"Signal’s settings include an option that prevents the actual message content from being previewed in notifications. However, it appears the defendant did not have that setting enabled, which, in turn, seemingly allowed the system to store the content in the database."
Second, how can I see this notification history?
HOURS=6
EPOCH_DIFF=978307200
SINCE=$(echo "$(date +%s) - $EPOCH_DIFF - $HOURS * 3600" | bc)
sqlite3 ~/Library/Group\ Containers/group.com.apple.usernoted/db2/db \
"SELECT r.delivered_date, COALESCE(a.identifier, 'unknown'), hex(r.data)
FROM record r
LEFT JOIN app a ON r.app_id = a.app_id
WHERE r.delivered_date > $SINCE
ORDER BY r.delivered_date ASC;" \
| while IFS='|' read -r cfdate bundle hexdata; do
date -r $(echo "$cfdate + $EPOCH_DIFF" | bc | cut -d. -f1) '+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S'
echo " app: $bundle"
echo "$hexdata" | xxd -r -p > /tmp/notif.plist
plutil -p /tmp/notif.plist 2>/dev/null \
| grep -E '"(titl|title|subt|subtitle|body|message)"' \
| sed 's/^ */ /'
echo "---"
done
Basically, notifications are in an sqlite db at ~/Library/Group Containers/group.com.apple.usernoted/db2/db and are stored as plist blobs.In recent years, filesystem paths for system services have started to converge for both macOS and iOS so I'm thinking with jailbreak you could get read access to that database and get the same data out of it.
Android > Settings > Notifications > Manage > Notification History
But this is a reminder that these centralized notification infrastructure (FCM and APNs) store notification content (if the app is told to send content in it - signal with option enabled wouldn't send content) even if we clear local history these middleman still hold it
If you drop a settings widget on your home screen, it will let you choose a specific area, including notifications.
I don't know if the output is the complete database.
But it was really useful each time I did not see a notification in time.
Hopefully, you meant to write "shortcut"...
Since the purposes of the program are pretty heavy on private communication, I'm inclined to think that takes precedence here, especially considering the consequences for dropping default message previews versus adding default reveal of supposedly private information.
An individual can disable name or content in notifications in iOS, or set "mute messages" for a chat to prevent notifications from appearing for that specific chat, but there's nothing that gives group members any assurance that other group members are doing that.
I've found other ways Signal can leak information, even with disappearing messages. It's not the total install-and-be-done privacy screen that some people think it is, and requires a little effort at the user end to fill in a few gaps.
I've had this enabled to prevent sensitive messages from appearing in full whilst showing someone something on my phone, but I guess this is an added benefit as well.
Settings > Notifications > Messages > Show
Deleting that history is good to know about after the fact, but preferably lets just not create the problem.
But most likely (pure speculation mind you), this was a case of someone handing over the phone for review and where cooperating.
It might have been that they deleted signal some time ago, or even deleted signal and then handed over the phone.
It's notable that the data wasn't recovered from signals storage (was the data securely erased or that kind of recovery not attempted?).
Critical distinction, as merely changing OS notification settings will simply prevent notification content from being displayed on-screen.
If the app generates them, the OS receives them. That's why the Signal app offers this setting.
"To use the Signal desktop app, Signal must first be installed on your phone."
The only one I can think of that doesn't require a mobile login is iMessage, because it's not a chat app, it's lock in and data theft disguised as software
They rest who "evaluate their threat models" can practice Spy-life-gymnastics by disabling it from Signal.
The article you're commenting on is about people who obviously would have wanted this disabled, but didn't have it disabled, presumably because they didn't know about this issue.
I'm not sure precisely how the NAND controller responds to requests for raw data from blocks with "deleted" data. And if this would require decapping the flash.
Some flash will happily let you see the data and delay erasing it.
Generally flash is non deterministic about when blocks even those with entirely stale data are erased . It might be years before the block is reused due to wear leveling algorithms and it might retain data that entire time.
Here's hoping the controller for phones which hold sensitive data are more active
0. https://www.404media.co/fbi-extracts-suspects-deleted-signal...
Court cases are the real way to audit security.
Larping about security and complaining about companies responding to court orders only gets you so far. Its way more useful to look at what actually happens in reality.
Photos I had long deleted were still in the backup! It's quite surprising just how much is being stored by the phone.
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