to create a sectioned off area. Everything that comes out of the enclave is encrypted: memory and network traffic, but also peripheral (PCIe) traffic to other devices such as the GPU. These encryptions are performed using secret keys that are generated inside the enclave during setup, which never leave its boundaries. Additionally, a “hardware root of trust” baked into the chip lets clients check security claims and verify that all security mechanisms are in place.

Up until recently, secure enclaves were only available on CPUs. But NVIDIA confidential computing recently added these hardware-based capabilities to their latest GPUs, making it possible to run GPU-based workloads in a secure enclave.

Here’s how it works in a nutshell:

1. We publish the code that should run inside the secure enclave to Github, as well as a hash of the compiled binary to a transparency log called Sigstore

2. Before sending data to the enclave, the client fetches a signed document from the enclave which includes a hash of the running code signed by the CPU manufacturer. It then verifies the signature with the hardware manufacturer to prove the hardware is genuine. Then the client fetches a hash of the source code from a transparency log (Sigstore) and checks that the hash equals the one we got from the enclave. This lets the client get verifiable proof that the enclave is running the exact code we claim.

3. With the assurance that the enclave environment is what we expect, the client sends its data to the enclave, which travels encrypted (TLS) and is only decrypted inside the enclave.

4. Processing happens entirely within this protected environment. Even an attacker that controls the host machine can’t access this data. We believe making end-to-end verifiability a “first class citizen” is key. Secure enclaves have traditionally been used to remove trust from the cloud provider, not necessarily from the application provider. This is evidenced by confidential VM technologies such as Azure Confidential VM allowing ssh access by the host into the confidential VM. Our goal is to provably remove trust both from ourselves, aka the application provider, as well as the cloud provider.

We encourage you to be skeptical of our privacy claims. Verifiability is our answer. It’s not just us saying it’s private; the hardware and cryptography let you check. Here’s a guide that walks you through the verification process: https://docs.tinfoil.sh/verification/attestation-architectur....

People are using us for analyzing sensitive docs, building copilots for proprietary code, and processing user data in agentic AI applications without the privacy risks that previously blocked cloud AI adoption.

We’re excited to share Tinfoil with HN!

* Try the chat (https://tinfoil.sh/chat): It verifies attestation with an in-browser check. Free, limited messages, $20/month for unlimited messages and additional models

* Use the API (https://tinfoil.sh/inference): OpenAI API compatible interface. $2 / 1M tokens

* Take your existing Docker image and make it end to end confidential by deploying on Tinfoil. Here's a demo of how you could use Tinfoil to run a deepfake detection service that could run securely on people's private videos: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_8hLmqoutyk. Note: This feature is not currently self-serve.

* Reach out to us at contact@tinfoil.sh if you want to run a different model or want to deploy a custom application, or if you just want to learn more!

Let us know what you think, we’d love to hear about your experiences and ideas in this space!

Comments

Onavo•11h ago
Are you HIPAA compliant?
FrasiertheLion•11h ago
Not yet, we're about one week away from SOC2, will pursue HIPAA which is arguably easier next.
kevinis•1h ago
Also curious about the potential users of your product, do you target individual users, small businesses, or large enterprises? Pursuing SOC2 and HIPPA make me think about the large ones; but aren't they already happy using hyperscalers?

Not to mention GCP and Azure both have confidential GPU offerings. How do you compete against them, as well as some startups mentioned in other comments like Edgeless Systems and Opaque Systems?

blintz•11h ago
Excited to see someone finally doing this! I can imagine folks with sensitive model weights being especially interested.

Do you run into rate limits or other issues with TLS cert issuance? One problem we had when doing this before is that each spinup of the enclave must generate a fresh public key, so it needs a fresh, publicly trusted TLS cert. Do you have a workaround for that, or do you just have the enclaves run for long enough that it doesn’t matter?

FrasiertheLion•11h ago
We actually run into the rate limit issue often particularly while spinning up new enclaves while debugging. We plan on moving to HPKE: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9180.html over the next couple months. This will let us generate keys inside the enclave and encrypt the payload with the enclave specific keys, while letting us terminate TLS in a proxy outside the enclave. All the data is still encrypted to the enclave using HPKE (and still verifiable).

This will let us fix the rate limit issue.

etaioinshrdlu•11h ago
Does the secure enclave also perform the TLS encryption on data leaving the enclave?

Also, if you're decoding TLS on the enclave, wouldn't that imply that you're parsing HTTP and JSON on the GPU itself? Very interesting if true.

natesales•10h ago
The verified trust boundary extends from the CPU to GPU [1], and TLS encrypts all data to/from the enclave and client so we can't see anything in the clear.

HTTP parsing and application logic happens on the CPU like normal. The GPU runs CUDA just like any other app, after it's integrity is verified by the CPU. Data on the PCIe bus is encrypted between the CPU and GPU too.

[1] https://github.com/NVIDIA/nvtrust/blob/main/guest_tools/atte...

etaioinshrdlu•10h ago
Could you talk more about how how this works? I don't think linked article doesn't given enough detail on how the trust boundary extends from CPU to GPU.

Does the CPU have the ability to see unencrypted data?

natesales•10h ago
The keys are generated on the CPU and never leave the enclave, but the data is decrypted on the CPU so it hits the registers in plaintext.

When the enclave starts, the CPU does a few things:

1. The CPU does a key exchange with the GPU (in confidential compute mode [1]) to derive a key to encrypt data over PCIe

2. The CPU verifies the integrity of the GPU against NVIDIA's root of trust [2]

[1] https://developer.nvidia.com/blog/confidential-computing-on-...

[2] https://github.com/tinfoilsh/cvmimage/blob/b65ced8796e8a8687...

edit: formatting

candiddevmike•10h ago
You're not terminating the TLS connection from the client anywhere besides the enclave? How do you load balance or front end all of this effectively?
FrasiertheLion•10h ago
>You're not terminating the TLS connection from the client anywhere besides the enclave?

Yes.

>How do you load balance or front end all of this effectively?

We don't, atleast not yet. That's why all our model endpoints have different subdomains. In the next couple months, we're planning to generate a keypair inside the enclave using HPKE that will be used to encrypt the data, as I described in this comment: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43996849

danr4•11h ago
great name. good idea if it works.
leboshkibowl•10h ago
hasn’t iexec (french co) been doing this for years? what’s your competitive advantage or moat, considering they are the first-movers?
ramoz•10h ago
Their GTM doesn't include a $ in front of their company acronym.

I think there is similarity to https://www.anjuna.io/ and https://www.opaque.co/ here. I've heard of these, never iExec.

FrasiertheLion•9h ago
CPU-based TEEs (AWS Nitro Enclaves, AMD SEV, Intel TDX) have been around for a few years, but aren’t widely used because they are more akin to primitives than fully baked security solutions. We are trying to make this as user friendly and self serve as possible, with full verifiability by open sourcing the entire server that runs inside the enclave. So far we have not found any end to end verifiably private solution on the market that we could just sign up for to try, which was a big reason we started Tinfoil in the first place. We also strongly believe that verifiably private AI should be the norm, so the more players in the space, the better because a missing piece is market awareness and convincing folks this is actually possible and real.
EGreg•9h ago
Been building something along these lines for a while. At Qbix, we call it our QBOX. Full stack, using Nix for the base, and Nitro attestation. No SSH. We have the exact same approach — cron running and only downloading signed scripts and binaries from endpoints. But there is a lot more… Would be great to connect and maybe join forces.

Want to connect some time next Tuesday or Wednesday? https://calendly.com/qbix/meeting

FrasiertheLion•9h ago
Yes, excited to connect, scheduled a call! We used Nitro back in December when we were prototyping but moved to NVIDIA CC because we wanted to support LLMs.
meelvidushi•10h ago
So impressive - cloud AI that is verifiable with zero trust assumptions is going to be game-changing regardless of the industry application. Looks like it could be used by anyone for making anything trustworthy.
jMyles•9h ago
> with zero trust assumptions

It's not that though. Not close. You are trusting the chip maker, whose process is secret (actually worse, it's almost certainly shared with the state).

3s•9h ago
We do have to trust the chip maker until open hardware catches up [1].

[1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43997856

davidczech•9h ago
Even if you had open hardware, how would you even know a chip you have sitting in front of you was fabricated correctly?
julesdrean•9h ago
Check out incredible work by Bunnie to make this possible at home https://www.bunniestudios.com/blog/2024/iris-infra-red-in-si...
Etheryte•9h ago
How large do you wager your moat to be? Confidential computing is something all major cloud providers either have or are about to have and from there it's a very small step to offer LLM-s under the same umbrella. First mover advantage is of course considerable, but I can't help but feel that this market will very quickly be swallowed by the hyperscalers.
itsafarqueue•9h ago
Being gobbled by the hyperscalers may well be the plan. Reasonable bet.
kevinis•2h ago
GCP has confidential VMs with H100 GPUs; I'm not sure if Google would be interested. And they get huge discount buying GPUs in bulk. The trade-off between cost and privacy is obvious for most users imo.
3s•9h ago
Confidential computing as a technology will become (and should be) commoditized, so the value add comes down to security and UX. We don’t want to be a confidential computing company, we want to use the right tool for the job of building private & verifiable AI. If that becomes FHE in a few years, then we will use that. We are starting with easy-to-use inference, but our goal of having any AI application be provably private
ATechGuy•9h ago
This. Big tech providers already offer confidential inference today.
julesdrean•9h ago
Yes Azure has! They have very different trust assumptions though. We wrote about this here https://tinfoil.sh/blog/2025-01-30-how-do-we-compare
mnahkies•8h ago
Last I checked it was only Azure offering the Nvidia specific confidential compute extensions, I'm likely out of date - a quick Google was inconclusive.

Have GCP and AWS started offering this for GPUs?

candiddevmike•8h ago
GCP, yes: https://cloud.google.com/confidential-computing/confidential...
julesdrean•8h ago
Azure and GCP offer Confidential VMs which removes trust from the cloud providers. We’re trying to also remove trust in the service provider (aka ourselves). One example is that when you use Azure or GCP, by default, the service operator can SSH into the VM. We cannot SSH into our inference server and you can check that’s true.
threeseed•4h ago
But nobody wants you as a service provider. Everyone wants to have Gemini, OpenAI etc which are significantly better than the far smaller and less capable model you will be able to afford to host.

And you make this claim that the cloud provider can SSH into the VM but (a) nobody serious exposes SSH ports in Production and (b) there is no documented evidence of this ever happening.

FrasiertheLion•4h ago
We're not competing with Gemini or OpenAI or the big cloud providers. For instance, Google is partnering with NVIDIA to ship Gemini on-prem to regulated industries in a CC environment to protect their model weights as well as for additional data privacy on-prem: https://blogs.nvidia.com/blog/google-cloud-next-agentic-ai-r...

We're simply trying to bring similar capabilities to other companies. Inference is just our first product.

>cloud provider can SSH into the VM

The point we were making was that CC was traditionally used to remove trust from cloud providers, but not the application provider. We are further removing trust from ourselves (as the application provider), and we can enable our customers (who could be other startups or neoclouds) to remove trust from themselves and prove that to their customers.

threeseed•3h ago
You are providing the illusion of trust though.

There are a multitude of components between my app and your service. You have secured one of them arguably the least important. But you can't provide any guarantees over say your API server that my requests are going through. Or your networking stack which someone e.g. a government could MITM.

osigurdson•3h ago
I don't know anything about "secure enclaves" but I assume that this part is sorted out. It should be possible to use http with it I imagine. If not, yeah it is totally dumb from a conceptual standpoint.
threeseed•4h ago
Cloud providers aren't going to care too much about this.

I have worked for many enterprise companies e.g. banks who are trialling AI and none of them have any use for something like this. Because the entire foundation of the IT industry is based on trusting the privacy and security policies of Azure, AWS and GCP. And in the decades since they've been around not heard of a single example of them breaking this.

The proposition here is to tell a company that they can trust Azure with their banking websites, identity services and data engineering workloads but not for their model services. It just doesn't make any sense. And instead I should trust a YC startup who statistically is going to be gone in a year and will likely have their own unique set of security and privacy issues.

Also you have the issue of smaller sized open source models e.g. DeepSeek R1 lagging far behind the bigger ones and so you're giving me some unnecessary privacy attestation at the expense of a model that will give me far better accuracy and performance.

amanda99•9h ago
Does this not require one to trust the hardware? I'm not an expert in hardware root of trust, etc, but if Intel (or whatever chip maker) decides to just sign code that doesn't do what they say it does (coerced or otherwise) or someone finds a vuln; would that not defeat the whole purpose?

I'm not entirely sure this is different than "security by contract", except the contracts get bigger and have more technology around them?

natesales•9h ago
We have to trust the hardware manufacturer (Intel/AMD/NVIDIA) designed their chips to execute the instructions we inspect, so we're assuming trust in vendor silicon either way.

The real benefit of confidential computing is to extend that trust to the source code too (the inference server, OS, firmware).

Maybe one day we’ll have truly open hardware ;)

ignoramous•7h ago
Hi Nate. Routinely your various networking-related FOSS tools. Surprising to see you now work in the AI infrastructure space let alone co-founding a startup funded by YC! Tinfoil looks über neat. All the best (:

> Maybe one day we'll have truly open hardware

At least the RoT/SE if nothing else: https://opentitan.org/

julesdrean•6h ago
Love Open Titan! RISC-V all the way babe! The team is bunker: several of my labmates now work there
rkagerer•6h ago
I agree, it's lifting trust to the manufacturer (which could still be an improvement over the cloud status quo).

Another (IMO more likely) scenario is someone finds a hardware vulnerability (or leaked signing keys) that let's them achieve a similar outcome.

max_•9h ago
The only way to guarantee privacy in cloud computing is via homorphic encryption.

This approach relies too much on trust.

If you have data you are seriously sensitive about, its better for you to run models locally on air gapped instances.

If you think this is an overkill, just see what happened to coinbase of recent. [0]

[0]: https://www.cnbc.com/2025/05/15/coinbase-says-hackers-bribed...

FrasiertheLion•9h ago
Yeah, totally agree with you. We would love to use FHE as soon as it's practical. And if you have the money and infra expertise to deploy air gapped LLMs locally, you should absolutely do that. We're trying to do the best we can with today's technology, in a way that is cheap and accessible to most people.
threeseed•3h ago
> The only way to guarantee privacy in cloud computing is via homorphic encryption

No. The only way is to not use cloud computing at all and go on-premise.

Which is what companies around the world do today for security or privacy critical workloads.

sigmaisaletter•8h ago
Looks great. Not sure how big the market is between "need max privacy, need on-prem" and "don't care, just use what is cheap/popular" tho.

Can you talk about how this relates to / is different / is differentiated from what Apple claimed to do during their last WWDC? They called it "private cloud compute". (To be clear, after 11 months, this is still "announced", with no implementation anywhere, as far as I can see.)

Here is their blog post on Apple Security, dated June 10: https://security.apple.com/blog/private-cloud-compute/

EDIT: JUST found the tinfoil blog post on exactly this topic. https://tinfoil.sh/blog/2025-01-30-how-do-we-compare

davidczech•8h ago
Private Cloud Compute has been in use since iOS 18 released.
sigmaisaletter•6h ago
It seems that PCC indeed went live with 18.1 - tho not in Europe (which is where I am located). Thanks for the heads up, I will look into this further.
DrBenCarson•7h ago
Private Cloud Compute has been live in production for 8 months
sigmaisaletter•6h ago
It seems that PCC indeed went live with 18.1 - tho not in Europe (which is where I am located). Thanks for the heads up, I will look into this further.
ts6000•7h ago
Companies like Edgeless Systems have been building open-source confidential computing for cloud and AI for years, they are open-source, and have published in 2024 how they compare to Apple Private Cloud Compute. https://www.edgeless.systems/blog/apple-private-cloud-comput...
_heimdall•1h ago
Anecdotal, but I work at a company offering an SMB product with LLM features. One of the first questions asked on any demo or sales call is what the privacy model for the LLM is, how the data is used, who has access to it, and can those features be disabled.
gojomo•8h ago
Is there a frozen client that someone could audit for assurance, then repeatedly use with your TEE-hosted backend?

If instead users must use your web-served client code each time, you could subtly alter that over time or per-user, in ways unlikely to be detected by casual users – who'd then again be required to trust you (Tinfoil), rather than the goal on only having to trust the design & chip-manufacturer.

FrasiertheLion•8h ago
Yes, we have a customer who is indeed interested in having a frozen client for their app, which we're making possible. We currently have not frozen our client because we're in the early days and want to be able to iterate quickly on functionality. But happy to do so on a case-by-case basis for customers.
ignoramous•7h ago
> rather than the goal on only having to trust the design & chip-manufacturer

If you'd rather self-host, then the HazyResearch Lab at Stanford recently announced a FOSS e2ee implementation ("Minions") for Inference: https://hazyresearch.stanford.edu/blog/2025-05-12-security / https://github.com/HazyResearch/Minions

computerbuster•8h ago
This is an incredibly robust solution to a really pressing problem for a lot of individuals/orgs who want to use/deploy reasonably powerful LLMs without paying through the nose for hardware. Others have mentioned the hyperscalers have solutions that make some amount of sense (Azure confidential computing, AWS nitro enclaves) but if you read a bit more about Tinfoil, it is clear they want to operate with far less explicit user trust (and thus much better security). This team is setting the standard for provably private LLM inference, and to me, it makes other solutions seem half-baked by comparison. Props to this talented group of people.
offmycloud•8h ago
> https://docs.tinfoil.sh/verification/attestation-architectur...

I tried taking a look at your documentation, but the site search is very slow and laggy in Firefox.

3s•8h ago
Interesting, we haven't noticed that (on Firefox as well). We'll look into it!
offmycloud•8h ago
It looks like it might be the blur effect in a VM with no Firefox video acceleration. Also, email to support@tinfoil.sh (from "contact" link) just bounced back to me.
FrasiertheLion•8h ago
Ah we don't have support@tinfoil.sh set up yet. Can you try contact@tinfoil.sh?
SebP•8h ago
Thats impressive, congrats. You've taken the "verifiable security" concept to the next level. I'm working on a similar concept, without "verifiable" part... trust remains to be built, but adding RAG ad fine tuned modelds to the use of open source LLMs, deployed in the cloud: https://gptsafe.ai/
japborst•7h ago
How do you see this compare to things like Amazon Bedrock, where it runs OSS in my own infra?
FrasiertheLion•7h ago
Bedrock has strong contractual guarantees, but it's still only a legal contract and runs on AWS infra. This is certainly okay for many use cases, we're trying to build for users who want verifiable privacy guarantees beyond legal contracts.

We're also doing more than pure inference, and trying to work with other companies who want to provide their users additional verifiability and confidentiality guarantees by running their entire private data processing pipeline on our platform.

binary132•7h ago
I love the brand and logo
ts6000•7h ago
NVIDIA shared open-source solutions for confidential AI already in mid-2024 https://developer.nvidia.com/blog/advancing-security-for-lar...
cuuupid•7h ago
This is a great concept but I think "Enterprise-Ready Security" and your competitive comparison chart are kind of misleading. Yes, zero trust is huge. But, virtually everyone who has a use case for max privacy AI, has that use case because of compliance and IP concerns. Enterprise-Ready Security doesn't mean sigstore or zero trust, it means you have both the security at a technical level as well as certification by an auditor that you do.

You aren't enterprise ready because to address those concerns you need to get the laundry list of compliance certs: SOC 2:2, ISO 27k1/2 and 9k1, HIPPA, GDPR, CMMC, FedRAMP, NIST, etc.

3s•7h ago
We're going through the audit process for SOC2 right now and we're planning on doing HIPPA soon
coolcase•7h ago
Tinfoil hat on: say you are compelled to execute a FISA warrant and access the LLM data, is it technically possible? What about an Australian or UK style "please add a backdoor".

I see you have to trust NVidia etc. so maybe there are such backdoors.

natesales•5h ago
An attacker would need to compromise our build pipeline to publish a backdoored VM image [1] and extract key material to forge an attestation from the hardware [2]. The build process publishes a hash of the code to Sigstore’s transparency log [3], which would make the attack auditable.

That said, a sufficiently resourced attacker wouldn’t need to inject a backdoor at all. If the attacker already possesses the keys (e.g. the attacker IS the hardware manufacturer, or they’ve coerced the manufacturer to hand the keys over), then they would just need to gain access to the host server (which we control) to get access to the hypervisor, then use their keys to read memory or launch a new enclave with a forged attestation. We're planning on writing a much more detailed blog post about "how to hack ourselves" in the future.

We actually plan to do an experiment at DEFCON, likely next year where we gives ssh access to a test machine running the enclave and have people try to exfiltrate data from inside the enclave while keeping the machine running.

[1] https://github.com/tinfoilsh/cvmimage

[2] https://arxiv.org/abs/2108.04575

[3] https://github.com/tinfoilsh/cvmimage/attestations

internetter•6h ago
> the client fetches a signed document from the enclave which includes a hash of the running code signed

Why couldn't the enclave claim to be running an older hash?

3s•6h ago
This is enforced by the hardware (that’s where the root of trust goes back to NVDIA+AMD). The hardware will only send back signed enclave hashes of the code it’s running and cannot be coerced by us (or anyone else) into responding with a fake or old measurement.
rkagerer•6h ago
What's your revenue model?

The pricing page implies you're basically reselling access to confidential-wrapped AI instances.

Since you rightly open-sourced the code (AGPL) is there anything stopping the cloud vendors from running and selling access to their own instances of your server-side magic?

Is your secret sauce the tooling to spin up and manage instances and ease customer UX? Do you aim to attract an ecosystem of turnkey, confidential applications running on your platform?

Do you envision an exit strategy that sells said secret sauce and customers to a cloud provider or confidential computing middleware provider?

Ps. Congrats on the launch.

FrasiertheLion•5h ago
>Since you rightly open-sourced the code (AGPL) is there anything stopping the cloud vendors from running and selling access to their own instances of your server-side magic?

Sure they can do that. Despite being open source, CC-mode on GPUs is quite difficult to work with especially when you start thinking about secrets management, observability etc, so we’d actually like to work with smaller cloud providers who want to provide this as a service and become competitive with the big clouds.

>Is your secret sauce the tooling to spin up and manage instances and ease customer UX?

Pretty much. Confidential computing has been around a while, and we still don’t see widespread adoption of it, largely because of the difficulty. If we're successful, we absolutely expect there to be a healthy ecosystem of competitors both cloud provider and startup.

>Do you envision an exit strategy that sells that secret sauce to a cloud provider or confidential computing middleware provider?

We’re not really trying to be a confidential computing provider, but more so, a verifiably private layer for AI. Which means we will try to make integration points as seamless as possible. For inference, that meant OpenAI API compatible client SDKs, we will eventually do the same for training/post-training, or MCP/OpenAI Agents SDK, etc. We want our integration points to be closely compatible with existing pipelines.

threeseed•3h ago
> Confidential computing has been around a while, and we still don’t see widespread adoption of it, largely because of the difficulty

This is not the reason at all. Complexity and difficult are inherent to large companies.

It's because it is a very low priority in an environment where for example there are tens of thousands of libraries in use, dozens of which will be in Production with active CVEs. And there are many examples of similar security and risk management issues that companies have to deal with.

Worrying about the integrity of the hardware or not trusting my cloud provider who has all my data in their S3 buckets anyway (which is encrypted using their keys) is not high on my list of concerns. And if it were I would be simply running on-premise anyway.

madars•4h ago
This is fantastic. One rarely discussed use case is avoiding overzealous "alignment" - you want models to help advance your goals without arbitrary refusals for benign inputs. Why would I want Anthropic or OpenAI to have filtering authority over my queries? Consider OpenRouter ToS - "you agree not to use the Service [..] in violation of any applicable AI Model Terms": not sure if they actually enforce it but, of course, I'd want hardware security attestations that they can't monitor or censor my inputs. Open models should be like utilities - the provider supplies the raw capability (e.g., electrons or water or inference), while usage responsibility remains entirely with the end user.
3s•3h ago
That's a big reason why we started Tinfoil and why we use it ourselves. I love the utilities analogy, something that is deeply integrated in business and personal use cases (like the Internet or AI) needs to have verifiable policies and options for data confidentiality.
osigurdson•3h ago
Here is a marketing campaign for you to prove that secure enclaves work.

Host a machine on the internet. Allow competitors to sign up to receive root ssh credentials. Offer a $10K prize if they are able to determine plaintext inputs and outputs over a given time period (say one month).

A bit of a strawman, but a competition like this might help build confidence.

FrasiertheLion•3h ago
That's exactly our plan for Defcon next year as Nate just mentioned: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=44000103

But making it a public competition is a fantastic idea.

kevinis•2h ago
Great work! I'm interested to know where the GPU servers are located. Are they in the US; do you run your own datacenter or rent servers on the hyperscalers?
FrasiertheLion•2h ago
Yes, in the US right now. We don't run our own datacenters, though we sometimes consider it in a moment of frustration when the provider is not able to get the correct hardware configuration and firmware versions. Currently renting bare metal servers from neoclouds. We can't use hyperscalers because we need bare metal access to the machine.
kevinis•2h ago
Thanks that's great to know. btw does a user need to trust Neoclouds in case they install malicious hardware/firmware/software on the servers?
FrasiertheLion•2h ago
That's the best part, you don't. You only need to trust NVIDIA and AMD/Intel. Modulo difficult to mount physical attacks and side channels, which we wrote more about here: https://tinfoil.sh/blog/2025-05-15-side-channels
kevinis•2h ago
Just noticed Tinfoil runs Deepseek-R1 "70b". Technically this is not the original 671b Deepseek R1; it's just a Llama-70b trained by Deepseek R1 (called "distillation").

Baby is healed with first personalized gene-editing treatment

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/15/health/gene-editing-personalized-rare-disorders.html
622•jbredeche•9h ago•276 comments

Cracked - method chaining/CSS-style selector web audio library

https://github.com/billorcutt/i_dropped_my_phone_the_screen_cracked
13•stephenhandley•1h ago•2 comments

A leap year check in three instructions

https://hueffner.de/falk/blog/a-leap-year-check-in-three-instructions.html
205•gnabgib•5h ago•71 comments

Teal – A statically-typed dialect of Lua

https://teal-language.org/
59•generichuman•3h ago•39 comments

Initialization in C++ is bonkers (2017)

https://blog.tartanllama.xyz/initialization-is-bonkers/
109•todsacerdoti•6h ago•78 comments

Ollama's new engine for multimodal models

https://ollama.com/blog/multimodal-models
26•LorenDB•2h ago•1 comments

Sitting for a long time shrinks your brain even if you exercise

https://alz-journals.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/alz.70157
25•codexon•3h ago•11 comments

Tek – A music making program for 24-bit Unicode terminals

https://codeberg.org/unspeaker/tek
99•smartmic•7h ago•13 comments

Launch HN: Tinfoil (YC X25): Verifiable Privacy for Cloud AI

109•FrasiertheLion•11h ago•82 comments

The unreasonable effectiveness of an LLM agent loop with tool use

https://sketch.dev/blog/agent-loop
251•crawshaw•8h ago•160 comments

NASA keeps ancient Voyager 1 spacecraft alive with Hail Mary thruster fix

https://www.theregister.com/2025/05/15/voyager_1_survives_with_thruster_fix/
143•nullhole•3h ago•17 comments

The current state of TLA⁺ development

https://ahelwer.ca/post/2025-05-15-tla-dev-status/
98•todsacerdoti•8h ago•23 comments

Rolling Highway

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rolling_highway
21•taubek•2d ago•9 comments

Lock-Free Rust: How to Build a Rollercoaster While It's on Fire

https://yeet.cx/blog/lock-free-rust/
21•r3tr0•2d ago•4 comments

I was a Theranos whistleblower. Here's what I think Elizabeth Holmes is up to

https://www.statnews.com/2025/05/15/theranos-whistleblower-tyler-shultz-commentary-elizabeth-holmes-billy-evans-haemanthus-startup/
62•iancmceachern•2h ago•26 comments

A Tiny Boltzmann Machine

https://eoinmurray.info/boltzmann-machine
225•anomancer•14h ago•39 comments

GTK Krell Monitors

https://gkrellm.srcbox.net/
28•Deeg9rie9usi•2d ago•12 comments

Show HN: Easel – Code multiplayer games like singleplayer

https://easel.games/about
54•BSTRhino•1d ago•32 comments

Dia – An Early Review

https://www.fldr.zip/blog/dia-review
3•wyxuan•2d ago•0 comments

Malicious compliance by booking an available meeting room

https://www.clientserver.dev/p/malicious-compliance-by-booking-an
314•jakevoytko•14h ago•293 comments

Show HN: Min.js style compression of tech docs for LLM context

https://github.com/marv1nnnnn/llm-min.txt
157•marv1nnnnn•14h ago•46 comments

"The Mind in the Wheel" lays out a new foundation for the science of mind

https://www.experimental-history.com/p/new-paradigm-for-psychology-just
53•CharlesW•9h ago•53 comments

Improving Naval Ship Acquisition

https://www.construction-physics.com/p/fixing-naval-ship-acquisition
44•Luc•9h ago•73 comments

Dr. Dobb's Journal interviews Jef Raskin (1986)

https://computeradsfromthepast.substack.com/p/dr-dobbs-journal-interviews-jef-raskin
67•rbanffy•9h ago•51 comments

In the US, a rotating detonation rocket engine takes flight

https://arstechnica.com/space/2025/05/venus-aerospace-flies-its-rotating-detonation-rocket-engine-for-the-first-time/
76•LorenDB•16h ago•59 comments

Fetii (YC S22) Is Hiring

https://www.ycombinator.com/companies/fetii/jobs/QDjleWs-senior-operations-manager-fetii
1•Mattiommi•10h ago

I don't like NumPy

https://dynomight.net/numpy/
371•MinimalAction•11h ago•161 comments

Refactoring Clojure

https://www.orsolabs.com/post/refactoring-clojure-1/
82•luu•8h ago•18 comments

Coinbase says hackers bribed staff to steal customer data, demanding $20M ransom

https://www.cnbc.com/2025/05/15/coinbase-says-hackers-bribed-staff-to-steal-customer-data-and-are-demanding-20-million-ransom.html
312•gpi•11h ago•343 comments

Pathfinding

https://juhrjuhr.itch.io/deep-space-exploitation/devlog/945428/9-pathfinding
122•sebg•15h ago•39 comments