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France's homegrown open source online office suite

https://github.com/suitenumerique
428•nar001•4h ago•203 comments

British drivers over 70 to face eye tests every three years

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c205nxy0p31o
133•bookofjoe•1h ago•109 comments

Start all of your commands with a comma (2009)

https://rhodesmill.org/brandon/2009/commands-with-comma/
437•theblazehen•2d ago•157 comments

Leisure Suit Larry's Al Lowe on model trains, funny deaths and Disney

https://spillhistorie.no/2026/02/06/interview-with-sierra-veteran-al-lowe/
26•thelok•1h ago•2 comments

Hoot: Scheme on WebAssembly

https://www.spritely.institute/hoot/
86•AlexeyBrin•5h ago•16 comments

OpenCiv3: Open-source, cross-platform reimagining of Civilization III

https://openciv3.org/
778•klaussilveira•19h ago•241 comments

Stories from 25 Years of Software Development

https://susam.net/twenty-five-years-of-computing.html
35•vinhnx•3h ago•4 comments

First Proof

https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.05192
38•samasblack•2h ago•23 comments

Software Factories and the Agentic Moment

https://factory.strongdm.ai/
19•mellosouls•2h ago•17 comments

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback

https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.12501
56•onurkanbkrc•4h ago•3 comments

The Waymo World Model

https://waymo.com/blog/2026/02/the-waymo-world-model-a-new-frontier-for-autonomous-driving-simula...
1027•xnx•1d ago•584 comments

Coding agents have replaced every framework I used

https://blog.alaindichiappari.dev/p/software-engineering-is-back
172•alainrk•4h ago•226 comments

Vocal Guide – belt sing without killing yourself

https://jesperordrup.github.io/vocal-guide/
168•jesperordrup•10h ago•62 comments

A Fresh Look at IBM 3270 Information Display System

https://www.rs-online.com/designspark/a-fresh-look-at-ibm-3270-information-display-system
24•rbanffy•4d ago•5 comments

StrongDM's AI team build serious software without even looking at the code

https://simonwillison.net/2026/Feb/7/software-factory/
17•simonw•2h ago•15 comments

Unseen Footage of Atari Battlezone Arcade Cabinet Production

https://arcadeblogger.com/2026/02/02/unseen-footage-of-atari-battlezone-cabinet-production/
103•videotopia•4d ago•27 comments

Vinklu Turns Forgotten Plot in Bucharest into Tiny Coffee Shop

https://design-milk.com/vinklu-turns-forgotten-plot-in-bucharest-into-tiny-coffee-shop/
5•surprisetalk•5d ago•0 comments

72M Points of Interest

https://tech.marksblogg.com/overture-places-pois.html
12•marklit•5d ago•0 comments

Show HN: Look Ma, No Linux: Shell, App Installer, Vi, Cc on ESP32-S3 / BreezyBox

https://github.com/valdanylchuk/breezydemo
265•isitcontent•20h ago•33 comments

Making geo joins faster with H3 indexes

https://floedb.ai/blog/how-we-made-geo-joins-400-faster-with-h3-indexes
152•matheusalmeida•2d ago•42 comments

Monty: A minimal, secure Python interpreter written in Rust for use by AI

https://github.com/pydantic/monty
277•dmpetrov•20h ago•147 comments

Ga68, a GNU Algol 68 Compiler

https://fosdem.org/2026/schedule/event/PEXRTN-ga68-intro/
35•matt_d•4d ago•10 comments

Hackers (1995) Animated Experience

https://hackers-1995.vercel.app/
546•todsacerdoti•1d ago•263 comments

Sheldon Brown's Bicycle Technical Info

https://www.sheldonbrown.com/
418•ostacke•1d ago•110 comments

What Is Ruliology?

https://writings.stephenwolfram.com/2026/01/what-is-ruliology/
65•helloplanets•4d ago•69 comments

Show HN: I spent 4 years building a UI design tool with only the features I use

https://vecti.com
364•vecti•22h ago•164 comments

Show HN: Kappal – CLI to Run Docker Compose YML on Kubernetes for Local Dev

https://github.com/sandys/kappal
16•sandGorgon•2d ago•4 comments

Show HN: If you lose your memory, how to regain access to your computer?

https://eljojo.github.io/rememory/
338•eljojo•22h ago•207 comments

An Update on Heroku

https://www.heroku.com/blog/an-update-on-heroku/
457•lstoll•1d ago•301 comments

Microsoft open-sources LiteBox, a security-focused library OS

https://github.com/microsoft/litebox
372•aktau•1d ago•195 comments
Open in hackernews

Eavesdropping on Internal Networks via Unencrypted Satellites

https://satcom.sysnet.ucsd.edu/
218•Bogdanp•3mo ago

Comments

bigfatkitten•3mo ago
I’m not sure where the novelty is in this research. It’s basically reporting something that has been universally known for decades.
pmontra•3mo ago
Universally known to whoever wanted to intercept that traffic.

Maybe and hopefully not known to the staff of those networks (the current staff could be maintaining what somebody else set up) as some of those companies fixed the problem when contacted by the researchers.

For sure not known to me and a lot of other people. I believed that everything in digital streams was encrypted. Ok, those ATM connections are probably tech from the 90s, but they probably had upgrades in part because of regulations. Privacy, security, nothing?

everdrive•3mo ago
It's an interesting problem. The reality is that for any decently-sized business people don't really know their networks. Their assumptions are sane, but often simply incorrect. I've heard a lot of people say things like "well the traffic is not going externally, so it's fine to leave it unencrypted." It's a bold, and almost always unchecked assumption.
Spooky23•3mo ago
Even when the assumptions are correct, you’re depending on people doing their jobs correctly.

Over the years, I’ve found shockingly bad failures, usually on areas of internal networks where there is ambiguity as to what internal org is responsible. In old companies with data centers and cloud, there’s often pretty bad gaps.

noir_lord•3mo ago
It doesn't help that practising even reasonable security comes at such a cost many orgs find reasons to not justify doing it - we've spent decades creating systems that are difficult to secure at every level and hand waving it away and now it's a wobbly jenga tower of systems.
everdrive•3mo ago
This is a major issue I have with cybersecurity articles. They're often quite clever and interesting, but the real companies I've worked for can barely implement SSO, MFA, software updates, pay for logging, write worthwhile detections, etc. The basics are quite well understood, but no one seems to acknowledge that hardly anyone can actually manage the basics.
noir_lord•3mo ago
My experience as well, my background is enterprise development - mostly what would be classed as the M in SME (Small-Medium Enterprise) with forays into the big E and all of them fell down on even basic security in so many many ways.

Example: at the largest place I worked (5000 staff, 200 in Dev/QA) I found out by accident that the outsourced devs where using personal laptops when in a sprint meeting I asked where someone was and got back "His work machine died, he's nipped home to get his personal laptop".

That company constantly raved about how good it's security posture was...

I spoke to my oppo number on the IT/platform team and his response was "yeah we know that happens, I've been trying to get them to ban it/make it impossible for a while".

TZubiri•3mo ago
Correct, this is why HTTPS (and encryption in general over the network) has become so popular. This property of traffic being intercepteable is also present in cable traffic as well, it's not hard to intercept traffic, you just find a tap, plug in a cable and observe, it's not even obviously illegal, there are many legitimate reasons to plug in a cable in a tap in the public, so there's a lot of possible alibis.
ErroneousBosh•3mo ago
Unlike wired traffic, you're blasting this all over a huge patch of ground that's possibly as large as 1/3 the surface of the earth.

You could be getting listened to from anywhere.

TZubiri•3mo ago
Right. But that's ok. We do not depend on the L1 signal being private, we assume it is public.
bigfatkitten•3mo ago
There is a weird assumption throughout the comments on this post that satellite hops are somehow different in this respect. They are not.
ErroneousBosh•3mo ago
I mean, the article is literally about people squirting unencrypted traffic over the bent pipe.

People do this.

You can't assume that the people you pay to handle your traffic are doing it properly. You or I know not to do this, but it looks like we are not running large phone companies.

natch•3mo ago
Define “known.” To those of us who have only heard rumors, it’s good validation.
bigfatkitten•3mo ago
In this case, well-publicised in research presented at major conferences, and in associated media reporting over multiple decades.
natch•3mo ago
It’s also known that things get better over decades even if problems have been reported in the past, so it’s good information here showing that the problems are not yet fixed.
lukeinator42•3mo ago
The paper seems to highlight that the novelty is in their general parser that worked across 39 different GEO satellites, and that it works with a couple hundred dollars of consumer grade equipment. From the paper:

"Our technical contributions include:

(1) We introduce a new method to self-align a motorized dish to improve signal quality. Specifically, we could receive IP traffic from 14.3% of all global Ku-band satellites from a single location with high signal quality and low error rate.

(2) We developed a general GEO traffic parser that can blindly decode IP packets from seven different protocol stacks that we observed in our scans. Five of these stacks have never been reported in any public research we are aware of."

matthewdgreen•3mo ago
By next year encryption will be vastly more prevalent across geostationary satellite links, and it will be entirely due to this research (the actual mechanism being “everyone who ‘knew’ this internally now being empowered to fix it, rather than uselessly ‘know’ it, because now it’s public and newsworthy and embarrassing.”)

I’ll let other people comment on the actual novel elements of the research, because those exist too. But I want to point out that some huge portion of the value of public security research is really “intellectual garbage pickup”: calling out bad technical debt that “everyone knew about” and turning it into actionable security upgrades. Security research is a good part of the reason it’s mostly safe to browse the web on public Internet connections, when it wasn’t a decade ago.

PS As someone who is very cynical about security deployment, even I thought cellular network backhauls would all be encrypted as a matter of course by now, at least in the US.

bigfatkitten•3mo ago
What makes this paper so unique, compared with the dozens of others that have preceded it (and attracted coverage in the tech media) over that past 20 years that it is going to drive such rapid change?

Black Hat, DEF CON etc seem to have a presentation just about every year that can be summarised as “DVB-S is fair game if you have a few hundred bucks and a quiet afternoon.”

Here’s a decent history of the state of play up to 2009. The authors recognised back then that this is already ground well covered.

http://archive.hack.lu/2009/Playing%20with%20SAT%201.2%20-%2...

And more of the same from 2020.

https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2028/DEF%20CON%20Safe%20M...

Then you’ve got coverage of the cool applications of this property of VSAT hops, such as the Russian intelligence services using it as a malware exfiltration vector.

https://media.kaspersky.com/pdf/SatTurla_Solution_Paper.pdf

matthewdgreen•3mo ago
I know the authors so I’m aware of the intense amount of responsible disclosure they’ve been doing, and the very substantial behind-the-scenes impact this is having. So maybe the difference is the scope of this, the number of protocols and vendors they were able to detect and attack in one go, and also the way they’re approaching disclosure. In other words they’re being much more systematic in every aspect of the research, disclosure and re-analysis. I expect some people won’t take seriously and there will be more papers in the future.

I mean another way to put this is: maybe there’s a problem if you can say “there’s loads of previous work” and yet massive and systemic problems still exist. Where that problem is (holistic nature of the research or the disclosure process) is probably something you could drill down into. But you’ve basically admitted the previous research didn’t do the job, so all we’re doing is haggling about the price.

serf•3mo ago
>But you’ve basically admitted the previous research didn’t do the job, so all we’re doing is haggling about the price.

it's a poor metric -- research doesn't exist to drive policy, but it does aid in decision making.

There are global policies around the world that make no damn sense from even a basic scientific understanding, with little to no research done.

If some research is done, a policy maker is pointed at it, and the only response is a shoulder-shrug you don't shit-can the research and do it over -- you appoint vocal political types to campaign on the existing research.

matthewdgreen•3mo ago
I’ve been involved in research that lead to major changes in TLS deployments across the Internet and so I can tell you that (1) research absolute can and should be structured to drive security improvements! You’re crazy if you think that isn’t an important goal. And (2) the way you structure, identify and disclose findings matters a lot when considering how well you achieve this goal.

Just to give an example of effective change-driving work: I would argue that persistent efforts via tools like Shodan and Censys have done a huge amount to clean up the Internet, at least as compared to one-off research efforts followed by “appoint activists to do the rest.” The reason is that companies respond to persistent measurement campaigns in a way that they don’t respond to one-off PR dings.

Most of the research you cite is pretty obscure and you’d have to search for it. Most of it didn’t get a lot of follow-up. When some of the firms with unencrypted backhauls were contacted by the current researchers, they didn’t even know that their backhauls were unencrypted. Finding and communicating this stuff, then following up on it relentlessly is the difference between “we knew and nobody did anything” and “it got fixed.”

Also don’t think for a second the vocal political types can do this work without constant communication from researchers who are willing to continue this work over a period of years.

voidUpdate•3mo ago
Well according to TFA, this has gotten three satellite providers to fix it so far
bigfatkitten•3mo ago
Unless you’re buying some sort of end-to-end managed WAN service, there is nothing for the satellite provider to “fix”. It’s the customer’s responsibility.

The spacecraft carries a bunch of linear transponders. RF goes in on one frequency, and comes out on another frequency.

The satellite operator leases you space on a transponder with a specified frequency, bandwidth and power limit, that they monitor very closely for compliance to ensure that you aren’t getting more than you paid for and that you aren’t causing interference.

Everything else about the signal from layer 1 upwards, ie the modulation, symbol rate, FEC etc is largely for the customer to choose, though some operators like Intelsat used to be a bit more prescriptive in this respect. None are looking at your protocol stack from L2 upwards.

Nextgrid•3mo ago
Previously: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=45575391
dang•3mo ago
Thanks! Macroexpanded:

Don’t Look Up: Sensitive internal links in the clear on GEO satellites [pdf] - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=45575391 - Oct 2025 (138 comments)

ZiiS•3mo ago
Seems very odd to list HTTPS. Intercepting traffic which is only encrypted at a different network layer, is not in any meaningful way intercepting unencrypted traffic.
jeroenhd•3mo ago
HTTPS still exposes hostnames in most cases, so you can get a gist of wat someone is doing on the internet even if you can't see the exact contents.

The unencrypted transmissions (SMS, phone calls) are much more interesting to listen in on, of course.

pyuser583•3mo ago
A director of the NSA once said something like "we launch missiles based on metadata alone."
promptdaddy•3mo ago
"We kill people based on metadata" Michael Haydon

Had to look that up.

themafia•3mo ago
Now they're killing people based on language models. It always cracks me up that the big worry with available AI is that people will somehow use it to manipulate other people on the internet; meanwhile, the government has turned it into an assassination tool.
stopbulying•3mo ago
While AI language models can emulate legal and judicial language, they are not sufficient substitutes for Due Process of Law because they have a comparably unacceptable wrongful conviction rate given that there are "hallucinations" and false citations.
worik•3mo ago
But they are doing it in secret.

"Due process be damned" is the apparent attitude

zzrrt•3mo ago
I’m aware of rumors about Israel using AI in war, but where are you hearing of it being used in legal and judicial settings? Besides a few lawyers getting caught and sanctioned, I don’t think it’s happening much.
bayindirh•3mo ago
Here's an article: https://jacobin.com/2025/10/ice-zignal-surveillance-social-m...

...and some quote from it:

> One Zignal pamphlet from this year advertises the company’s work with the Israeli military, saying its data analytics platform provides “tactical intelligence” to “operators on the ground” in Gaza. The pamphlet also highlights Zignal’s work with the US Marines and the State Department.

psunavy03•3mo ago
Jacobin is hardly a credible source.
bayindirh•3mo ago
Zignal's document is linked in the article. IDF's logo is in that linked document.

Don't believe me or Jacobin. Verify yourself.

zzrrt•3mo ago
I don’t think this really answers the question, how is AI being used in legal and judicial contexts? Not military and executive agencies. State Department maybe overlaps a bit, but no detail is given about what contexts they are using it in.
bayindirh•3mo ago
I replied to the "rumors of Israeli's use of AI in war" part. Not for the legal & judicial contexts.

If I found anything on that regard, I'll post them, too.

megous•3mo ago
Not rummors. It's certain that Israel is using AI in war.

IDF has massive contracts with american companies to provide AI services for variety of purposes, and confirms its use itself:

https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-ai-technology...

miki123211•3mo ago
This is not the "right" way to use AI to kill people.

AI lets you do sigint and treat it a lot more like humint. You can e.g. wiretap everybody a suspected terrorist has called in the last year, transcribe all their conversations and pass them through an AI model which flags anything "concerning."

Unlike traditional approaches, AI can distinguish between "bomb" in the context of playing counter strike, discussing a news report and planning an actual terrorist attack.

It can't do anything a human can't do, but it's orders of magnitude cheaper, especially if you can't outsource the human labor due to natsec concerns.

freddie_mercury•3mo ago
Because manipulating billions of people a year is worse than assassinating 500 a year? Doesn't seem hard to figure out.
themafia•3mo ago
I could not possibly disagree more.

Would you mind if one of the 500 was your mother? What if it was you? Would you still be so cavalier?

wahern•3mo ago
> People are now planting bombs in the tramways of Algiers. My mother might be on one of those tramways. If that is justice, then I prefer my mother.

-- Albert Camus

Contextualized: https://archive.org/details/AlbertCamusArthurGoldhammerAlice...

matthewdgreen•3mo ago
Hostnames, IP addresses and maybe occasionally an HTTP connection that lets you tie all that metadata to an actual human identity.
userbinator•3mo ago
This reminds me of what happened decades ago: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Television_receive-only

tl;dr: Satellite TV signals were originally unencrypted and one would watch TV for free with a suitable receiver, but the broadcasters didn't like that, resulting in them eventually being encrypted.

donatj•3mo ago
Would the signals being unencrypted potentially open them to signal hijacking like the Max Headroom incident?